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Over the past few decades, the large scale of imprisonment and the heavily-adopted 
punitive approach as a way of responding to crime have engendered widespread 
concerns among the public and academia in the UK. Whereas there have been a good 
number of studies that have investigated their underlying sociological causes and 
elaborated a variety of accounts of how such phenomena are historically configured 
and how they may be moderated or reversed, the normative dimensions of the current 
imprisonment complex have not yet received sufficient examination. This 
particularly regards the understanding of the tensions between the aspiration for a 
universal ideal of imprisonment and the reality of highly diverse and fragmented 
post-welfarist approaches in the incarceration field. 
 
This thesis tries to uncover and account for the dilemmas and problems in the 
normative sphere of incarceration in the UK. In doing so, it elaborates the analytical-























a. Declining prospects for the universal ideal of imprisonment 
 
About half a century ago, there were widespread expectations among criminologists 
in the UK and the US that the prison would be improved materially with the progress 
of positive social science and would ultimately become a rationalised institution 
within the criminal justice system. Many of them - including Norval Morris (1965: 
268), one of the leading American criminologists - then believed that the old form of 
prison would become extinct, and would be replaced by ‘quite different social 
organizations’ which are more effective and morally defensible in responding to 
crime and treating offenders. This confidence in the prospects of prison reform was 
also displayed in the tone of a number of government reports during that period.
1
   
  
However, when the pages of the calendar have been turned over to reach the 21
st
 
century, the reality that we face appears to be quite the opposite: penal policy-
making in these two countries is more often dominated by mass-media fuelled 
punitive appeals than by thoughtful approaches buttressed by professional knowledge, 
meanwhile the scale and the proportion of the population that are detained in prisons 
and other custodial institutions have reached a stunningly high level (Garland, 2001a 
& 2001b; Simon, 2007; Millie. et al., 2003 and Bosworth, 2010b).  
 
                                                 
1
 This was reflected in several key post-war government white papers in the UK including Penal 




What is notable as well is the blighted faith in the holistic approach per se in making 
prison a meaningful place for both its inmates and society. The penal welfarist 
project which promises the social reintegration of prisoners was once embraced as 
the authoritative route to prison reform, but this approach has waned markedly since 
the ‘nothing works’ attack in the 1970s. Since its downfall, we cannot yet observe or 
even envisage any successors which can take its place by providing another holistic 
paradigm for the purpose of guiding custodial practice. Although in recent years 
certain elements of the past welfarist scheme - particularly those relating to prisoner-
rehabilitation programmes - are found to be reviving in political rhetorics and in a 
variety of institutional sectors of imprisonment in the two countries, they can hardly 
be taken as the sign of the resurrection of rehabilitation as a holistic paradigm to 
transform the whole spectrum of incarceration practice.
2
  Instead, coexisting with 
multiple divergent and competing approaches in the field, they indicate how diverse 
and fragmented the normative landscape of imprisonment is.
3
 Compared with the 
heyday of the welfarist prison reform project, the perception that the prison system is 
‘beyond hope’ is quite overwhelming today and it seems to rule out any attempts to 
systematically reorganise the prison systems and subject them to thorough 
moralisation.  
 
What occurred in the imprisonment field is part of the changes in the broad penal 
realm which has been the subject of analyses in extensive contemporary 
criminological literature (e.g., Garland, 2001a; Loader, 2006; Allen, 1981 and 
Martinson, 1974). To understand it properly, we need first of all a clear idea about 
penal welfarism, the fate of which, as we mentioned above, characterised the very 
contour of the ‘problem zones’ of the current imprisonment sphere. The major 
objective of penal welfarism is the rehabilitation and reintegration of offenders, 
which also sets the organising principle for the penal institutions.  In practice, the 
realisation of the rehabilitative goal relies heavily on the development of ‘human 
science’, which provides the theoretical tool, expertise and techniques for the 
individualised assessment and treatment of the offender. The whole network of 
welfarist penality can range from the practice of probation, after care, licenced 
                                                 
2
 See, e.g., Robinson (2008) and Green (2013). We will also discuss this point in Chapter 5 (II.ii).   
3
 We will elaborate this point at greater length shortly (in section I.i.c).  
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supervision, reformatory schools and juvenile correction centres to various 
preventive-detention institutions and ordinary prisons. Under this system each 
offender or deviant is assessed and categorised according to her own background, 
history, youth, character and corrigibility, and those highly individualised factors 
form the basis for the decision-making regarding what particular treatment she is to 
receive and which institution is to accommodate her. In principle, those who are not 
yet fully criminalised and who are about to return to normal life after a period of 
correctional treatment are brought under the supervision of penal sectors which are 
closest to normal society and whose operational patterns mainly aim to inculcate the 
proper attitudes and norms so that their candidates can satisfy the requirements of 
good citizenship (e.g., in the case of probation and after-care). Those whose case is 
more serious than the former but who are deemed as within the capacity of corrective 
training are under the authority of treatment programmes in a variety of specialised 
reformative institutions as well as prisons. The design of those programmes is 
oriented to suit differentiated rehabilitative or educational needs of individual 
offenders. Finally, the ‘dangerous offenders’ who are judged as incapable of 
reformation are subjected to the penal patterns which are designed to detain them in 
secure environment and prevent them from harming the normal society (usually in 
the form of long-term or indeterminate custody).  
 
Those three major elements of welfarist penality are summarised by Garland (1985) 
as the ‘normalising’, ‘correctional’ and ‘segregative’ sectors, which, in their 
operation, are interrelated with one another. And just as he observes, in spite of the 
official representation of the welfarist penal patterns which routinely highlight their 
liberal and modernising features, they form a ‘a more extensive and refined network 
of control’ than the previous penal regimes (1985: 234). It is a network which places 
the population sector which fails (to various degrees) to meet the requirements of the 
mainstream social order and labour market within the parameters of its discipline and 
supervision and which in effect serves as the default solution to the unsuccessful 
integration of civic social institutions (schools, workplaces and families). In this 
respect, the regime of welfarist penality has an immanent coercive and suppressive 
element. Whereas the existence of differentiated penal patterns can somewhat have 
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the effect of relieving the severity of the suppressive side of welfarist penality by 
presenting a variety of relatively mild forms of intervention, its total justification can 
only be conceived in a more general ideological framework. This is provided in the 
social ideal which underpinned the flourishing of the welfare state: according to it, a 
good society should not be a simple aggregate of atomic individuals who are bound 
to pursue their own fate and face the risks of modern life with their own resources, 
but should be a moral community which seeks to embrace the individual members 
with its care and support, and which takes the responsibility to protect them from 
various risks generated in modern society. In the perspective of this holistic social 
ideal, the deviants and offenders also fall within the scope of the collective care; their 
law breaking acts are considered more as the result of personality pathology (which 
is usually diagnosed in connection with social pathologies) than free and independent 
choice. The penal process is thus conceived primarily in terms of diagnosis and 
therapy rather than retribution.  Whereas it becomes normatively inappropriate to 
impose pains and restriction simple to punish, they are justifiable if they are 
unavoidable in the rehabilitative process, for such imposition is necessary to achieve 
the desired social inclusion and solidarity, which imply the recognition of the equal 
membership of deviants and offenders in this community as well.  
 
In the welfarist scheme, the prison functions in tandem with the other sectors of 
intervention. As Garland (1985: 28) observes, the structural status of the prison in the 
penal realm amounts to an ‘endpoint on an extended network of ‘‘alternatives to 
imprisonment’’ and specialist establishments’. Its own practice is then organised and 
undertaken in accordance with the general aim of rehabilitative and integration, 
which also serves as the very source of its justification. This means, the use of 
incarceration is prescribed by the welfarist scheme as the necessary measure for the 
pursuit of its ideal of social integration and solidarity:  the infliction of restriction of 
freedom and suppression is held as defendable when it is inevitably involved in the 
correctional process that aims to include the prisoners within this social ideal and 
protect both them and society. 
4
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 Due to the limits of the present work, we can only offer a brief and schematic discussion about the 




Whereas the above discussion is concerned with the contours of the key features of 
penal welfarism and the role of imprisonment in it, it does not imply that they have 
uniform performance in all penal realms. In the case of the UK and the US, the 
penal-welfare approach is observed to emerge in the 1890s, have its rigorous 
development in 1950s and 1960s and become the established framework in the penal 
field by 1970s (Garland, 2001a).  This process, however, did not result in the total 
denial of the penal systems that had been in place already; rather, the correctional 
element was in effect overlapped with the existing legal framework of criminal 
justice (including the due process principle). In this regard, it is implausible to 
observe a ‘totalised’ penal welfarist regime in reality:  the defining feature and major 
objective of welfarism – rehabilitation and social integration –had uneven impact on 
different sectors of penal practice and different jurisdictions. For the same reason, the 
decline of the welfarist paradigm was also not a thorough and concurrent breakdown. 
Whereas the ‘nothing works’ attack produced most discernible effect in the US, 
England and Wales, where the allegiance to the penal welfarist project decreased at a 
dramatic speed since the 1970s, in Scotland the rehabilitative ideal was kept 




The above discussion about the penal welfarist scheme also outlines what existed 
right before the current imprisonment complex and thus provides a rather familiar 
case for comparison. In the paragraphs below, we will see what is acutely absent in 
the post-welfarist imprisonment field, which creates a crucial predicament for the 
normative foundation of the contemporary incarceration practice.  
 
Indeed, the material status quo of incarceration may be able to be improved, and 
even the current ‘punitive’ penal atmosphere may turn out to be ‘volatile’ and 
reversible, especially when we take into account the fact that crime rates in the two 
countries have been dropping continuously since the 1990s (O’Malley, 1999; Tonry, 
                                                                                                                                          
we will try to make further elaboration about its ideological performance and its connection with 
universal normativity.  
5
 There have been a voluminous body of studies on the social, political and cultural factors 
underpinning the decline of penal welfarism and its differential situations across jurisdictions; some of 
those key texts have been mentioned already.  
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2001a and Zimring, 2007). However, we can hardly expect those potential changes, 
positive as they may be, to automatically lead to the restoration of the normative 
integrity of custodial institutions and to reveal a morally desirable future for them. It 
is a challenge that is more fundamental in nature.  
 
Unlike many other modern institutions, prison is based on the exercise of coercive 
power and the severe restrictions which are imposed on its inmates. It is not about 
the distribution and optimisation of economic gains, or equal political participation, 
but involves the deprivation of an individual’s fundamental rights, the pains and 
sufferings of concrete persons. In contemporary societies which increasingly praise 
personal choice and mobility, its suppressive and intrusive character stands out rather 
distinctively.  To justify the use of incarceration thus raises standards that are far 
stricter than those of economic and political institutions.  
 
In the penal welfarist scheme, as we have just discussed, the justification of the 
coercive aspect of imprisonment was made possible on the basis of the promise of a 
just and inclusive society which accepts the deviants and offenders as its members as 
well as the law-abiding majority. The individualistic approach, which was the most 
prominent penological paradigm that preceded penal welfarism, provided a different 
solution to this problem. Instead of building the legitimacy of the prison on any ideal 
of the desired state of society, it resorts to the philosophy of universal moral order 
which determines both the justifiability and the boundary of punishment. Under this 
perspective, the offender is viewed as an individual subject who is characterised by 
the same moral autonomy, reason, liberty as every other free and rationale individual 
subject in society. Accordingly, as the act of committing crime is associated with the 
choice of a free moral being, punishment becomes the logic response to it. It is not 
just morally permissible, but also morally required, for it is the necessary step to 
restore the normative order disturbed by the unjust behaviour of criminal offense and 
to hold the subject responsible for what she has chosen to do. One typical case is the 
late Victorian penal system in the UK. Following the individualistic philosophy of 
punishment, the imprisonment regime in this period (1865 -1895) was characterised 
by standardised practice and ‘uniformity’, which aimed to make sure that the 
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offenders are treated ‘exactly alike’. On the other hand, the rehabilitative end was 
just expressed as something to hope for, which was secondary compared to the moral 
purpose of punishment in the Victorian imagination (Garland, 1985). Though the two 
previously dominant penal paradigms have stark differences in their ways of 
moralising the imposition of custody, both of them link the purpose and operational 
principles of the prison with certain holistic normative schemes. In the absence of a 
faith in ultimate and universal goodness, it would be considerably harder for those 
modern penal designers and reformers to conceive a regime whose routine operation 
involves the imposition of deprivations on individuals as great and fundamental as 
those that prison imposes.  
 
However, this awkward situation now besets much of the contemporary 
imprisonment field. In the UK and the US, in particular, the aspiration to formulate 
universal ideals to guide and legitimise the practice of incarceration is now 
observably at a low ebb. This is not merely reflected in the abandonment of 
traditional universal penal ideologies, but also in the particular circumstances in the 
post-welfarist imprisonment field which render it difficult for any allegiance to a new 
universal paradigm to take shape and become consolidated. The current 
imprisonment field is characterised by the coexistence of multiple deeply diversified 
theoretical approaches, discourses and practical strategies, ranging from resurgent 
liberal prison policy proposals to ‘prison works’ rhetoric, and from actuarial risk 
management logic to radical abolitionist claims.
6
 This situation also renders the 
current normative spectrum of approaches to imprisonment highly fragmentary and 
divided. The advocates of prisoners’ rights from a liberal point of view, for example, 
often find themselves in deep disagreement with the ‘tough on crime’ approach and 
the stringent prison policies buttressed by many tabloid papers and politicians. The 
disagreement cannot be solved just by promoting a ‘comprehensive’ understanding 
of the institutional operation of the prison systems; it instead signifies divisions in 
moral beliefs and normative visions about incarceration and punishment in general.
7
 
As the traditional holistic ideal of rehabilitation and social integration has lost much 
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 We will discuss at greater length the post-welfarist penal imaginary spectrum and also identify some 
constructive facets of it in a later part of the chapter (section I.i.c). 
7
 See also the discussion of Tonry (2011).  
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of its grip, such diversions can hardly be treated as more than a disparity in 
perspectives or a relative matter in terms of political stands. Consequently, the 
respective normative approaches in such a context only have finite grounds for 
establishing the validity of their own claims and refuting contradictory ones. The 
lack of any prospects for a viable universal normative paradigm in the field may also 
be reflected in the fact that the pragmatic style of calculation and, conversely, the 
punitive ‘hit-back’ reaction often stand out distinctively in the contemporary penal 
sphere (Garland, 1996 & 2001a).   
 
Against the background depicted above, we may argue that the appeal to universal 
normativity has diminished considerably within the current imprisonment field.  This 
did occur to many other social sectors as well, and is viewed as a rather far-reaching 
phenomenon in the post-World War era by the political philosophers and social 
theorists who have had extensive discussion of the decline of the utopian aspiration 
of modernity (e.g. Strauss, 1964; Berlin, 1978 and Habermas, 1976). 
 
What happened in the field of imprisonment can be viewed as one specific example 
of the crisis of utopianism in the post-World War II western societies. As we will see 
more clearly later, on this vantage point we can capture some particular implications 
of the decline of penal welfarism and the subsequent dynamics in the discursive field 
regarding the practice of incarceration.  
 
It does not imply, however, that the decline of universalism in the field of 
imprisonment (particularly the fall of penal welfarism) is directly triggered by or, 
simply the result of, the ‘utopia crisis’ in the post-World War II western societies.  
The latter, as chronic and wide-ranging as it is, does not exert its influence on every 
modern institution evenly and indiscriminately. Some of them (such as the medical 
and educational institutions) proved to have more resources to re-organise their 
cognitive structure and ways of practice to meet the challenge so that their routine 
praxis and outcome can be maintained intact. In those cases, the predicament of 
universalism does not work as the dominant force that sets up the trajectory of the 
institutional performance; it tends to be moderated by the reflexive and adaptive 
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ability of the traditional configuration or orthodox system.  But in other cases, the 
imprisonment field in particular, due to particular reasons (like those we identified in 
reviewing the fall of penal welfarism) the existing orthodox system was subject to 
severe oppositions and it was proved not viable enough to preserve its salience by 
renewing itself to meet the ideological and practical challenges. As it grew weaker 
and deprived of political credit and public confidence, the resources would also 
shrink which could be relied upon to bear and minimise the impact of the 
predicament of universalism. As a result, the phenomenon we discussed earlier 
concerning the imprisonment sphere – the absence of a holistic ideal of the 
institutional practice – tends to become a defining feature of the specific domain and 
render vulnerable the prospects of a new universalist paradigm that can be formed to 
replace the former.  
 
Thus, as a cultural phenomenon, the post-World War II dystopian trend reaches far 
beyond the sphere of imprisonment, but its representation is conditioned by the 
actual situations in each individual case. In this regard, it is implausible to take it as 
an independent force which would inevitably bring about a pre-determined set of 
changes across the social sectors indiscriminately. Rather, it is better described as a 
particular reflexive element which is penetrating in the contemporary social life and 
institutional practice.  The fact that its representation in the imprisonment field in the 
UK is markedly salient has much to do with the peculiar historical and political 
factors as we examined above. The fall of the welfarist paradigm, which held the last 
holistic ideal for penal practice, has made the vacuum of universal normativity 
particularly salient. The crisis of universal normativity for prisons in the UK, 
however, is not only related to the salience of its circumstances. The very nature of 
custodial practice determines that the absence of universal normativity has 
significant implications for the incarceration institutions. We will elaborate this point 
in the paragraphs below.  
 
Is it possible for people, as they do in many social institutions other than those of 
incarceration, just to come to terms with the exhaustion of universal normativity and 




Indeed, the absence of any holistic normative ideal of incarceration does not 
necessarily disturb the conscience of the public. As Richard Sparks (2007a) observes, 
the practices in prisons are not always at the centre of the radar of the public and the 
mass media. Instead, they can continue quietly and unproblematically in many places 
and for a considerable period of time under the control of trusted penal experts and 
practitioners. Under such conditions, the normative status of those institutions 
seldom triggers any serious concerns among members of mainstream society. Even 
in a situation where they start to receive increasing attention from the media (as is 
being witnessed in the UK and the US nowadays), these public responses scarcely 
point in the direction of questioning and reflecting on the dilemmas of universal 
normativity. Instead they tend to lead to investigation of the responsibilities of 
management personnel or ‘the failure of the system’, and to the allegation that lax 
prison policies and administration should be held accountable for the problems.
8
 
Politicised in this fashion, such public engagement may consequently blur the 
normative dimensions of the contemporary prison systems to an even greater extent 
than does the conventional expert-and-practitioner-dominated penal order.   
 
What, then, prevents us from bypassing the malaise within the ideological sphere and 
concentrating instead on practical tasks – which would produce effects more quickly 
and tangibly? There are actually many such tasks that need to be addressed with 
regard to the prison, and some are quite urgent and severe: expanding current prison 
accommodation so that the overcrowding can be alleviated, increasing gymnastic 
facilities and educational programmes so that the time spent by inmates behind bars 
can be made more ‘meaningful’, improving the working conditions of the prison staff, 
and so on. All of those tasks are without question worthy of a good amount of 
investment.  
 
However, the aggregate of those problem-solving oriented programmes is unlikely to 
lead to a favourable outcome, and we will demonstrate shortly that the practicality-
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 We will give more detailed discussions of the phenomenon in Chapter 4. 
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absorbed approach to prison reforms could be profoundly misleading when it brushes 
away the perspective of and any belief in the ultimate ideal behind such activities.  
 
b. A Kafka-like pursuit: practicality-directed prison reforms 
 
If the prison population is too high, we can choose to put more constraints on 
delivering a sentence of imprisonment; if the space in prisons is insufficient for 
accommodating their inmates properly, we can expand or reorganise it; if there are 
high suicide rates and cases of self-inflicted harms, we can increase and improve the 
provision of mental health care.  
 
Probably various problems will stand in the way of their realisation: fiscal shortages, 
public misunderstanding, political intervention, bureaucratic errors, and so on. It is 
possible that due to such obstacles the accomplishment of those goals is subject to 
postponement, even to indefinite postponement.  But the logic here is clear: it 
delineates a definite and concrete pathway for prison reformers to follow. The job is 
then to tackle each of the problems respectively and responsibly and the evolution 
and improvement of custodial practice may be expected to ensue.  
 
However, the actual history of the prison reform movement tells a story quite 
contrary to the trajectory that might be anticipated by such a straightforward 
problem-tackling approach.
9
  Most often, earnest efforts were made and material 
changes were expected, but then new frustrating aspects of imprisonment emerged in 
a damaging way and dominated the agenda, while the previously defined targets 
became uncertain and dubious.  One of the most typical cases can be observed in the 
development of English prison architectures: taking actions to combat the 
deteriorating ventilation and health conditions was once the primary concern for 
prison reformers and architecture designers (for the sake of preventing contagious 
gaol fever), but the solving of this particular problem soon gave way to the more 
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 See, for example, Keith Soothill’s analysis of the history of English prisons from 1776 to 1966 
(2007). Also, see Michel Foucault’s argument about the paradoxical character of the history of prison 
reform, which renders prison crisis and reformation discourses two facets of the same circular 
dynamics of the institution’s operations (1977).  
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demanding one of preventing the contagion of ‘moral corruption’. This concern led 
to the physical redesigning of prison buildings to suit the operation of the ‘separate-
silence’’ system; yet such changes were found to generate new devastating results: 
inmates’ psychological well-being deteriorated with more frequent occurrences of 
suicide and self-inflicted harms. The subsequent loosening-up of the rigid regulations, 





There is no doubt that almost all modern institutions, whether they are schools, 
hospitals or governments, unavoidably have to experience a continuous process of 
adjusting their operational objectives to the changing social environment. However, 
as critics have pointed out, what distinguishes prisons from these institutions is the 
constant state of crisis, which is accompanied by the circulation of contradictory 
rhetorics and statements of purpose (Foucault, 1977). This situation has scarcely 
changed in the contemporary UK and US (O’Malley, 1999; Tonry, 2001a; Scott, 
2007). Therefore, although prisons in industrialised countries are generally better 
than their predecessors in the 17
th
 century in terms of their material conditions, they 
can hardly claim the same degree of success as other modern institutions such as the 
medical and educational sectors.  
 
The frustrating experience of prison reform is instead rather analogous to what 
Kafka’s hero ‘K’ experiences in his novel ‘Castle’: his purpose was quite precisely 
determined (entering the castle), and his target (the castle) also appeared to be 
concrete and reachable at first sight (it is just above the village in which he resides); 
however, the real process – as soon as ‘K’ has started his enterprise – proves to be an 
ominously distorted, prolonged and uncertain one, even if all the obstacles he faced 
seemed to be of a comprehensible nature (ruthless administrative customs, the 
arrogance of the castle officials, the ambivalent attitudes of the villagers, the 
fecklessness of his partner, his own tactical errors, etc). The novel remained an 
unfinished work, but readers are clear enough about the hopeless prospects of ‘K’’s 
adventure. Whereas Kafka’s ‘Castle’ exposes some of the deepest facets of the 
                                                 
10
 See the study of Yvonne Jewkes and Helen Johnstone on the evolution of prison architecture (2007).  
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experiences of individuals in the modern age, the ‘factual story’ that has happened in 
the sphere of imprisonment also reveals something that is quite comparable to that 
experience, in particular with regard to the elusive nature of the pursuit of meanings 
in a context where any overall normative horizon is essentially absent. Perhaps that is 
the reason why the problem-tackling approach in correcting ‘prison errors’ so often 
gets confused or distracted before it reaches any substantial grounds for envisaging a 
thoroughly successful outcome: the achievement of better health conditions, or more 
‘meaningful’ activities, or more security devices, in spite of all their positive effects, 
cannot properly settle the issue as to what prison should ultimately be like.  
 
As long as there are differences between bad prisons and prisons that are not so bad, 
reform programmes can be anticipated to carry on, but none of the ‘not so bad’ 
prisons that are found in existence are able to represent the ideal of the ‘right’ prisons 
or to serve as a substitute for the normative vacuum left by the abandonment of the 
universal vision of penal modernism. Consequently, the endeavour of improving 
prisons, following such a pattern, only extends its life by running through the circle 
of identifying problems, pursuing practicality-directed reforms and detecting new 
problems. While doing so, it has little hope of ending the process of crisis-permeated 
circulation. In terms of its normative performance, the problem-tackling strategy may 
be viewed as one of the forms of penal nihilism, for it in effect functions to conceal 
the absence of any universal normativity rather than confronting it in an authentic 
way.  
 
c. Post-welfarist imaginaries of imprisonment and their normative performances 
 
My contention is that the pursuit of practicality cannot replace the pursuit of 
normativity in the incarceration field. The latter should be held as indispensible to 
the endeavour of understanding the imprisonment complex and making any effective 
interventions within it.  Thus, in a context where the prospects of the universal ideal 
of imprisonment are declining, it would be particularly misleading and 
counterproductive to reply on various practicality-directed programmes as the 




What, then, would be the proper way of addressing such dilemmas and making 
fruitful the pursuit of normativity in a post-universalist context? In our view, a useful 
point of departure for this task might be to probe into the specific imprisonment 
context and uncover the extant normative resources which it already consists of.  
 
In this regard, the imprisonment sphere in the UK provides a particular example. As 
we briefly described in the earlier paragraphs, it has to face a rather fragmented penal 
ideological territory constituted by diverse post-welfarist patterns of discourses and 
practices. On the one hand, it no longer benefits from the blessings of universal 
normativity and the allegiances to it, but on the other, those post-welfarist 
approaches also provide rich resources for representing and reflecting on how the 
normative dimensions of imprisonment can be addressed in contemporary 
circumstances.  
 
Those differential approaches to imprisonment involve their own perspectives for 
interpreting the current imprisonment complex and their particular definitions of its 
urgent needs and central reformation objectives. They tend to attract their own 
respective groups of audiences and they exert uneven influence in the realm of 
policy-making and the institutional operations of incarceration. To a great extent they 
are entangled with one another. For example, among academics and many 
professional practitioners, liberal penological values are still widely adhered to and 
this is reflected in a number of proposals, including the promotion of penal 
moderation and the revival of rehabilitation programmes in prisons (Loader, 2010; 
Bosworth, 2010a; Snacken, 2010; Robinson, 2008). Although, within the sphere of 
policy-making and institutional practice, the impact of the liberal prison reform ideal 
has shrunk markedly compared with the penal welfare phase, the core values of 
liberal penal thinking have maintained a stable place within academic journals and 
conferences, and this has been reflected constantly in mainstream broadsheet 
newspapers and government-funded prison researches and corresponding reports 
(including the influential Woolf report which was published in the early 1990s) 
(Home office, 1991a). Moreover, as we will analyse at greater length in Chapter 3, 
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the contemporary liberal imaginaries of imprisonment also contains reflexions on the 
circumstances of the declining universal normativity in the post-welfarist 
imprisonment field and have developed multiple strategies to reorient the liberal 
penological visions in order to adapt to them.  
 
In the tabloid papers, however, the agenda discussing prison issues is deeply critical 
of the ‘out of touch’ official discourses about imprisonment and proposals 
advocating more direct community involvement in making the system more 
responsive to ordinary people’s moral opinion on just punishment and the need for 
security (Sparks, 2001a; Cheliotis, 2010; Pratt, 2000c & 2007). Those forms of 
imaginaries have also gained a place within the political rhetorics formulated by ‘law 
and order’ politicians, victims’ rights advocates and community safety campaigners.  
 
There are, in the meantime, risk-oriented approaches to conceiving the role and 
exercise of carceral power. Those forms of imaginaries place at their centre the 
administrative efficiency of the institutions and they tend to withdraw from 
substantive value judgements on the ultimate end of those institutional practices. By 
bringing the various risk management techniques and evaluative frameworks into the 
incarceration field over the past few decades, they have since brought visible changes 
to various aspects of institutional practice as well as the ways in which imprisonment 
is conceived in the contemporary world (O’Malley, 2004 & 2010; Kemshall, 2003; 
Ward and Maruna, 2007).  
 
Apart from these prominent approaches to comprehending prison issues, there are 
also various critical, non-mainstream forms of imaginaries which are represented by 
independent art performers, critics and film directors whose work seeks an 




Notably, those penal imaginaries do not simply refer to static concepts and notions, 
but they represent an active and dynamic sphere that keeps interacting with the actual 
performances in the incarceration field. In this regard, it is helpful to consult Charles 
                                                 
11
 See, for example, the recent study of Campbell (2011) on stand-up comedy shows.  
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Taylor’s concept of the ‘social imaginary’ to shed light on the way in which we 
understand the post-welfarist penal imaginaries.  For Taylor, the ‘social imaginary’ is 
not a set of ‘ideas’, but is what premises and enables the practices of a society by 
giving meanings and moral significance to them. It is implied in the ways in which 
people imagine their social existence, comprehending their relationships with other 
individuals and institutions, engendering expectations in different social settings; and 
it is also about the deeper normative notions and ideals which underlie these 
expectations (Taylor, 2002).  
 
The post-welfarist penal imaginaries in the imprisonment field may also be viewed 
as a particular cluster of social imaginaries, which are reflected in the publicly 
generated and debated discourses about prison issues, as well as in the less explicit 
logics, categories and presumptions which underpin the patterns and tactics of 
institutional practice, political rhetoric and actual policy-making in the incarceration 
sphere. We will be able to give a fuller account of the dynamics of penal imaginaries 
in the later part of the thesis (Chapter 2: III.iii.b); what we want to emphasize here is 
that the status quo of this spectrum is characterised by the coexistence of rather 
diverse and heterogeneous approaches. This, on the one hand, evidently signifies the 
decline of universal normativity in the imprisonment field; yet, on the other hand, 
those diverse penal imaginaries also imply their own visions about the moral 
foundations of incarceration, and many of them have developed their own respective 
ways of responding to the normative challenges associated with the post-universalist 
predicament.  
 
For example, the contemporary forms of liberal penal imaginaries have developed a 
number of strategies to defend the validity of their normative claims without the 
support of holistic penal paradigms (we will discuss four specific approaches in this 
respect in Chapter 3).  Such development has made them different from the liberal 
imaginaries associated with the holistic penal projects such as the welfarist prison 
scheme: they can now be viewed as containing the particular reflexive element and 
adaptive strategies in response to the predicament of the decline of universal 
normativity in the imprisonment field. Similar phenomena are also observable in 
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other representative forms of post-welfarist imaginaries, such as the populist 
imaginaries and the risk-oriented imaginaries of imprisonment (as we will examine 
in more depth in Chapter 4 and Chapter 5), notwithstanding the fact that they may 
resort to quite different strategies.  
 
This means that the post-welfarist approaches to imprisonment do not passively live 
with the decline of universal normativity, but instead respond to it in their own 
respective ways. And this is closely connected with their effort to build up their own 
normative perspectives on imprisonment.  
 
In this respect, we can talk about the normative performance of those penal 
imaginaries: as no single universal penal ideal is held as the uncontroversial standard 
used for determining the normative issues of prisons, the existing penal imaginaries 
have to rely on their individual discursive potency and constructing tactics to 
establish the validity of their own normative claims. Their normative performance 
thus refers to how effectively specific penal imaginaries formulate their own 
particular normative visions and have them communicated to and accepted by the 
relevant audiences in the normative terms.  
 
The realm of the normative performances of post-welfarist imaginaries of 
imprisonment is as yet an under-explored one. They are, however, far from 
insignificant for the endeavour of addressing the post-universalist predicament in the 
incarceration field. This is because they indicate that the post-welfarist incarceration 
field may not be viewed merely as a desolate land from which universal normativity 
has been exiled. Instead, it is also a land of resources, which are involved in multiple 
and in many respects heterogeneous patterns and logics in making sense of custodial 
practices and conceiving of a desirable future for them. They are also connected with 
the beliefs, habitus and dispositions of the prison-related actors and their audiences 
which have been vital to the constitution of the current imprisonment complex. For 
these reasons, we should take the post-welfarist imaginaries and their normative 
performances as providing both the significant context and rich resources for 
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ii. Aims and Objectives 
 
The discussion in the previous section suggests that custodial sphere in the UK is 
characterised by the decline of universal normativity and that it is a fragmented 
territory of post-welfarist patterns of discourses and practices.  Indeed, as we will 
show in section (II.i) of this chapter, there are actually three separate prison systems 
in the UK (which respectively belong to England and Wales, Scotland and Northern 
Ireland) and they are quite different in practices and legal frameworks, which renders 
it difficult to make any generalisation of their characteristics and performances. 
However, the argument we made about the decline of universal normativity is not 
meant to imply that its situations are exactly the same in all the three jurisdictions in 
the UK. The degree of fragmentation and diversion within the normative landscapes 
of imprisonment certainly differs, for example, between England and Wales where 
neo-liberal policies and politicisation of penal matters are most pronounced, and 
Scotland, where there is a strong social democratic tradition. However, even in the 
latter case, the imprisonment field is far from immune to the declining universal 
normativity or to the advent of pluralistic normative approaches.
13
 In fact, it is hardly 
feasible for a single jurisdiction, relying on its own resources, to manage the task of 
conserving the vitality of universal normativity and sheltering it from its decline. In 
this regard, it is important to recognise the predicament of universal normativity as a 
                                                 
12
 The dynamics of post-welfarist imaginaries of imprisonment also exist in other countries, 
particularly some of the English speaking countries. But to incorporate them into a single piece of 
work definitely requires a research scale much larger than this thesis. In this regard, to make the UK 
the specific example of our study does not only suit our research scale, but can also illustrate how 
such inquiries can be carried out in a given context. In this sense, this work is prerequisite to the 
examination of the more general post-welfarist imaginary spectrum. In the rest part of thesis, when we 
use the term ‘the contemporary imprisonment field’, it refers acquiescently to the context of the UK.   
13
 This is reflected in the peculiar tactics used by the administration agents of the Scottish prison 
service in defending their decisions and penal values against the challenge of rival claims. Those 
tactics are based on parochial reasons rather than universal discourses, since the former is more likely 
to gain credit among their audience whose composition is also diverse. We will discuss this point in 
more detail in Chapter 3 (III.iii).  
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pervasive one, despite the fact that its concrete representations are dependent on each 
of the specific contexts of the three jurisdictions in the UK.  
 
This, in our view, has important implications for the task of ‘doing the normative’ 
both theoretically and practically in the contemporary imprisonment field.  
 
Firstly, it constrains the chances of success of top-down moral-penological theories 
to determine the purposes of prisons and the grounds of their legitimacy.  Without 
the soil of the conviction that the existence and the operation of incarceration must 
be in accordance with an overarching social ideal, any a priori prescriptive 
framework that tries to acquire orthodox status, as did the penal welfare paradigm in 
the post-World War II era, would turn out to be controversial in the face of multiple 
competitors, each of which claims a different hierarchy of values or priority of 
purposes. Such an attempt is also subject to the query as to how, as a unitary 
prescriptive paradigm, it can plausibly reflect the deeply fragmented and pluralistic 
reality of contemporary imprisonment and justify its own particular normative stand.  
 
Secondly, it also puts into question the ways in which ‘facts-based’ social-
penological enquiries engage in the normative debate about the purposes and 
desirable direction of prison reforms. Under the condition that there is a general 
allegiance to a universal ideal which was viably guiding and providing grounds of 
legitimacy for the criminal justice system, the mainstream social scientific study of 
prisons usually assumes a definite role, or division of labour, in supporting and 
enriching a given normative agenda through the interpretation of its findings. For 
example, in the case of welfarist penology, its empirical findings and theorisations 
are essentially linked to the task of uncovering and understanding the optimal 
conditions for the effective rehabilitation of prisoners and the promotion of social 
integration. Thus there is a guaranteed path of normativity for mainstream penal 
studies to take. In the post-universalist context, however, the empirical and 
theoretical queries within the imprisonment sphere face a subtler and more uncertain 
situation: they are increasingly subject to the requirement of interpreting the moral 
and political implications of their own findings and developing insights for the 
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choices between different substantive penological ideals in their own terms. One of 
the often noted tactics of those studies to carry out the task is to resort to certain 
internal, ‘scientifically neutral’ standards, within their own disciplines in order to 
buttress some particular normative claims and to disprove others which are 
concerned with incarceration issues. For example, efficiency tests and cost-benefit 
analysis, ethnographic accounts of ‘pains of imprisonment’ and risk assessments, 
have been undertaken respectively or jointly in a number of incarceration researches 
to criticise and oppose (and in rare cases support) the tightened prison management 
policy, punitive sentencing philosophy, and more generally the ‘prison works’ 
hypothesis (e.g. Wright, 1994; Liebling, 1995; Liebling and Maruna, eds, 2005; 
Hannah-Moffat, 2005). Yet what those approaches have achieved is not immune to 
controversies. Michael Tonry identifies the fallacy of the ‘disingenuous argument’ 
made by the American liberal penal reform advocates who, instead of ‘arguing that 
unduly harsh policies are unjust, and should be repealed or modified for that reason’, 
have much more often ‘argued that policies—which they believed to be unjust—
should be changed because they are ineffective or too costly. Proposed alternatives—
exemplified by most reentry initiatives—are generally supported by arguments about 
reduced cost or improved recidivism reduction’ (2011: 637).  In his view, this does 
not amount to a genuinely normative response to the punitive policies which are 
motivated by moral beliefs, and thus is bound to fail. In fact, the criticism may be 
levelled in a similar way in relation to the more extensive social scientific 
undertakings (certainly not confined to the American cases) which try to draw certain 
political implications from their analysis and interpretation of the incarceration 
phenomena. The tactics and discourses involved, diverse as they are, try to ‘reason’ 
with their discontented opponents (usually advocates of punitive views) from 
different theoretical angles, but they seldom answer them directly and intuitively in 
terms of normative judgements. 
 
In our view, this predicament has not been brought about by making the ‘wrong’ 
choice between tactics of argumentation, nor can it be resolved by a shift to the 
‘correct’ one (e.g. an efficiency argument being replaced by a normative argument). 
It is, however, indicative of some of the more intrinsically weak aspects of current 
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social penological studies in undertaking their normative pursuits in the post-
universalist imprisonment field. That they do not ‘opt’ for straightforward normative 
arguments is primarily due to the fact that they are incapable of doing so. Without a 
profound conviction of the universal validity of any specific penal norms or ideals, 
making a normative argument is hard to differentiate from the mere ‘expression’ of 
one’s personal moral or political preferences. In the post-universalist context, it has 
become inherently difficult to establish the absolute moral authority of any single 
strand of penal beliefs (even if they appear to be the most ‘unproblematic’ ones), this 
also renders it hard to reject determinately the set of moral beliefs allegedly 
underpinning certain unpopular and unpalatable penal policies, simply on the 
grounds that they are external to our own moral parameters. This explains why social 
penological researchers tend to adopt various ‘round-about’ tactics to mobilise their 
normative calculations. They embrace a compromise between the need to embark on 
a convincing normative foundation for incarceration and the very consequence of the 
post-universalist dilemma that disrupts the formation of allegiance to any 
overarching penal paradigms. However, ‘doing the normative’ in this fashion can be 
viewed as being feeble and indeterminate from the outset, and their potential for 
advancing a more inspiring outlook in terms of political calculation and normative 
imagination are also constrained by the value/fact separation which, to a greater or 
less degree, is the premise of most of the current mainstream social scientific 
undertakings. In conditions where the dimension of values is taken as being discrete 
from the factual realm, the endeavour to generate meaningful normative 
understandings through investigating, interpreting and theorising the incarceration 
phenomena could hardly justify the validity of its findings within the sphere of 
‘values’. This, in turn, undermines the chances of success of social penological 
approaches in offering normative answers to the post-universalist incarceration 
problems.  
 
We shall further extend our discussion of this topic in the next chapter, which 
discusses methodological issues (Chapter 2: II.i & II.ii). But hopefully the above 
paragraphs have already prepared the ground for tentatively establishing the point 
that the extant normative penological approaches are considered by us to be 
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unsatisfying for addressing the post-universalist predicament and for examining 
pertinently and fruitfully the normative dimensions of the current imprisonment 
complex. Their weakness in this respect is itself a reflection of the post-universalist 
dilemma.    
 
The crucial task which concerns us is then to explore feasible means of ‘doing the 
normative’ in the imprisonment field with sufficient awareness of the predicament of 
universal normativity and the challenges caused by it. On the one hand, it must be 
able to demonstrate that there are possibilities beyond the practicality-absorbed 
approach for understanding and bringing changes to the prison related issues. On the 
other, it should offer an alternative methodological perspective to that of the top-
down ‘normativist’ argument and that of the ‘bystander’ style of social penological 
observation and analysis. To achieve this it needs to find ways of bridging the factual 
and the normative within its inquiries and to make meaningful use of the extant 
normative sources which are viable within the current imprisonment field and to 
bases its approach on them instead of any presumed universal penal ideology.  
 
Our thesis proposes an approach to meeting these challenges by undertaking a social 
hermeneutic examination of the dynamics of post-welfarist imaginaries of 
imprisonment. Let us proceed with some further explanation below.  
 
Firstly, as we showed in the foregoing paragraphs, the diverse forms of 
contemporary penal imaginaries and their normative performances can be taken as 
important resources for the endeavour of addressing the post-universalist 
predicament and of meeting the challenges related to it. This is why we consider 
them as the meaningful starting point for our research project. But when it comes to 
the question of how to make effective use of them to suit our research purpose, we 
will need to adopt a particular methodological framework.  
 
Because our purpose is to revitalise the normative pursuit in a context deprived of 
universal normativity, we cannot take the normative assumptions of each of those 
imaginary forms as self-evident and unproblematic or accept their interior logic in a 
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non-reflexive way. Each of the strands of these penal imaginaries may demonstrate 
to us a particular normative approach to imprisonment, and we may manage to figure 
out whether a specific ideal or operational mode of imprisonment is in accordance 
with it or not, but essentially this would only confirm its own normative 
understandings and presumptions, whose validity is at once questionable outside its 
own conceptual boundaries. And we can hardly tell why any one particular approach 
is inherently superior to another. 
 
For the same reason, we would not be able to fulfil this task by confining our studies 
to the external linkages of those imaginaries. It is certainly a meaningful endeavour 
to investigate how the contours of current forms of imaginaries of imprisonment 
were constituted and what particular socio-political factors functioned to shape them. 
But this kind of work would not automatically convince us which type of approach 
should be considered as a sound one in the normative sense, or what would be an 
acceptable alternative. Moreover, it is far from feasible to adopt any external criteria 
to decide the matter, since the field per se is characterised by plurality and by the 
absence of universal normativity.  
 
Since neither the internal nor the external standards of imprisonment imaginaries can 
be accepted as the premises of our enquiry, we need an alternative approach for 
pursuing it. We propose a social hermeneutic approach for examining the 
imaginaries of imprisonment with a focus on their normative performances. The 
methodological framework that we use has been developed from a re-interpretation 
of Emile Durkheim’s methodological insight in promoting his idea of ‘moral science’. 
And the distinctive character of our method is that it adopts a more integral 
perspective for treating the relationship between the factual and the normative in its 
probing into the dynamics of penal imaginaries. And this enables the inquiry to be 
simultaneously an undertaking that is targeting at and capable of revitalising and 
enriching the normative performances in the imprisonment field.  
 
We are going to discuss in detail in the next chapter how we will establish our 
methodological framework and what its concrete working rationales consist of. Yet, 
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at present, a brief explanation of it will be helpful for the purpose of making clear our 
research objectives.  
 
The methodological approach is based on the concept of ‘introspective normativity’, 
which gives analytic and evaluative guidance to the social hermeneutic examination 
of various strands of the imaginaries of imprisonment. ‘Introspective normativity’ in 
our thesis refers to the particular performances of penal imaginaries to symbolise the 
post-universalist penal realities and to construct their distinctive normative visions of 
imprisonment. It concerns how, without the backing of any conventional penal 
ideological beliefs and in some cases in the absence of any essential allegiance to 
such belief systems’ desirability, the validity of different normative claims gets 
established in the forms of their respective penal imaginaries. Thus, in our thesis, 
‘introspective normativity’ assumes a markedly post-universalist attribute and it 
gives us a theoretical perspective to uncover the normative performances of penal 
imaginaries in post-universalist conditions. Our hermeneutic examination of the 
performance of introspective normativity is then envisaged to shed light on whether 
and to what extent a particular type of imprisonment imaginary can manage to 
assume the normative role which traditional universalist penal ideologies used to 
play. By exposing that, it helps us to detect the innovative as well as the 
counterproductive tendencies within the normative performances of those 
imaginaries, and accordingly it helps us to push forward the normative endeavour in 
the imprisonment field in a healthier and more fruitful direction.  
 
In order to specify the concrete forms of the performance of introspective 
normativity, we resort to a number of ideal types in the thesis. These ideal types 
include detachment, oblivion, confrontation and transformation. Each of them 
represents a distinctive pattern of introspective normativity in which the innovative 
or nihilistic tendencies of normative performance get realised in penal imaginaries. 
They are used to indicate how, in their respective ideal cases, the penal imaginaries 
either vibrantly reinvent and revitalise their normative pursuits, or instead place 
nihilistic closure on them in the post-universalist conditions.  For example, the 
detachment model is related to the peculiar disposition of the penal imaginary to 
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accept the fading of any universal ideal as a fait accompli and to renounce any 
attempt to restore it. We will find that this pattern underlies some contemporary 
forms of liberal imaginaries of imprisonment.
14
  By revealing and highlighting those 
patterns in relation to the concrete dynamics of penal imaginaries, we can capture the 
idiosyncratic quality of the normative performances in those imaginaries, as well as 
acquiring evaluative grounds for assessing them. Together the ideal types of 
introspective normativity work as theoretical coordinates for directing the analyses 
and evaluation of the specific forms of imaginaries of imprisonment and providing 
simultaneously analytical and normative guidance for the examination based on them.
 
We will give detailed explanations of each of the ideal types in Chapter 2 (III.iii.d), 
and we will show how they can be applied to the examination of specific penal 
imaginary cases in the three chapters that follow.  
 
This method enables us to determine whether certain forms of penal imaginaries 
contain innovative potential which can be developed for the purpose of meeting the 
post-universalist challenges, or whether instead they are obfuscated by nihilistic 
tendencies in treating the normative facets of incarceration. Accordingly, this study 
can help us to decide how to deal with the different approaches of penal imaginaries 
respectively in the face of the post-universalist predicament in the contemporary 
imprisonment field: whether to affirmatively accept it and develop its insights, or 
whether to critically argue against it and seek its transformation. This merit of the 
method renders it a suitable one for our research in pursuit of the goal of promoting a 
fruitful normative enterprise in the post-universalist imprisonment field.  
 
Now we are in a position to summarise the research purpose and the objectives of our 
thesis. 
 
In general, it has the aim of uncovering the normative aspect of the post-welfarist 
imaginaries of imprisonment in the UK and it is seeking to revitalise their normative 
performances.  
 
                                                 
14
 See Chapter 3 (III.ii). 
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The weight of this inquiry consists in the idea of illustrating the application of a 
particular methodological approach in the context of ‘doing the normative’ in the 
post-universalist imprisonment field, and not in the construction of an exhaustive 
account of the normative performance of every type of imaginaries of imprisonment. 
As we will make clear in the next chapter, the methodological perspective based on 
the concept of introspective normativity is inherently an open-ended one, and its 
undertakings are non-static and on-going in relation to the ever-renewing dynamics 
of the penal imaginary. In this respect they do not envisage a research outcome that 
would achieve closure in relation to the examination of penal imaginaries, but one 
that may inspire further reflexion on them and embrace their innovative potentiality 
(in Chapter 6 we will find a proper place to test this point).  
 
As we showed earlier, the case of the UK forms a typical example of imprisonment 
in the post-universalist context. The resources of the penal imaginaries that we draw 
upon are mostly parochial, which means that the research findings are case-specific. 
Yet the decline of universal normativity in the imprisonment field is far from being a 
unique phenomenon in contemporary societies. In this respect, the methodological 
approach of the thesis can also be applied to improving our understanding of other 
prison systems which face similar situations (for example, those in North America, 
Australia and New Zealand).  
 
Specifically, the thesis has three objectives to fulfil. It aims to: 
 
1. Develop a pertinent methodological framework for analysing and evaluating 
the normative performances of post-welfarist imaginaries of imprisonment. 
 
2. Identify the representative forms of imaginaries of imprisonment in the UK 
and examine their normative performances respectively. 
 
3. On the basis of the fulfilment of the above two objectives, to give an overall 
assessment of the imprisonment imaginary spectrum within the UK and to 




iii. Structure of the Thesis 
 
The thesis is composed of six chapters. In the remaining part of Chapter 1, we will 
provide an overview of the current circumstances of imprisonment in the UK. It 
seeks to identify the key problems and challenges within the field in the light of its 
institutional structure and organisations, the profiles of its inmates, the definition of 
its aims and objectives, its intra-order maintenance and its political environment. 
This section serves to provide a rudimentary background of empirical knowledge for 
the main body of research in the thesis.  
 
In Chapter 2 we elaborate the methodological framework of the research. This starts 
with an overview of two representative approaches to normative penological 
understanding: the normativist approach and the sociology of punishment, and it 
explains why they both have important shortcomings which render them inadequate 
for the purpose of our research. Then we turn to the methodological thoughts of 
Durkheim’s work, which we consider contains rich and significant resources for 
rethinking and re-evaluating a number of key presumptions related to the tensions 
and challenges faced by the current methodological perspectives in advancing 
normative penological understanding. These presumptions include those about the 
relationship between the normative and the factual, between theory and practice, 
between scientific inquiry and moral construction. Through the interpretation and 
critical analysis of Durkheim’s methodological perspectives implied in his 
construction of the peculiar moral secularisation project, we will identify some of his 
insights which are particularly relevant and inspirational for our own research, and 
we also will investigate how such insights – which we will recognise and reconstruct 
as a unique social-historical hermeneutic approach – might benefit the 
methodological thinking in the context of contemporary imprisonment field. Based 
on that work, we will develop our own analytic-evaluative method (one underpinned 
by the concept of introspective normativity) of dealing with imaginaries of 




The chapter also explains why we use penal imaginaries as the main materials to be 
examined and how we select the relevant sources in our specific studies. Finally, it 
specifies four ideal patterns of the performance of introspective normativity, namely 
detachment, oblivion, confrontation and transformation, so that they can jointly 
provide concrete guidance for each of the specific studies in the following chapters.  
 
In Chapter 3 we identify three representative forms of imaginaries of imprisonment 
in the UK at the present time. They include the liberal, the populist and the risk-
oriented imaginaries of imprisonment.  The main part of this chapter deals with the 
case of liberal imaginaries. It discusses four distinct types of normative construction 
in the contemporary liberal imaginaries of imprisonment: namely the exterior 
validity approach, the ‘limits’ acknowledgement approach, the cultural identity 
approach and the penal consumption approach, and it examines how they 
respectively display the nihilistic or innovative patterns of the performance of 
introspective normativity, including the patterns of detachment and oblivion.   
 
Chapter 4 examines the normative performance of populist imaginaries of 
imprisonment. Firstly, it offers an overview of the usual ways in which prisons and 
prisoners are imagined in the mass media and by the public in the UK. Secondly, in 
order to facilitate a more comprehensive understanding of them, it discusses how 
these phenomena are explicated in the current sociological literatures (particularly 
those analysing the phenomena of ‘moral panics’). On this basis, we will conduct an 
examination of introspective normativity and uncover some of the inherent limits in 
populist imaginaries which make them a ‘handicapped’ normative pursuit. The 
chapter also identifies some innovative potential within this approach.  
 
Chapter 5 examines the normative performance of risk-oriented imaginaries of 
imprisonment. Firstly, it gives a brief discussion of the dominion of risk logic in 
contemporary societies and provides an overview of various risk management 
techniques and perspectives within the imprisonment field. Then it carries out the 
introspective normativity analyses and identifies three particular strategies of 
normative construction in risk-oriented approaches, including the subordination of a 
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holistic normative perspective, risk serving as an ideological shelter, and the creation 
of an isolated normative reality. The chapter concludes that those strategies function 
to impose closure on the normative performance of imaginaries of imprisonment and 
that they are at odds with the needs for normative innovation within this spectrum. In 
the meantime, it also acknowledges the potentials of normative innovation within 
certain specific risk-constructing approaches employed in the imprisonment field.  
 
In the final chapter, we will undertake the task of giving a general assessment of the 
normative performance of the spectrum of the imaginaries of imprisonment in the 
UK and shedding light on the ways of re-normalising it. Based on the summarising 
of the findings in the preceding chapters, we will diagnose the general performance 
of the mainstream imaginaries of imprisonment in the UK as ways of ‘escaping from 
being normative’ and link them respectively to the nihilistic patterns of introspective 
normativity. Then we will analyse the social conditions which are connected with 
such tendencies and with problems in the normative sphere. The structuralised 
segregation of disadvantaged groups of people is identified as a crucial factor in this 
regard. The latter part of this chapter focuses on demonstrating the possibilities of re-
normalising the imaginaries of imprisonment in the context of the UK. It starts with a 
discussion of the innovative potentials of the three representative forms of penal 
imaginaries respectively. Then it introduces the cosmopolitan approach as a response 
to the predicament of the decline of universal normativity in the imprisonment field. 
The major part of it tries to outline a cosmopolitan perspective that is enriched by 
viable performance of introspective normativity and to specify its implications for 
imaginaries of imprisonment in a number of areas.  
 
II. Imprisonment and Its Challenges: An Overview of the British Case 
 
This section aims to provide a descriptive account of the key issues in the field of 
imprisonment in the UK.
15
 It is obvious that to grasp the whole dynamics of the 
                                                 
15
 As the limited volume of the chapter does not allow comprehensive discussion of each of the three 
major prison systems in the UK, we opt for a collective approach in doing the overview. As the 
following paragraphs will make clear, the circumstances of England and Wales have the greatest 
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discipline in all its details is beyond the range of the thesis. Our purpose is thus to 
describe several critical aspects of the actual circumstances of imprisonment in this 
country, which have attracted much attention in both the academic and the political 
spheres. Whereas great efforts will be made to offer readers a concrete appreciation 
of the multiple facets of British prisons, it is also anticipated that this descriptive 
element of the study, which at the present phase of our exploration will be 
unavoidably gross in character, will also be open to progress and to new findings in 
the area, which is dynamic in nature and subject to ongoing changes.  
 
To start with, we will provide an overview of the practices of prisons in the UK by 
examining several key aspects of their performance. Following the overview we will 
proceed to identify the principle challenges for the practitioners and policy-makers in 
the field of imprisonment. This part of the work is basically descriptive: it aims to 
provide the empirical background knowledge that is necessary and is a prerequisite 
for further exploration of the normative dimension of the pluralistic penal 
imaginaries which have emerged as responses to and/or as shaping forces of the 
imprisonment complex in the UK. 
 
i. Structures and Organisations  
 
The contemporary prison service in the UK consists of three different systems. The 
largest one is that of England and Wales; apart from that, both Scotland and Northern 
Ireland have their own respective prison systems which are part of different historical 
and legal traditions. The focus of this study is on the former two; yet by design it is 
not confined to documentation of every aspect of imprisonment within a specific 
temporal-spatial framework, but instead it aims to provide a background in a way 
that is a prerequisite for understanding the challenges of a broader sociological origin 
and the corresponding approaches in responding to them, which together provide the 
basis for the following investigations of our research. 
 
                                                                                                                                          
weight in our discussion, whereas we will specify the situations in Scotland and Northern Ireland 
where they are particularly relevant.  
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In the UK, the systemic practice of depriving offenders of their freedom in a 
custodial institution as a punishment per se for the violation of serious legal rules 
started only a little more than two hundred years ago, when the independence of the 
Northern American colonies forced the British government to seek alternatives ways 
of disposing of felons, who used to be transported to those colonies to serve their 
sentences. As a result, confinement served as the solution to this crisis. From the use 
of hulks in the initial phase, through the building of the national penitentiary at 
Millbank, the design of a ‘model prison’ at Pentonville, the setting-up of the youth 
reforming institution called the Borstal, to the open-condition experiment and the 
hostel scheme, the physical means of imprisonment have underdone considerable 
change in Great Britain (Soothill, 2007: 32-33).  This process also involved the 
establishment of the administrative organisations of the prison service, as well as 
legal frameworks that stipulated the pertinent conditions for applying confinement 
and operational rules in running the institutions. In the middle of the 19
th
 century, the 
prisons in England and Wales were turned into a national system and were removed 
from the previous control of local hands such as magistrates (McConville, 1981) by 
the introduction of the Prison Act 1877, and they were put under the responsibility of 
a central management body (which was the Prison Commission at that time; and 
similar changes also happened within the Scottish system as well, with the 
establishment of a Prison Commission for Scotland in the same year). The particular 
forms and structures of central government control of prisons have changed a lot 
since then, and in general although prisons are located regionally, the definition of 
their operational targets and principles and the assessment and monitoring of their 
performance are put under the control of a central department: currently the Home 
Office sets up the position of Director General of the prison service to take charge of 
the overall operation of prisons in England and Wales, and it appoints a number of 
area managers to work in their respective headquarters to make sure that each prison 
carries out its performance in accordance with the edicts of the centre (Coyle, 2005: 
54). Apart from the leading role of the central government, British prisons are subject 
to monitoring and inspection, a practice which dates back to the early 19
th
 century 
and which is one of the major powers that have prompted major reform movements 
32 
 
in the history of the institution.
16
 Before 1981, the monitoring of prisons was 
incorporated into the prison system, but since then it have become the task of an 
independent inspectorate which was under the leadership of HM Chief Inspector of 
Prisons for England and Wales. A similar body has also been established in Scotland. 
The prison inspectorate is granted the right to visit all parts of prisons at any time, 
independently monitoring the conditions of prisons and reporting to the central 
government directly.  
 
The latest development regarding the administrative structure of prisons in the UK is 
the setting up of the National Offender Management Service (NOMS) in 2004, which 
aims to integrate the prison and the probation services on a basis that addresses the 
need for managing offenders and reducing re-offending more coherently and more 
effectively.  
 
Another important facet of the British prison system is related to the trend of the 
privatisation of public services which became the leading policy of the government 
when the Thatcher administration held power in the 1980s. Like the other public 
sectors, the prison service in the UK, despite great controversies, also became a 
service to be contracted to private companies. In some cases, the private corporations 
not only engage in the provision of material and security support for prisons, but also 
take on the core task of prison management, which means, in spite of the allegedly 
non-transferable overall control and responsibility of the central government, that it 
is some particular private sector that enforces the custodial status of the prison 




Within the structural framework of British prisons outlined above, how is the 
concrete operation of custodial policy taking place? We need in the first place to 
                                                 
16
 In 1835, the government appointed prison inspectors to examine the condition of prisons throughout 
the UK and it turned out that their critical report on the details of the prison service played an 
important role in the subsequent centralisation of the prison system in 1878 when the Prison Act 1877 
came into force.  
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come to an understanding of those who are kept confined there, where they come 
from and what are the principle causes of the receiving of an imprisonment sentence. 
After all, the circumstances and social backgrounds of the inmates of the prisons 
constitute the starting point for consideration of both the concrete problems and the 
challenges of the contemporary regime and the meaningful exploration of practical 
and normative solutions. 
 
According to the report of Prison Reform Trust, published in December 2010, the 
total prison population in the UK reached 85,393 in England and Wales (19 
November 2010), and 7,680 in Scotland (5 November 2010) (Prison Reform Trust, 
2010). According to the data, England and Wales had the highest imprisonment rate 
among all the western European countries, which was 154 per 100,000 of the 
population. In comparison, France, with a similar size of population, had a total 
prison population of 59,655 and the imprisonment rate was 96 per 100,000 at the 
time when these statistics were compiled in 2010.  
 
Notably the large scale and the high rates of imprisonment in the UK are the result of 
a rapid increase in the prison population over the past few decades. Compared with 
the present figure, the average prison population in England and Wales in 1992-93 
was 44,628. This means that, in a period of less than two decades, the number of 
those imprisoned nearly doubled in England and Wales. If we estimate the increase 
of the prison population between 1995 and 2009, the outcome is also outstanding: the 
figure grew by 32,500 or by 66% (Prison Reform Trust, 2010). This growth was 
directly related to the change in custodial rates and length of sentences (Millie et al., 
2003). Details of the prominent expansion in the prison population have been well 
documented in government reports and the researches conducted by  activist groups, 
institutes and academics, but their multiple implications for the operation of the 
prison regime, the grounds of its legitimacy and its  broader social, political and 
fiscal impact are still to be fully examined.  
 
Among the growing body of inmates in England and Wales, most are male prisoners, 
and women prisoners represent 5% of the total prison population. The number of 
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women prisoners was 4,265 on 19 November 2010, which was comparatively small 
compared to the number of male prisoners, but in the last decade, the population of 
women prisoners has gone up by 33%, which is even higher than the 28% growth for 
men. For female prisoners there are nine women’s prisons in England (none in 
Wales). In Scotland, according to the 2008 report of the Scottish Prisons 
Commission, the 2006/07 female prison population was 353, which, compared with 
the average daily female prison population in 1997/98, increased by 90%.
17
 It can be 
noted that the growing population of female prisoners has become an increasingly 
significant issue for the British prison systems whose design rationales are mainly 
male-oriented. The statistics also show that the majority of women prisoners were 
convicted of non-violent crimes (63% compared to 45% of men). 
 
Another noteworthy feature of the inmates’ composition is the high representation of 
ethnic minority and foreign prisoners. At the end of 2010, there were 11,062 foreign 
citizens (non-UK passport holders) kept in prison in the UK, constituting 13% of the 
overall prison population. Between the years 1999 and 2009, the total number of 
foreign nationals in UK prisons increased by 111%, compared to a 21% increase in 
British nationals. Inmates from minority ethnic groups also have a noticeable 
representation among the imprisoned population: in 2009, there were 22,292 
prisoners from minority ethnic groups, who accounted for nearly 27% of the overall 
prison population. This number is much higher than the 1 to 11 rates among the 
general population. Specifically, overall black people account for the largest number 
of minority ethnic prisoners (54%), and their number increased by 51% between 
1999 and 2002, when the total prison population grew by just over 12%. The 
disproportionality of the number of black people in prisons in the UK has even 
overtaken that in the US.
18
 In many cases, there is an overlap between these two 
identities: for example, the statistics show that at the end of June 2009, 33% of 
minority ethnic prisoners were also foreign nationals. Given the often more severe 
situation of the foreign and minority ethnic prisoners (e.g. their lack of language 
skills, their difficulty in getting community support and legal assistance), their 
notably disproportional representation within  UK prisons consistently  raises a 
                                                 
17
 See the report of the Scottish Prisons Commission (2008). 
18
 See the overview of foreign and minority ethnic prisoners in Prison Reform Trust (2010). 
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crucial question as to  their legitimacy basis, especially in terms of the concern about 
discrimination.  
 
If we investigate further those kept behind bars, we must not neglect some notable 
characteristics regarding their social backgrounds. The statistics of prisoners have 
displayed some common features among a good proportion of inmates. One is their 
status of employment. The Social Exclusion Unit report ‘Reducing re-offending by 
ex-prisoners’, carried out  in 2002, showed that an average 65% of prisoners were 
unemployed before imprisonment, while the average unemployment rate in the 
general population was just 5%. Moreover, 52% of male prisoners and 71% of 
female prisoners held no qualifications; 49% of male prisoners and 33% of female 
prisoners had been excluded from schools. In each case the percentage is much 
higher than the average of the general population. Notably there are also a large 
proportion of homeless people in prisons (32%). These figures suggest that the 
inmates of the prisons in the UK largely come from those socially disadvantaged 
groups: those who are under-educated, unemployed and homeless. It is also known to 
criminologists that these groups are also the primary victims of violent crime. Thus it 
is hardly surprising that the operation of prisons in the UK context is crucially 
connected with the structural problems that account for the reproduction of social 
marginality and it is in need of being addressed within the broader context of social 
justice rather than a formalistic application of penal codes and sanctions. And as we 
will analyse in Chapter 6, this also has significant implications for the normative 
performances of current mainstream imaginaries of imprisonment in the UK.  
 
Apart from the features of the composition of inmates discussed above, there are still 
a number of issues that are important for the understanding of people who are kept in 
prison, such as the particular representation of aging people, children and young 
offenders, those with drug addictions and other mental and physical disorders. For 
the purpose of providing a background understanding of the particular practices of 
imprisonment in the UK, those issues are omitted here so as to restrict the scale of 
the examination; yet more details will be brought into discussion in the later chapters, 




iii. Aims and Objectives 
 
With such a large body of inmates contained within prison walls, how to define the 
aims of these institutional practices is vital to those who are subject to the 
performance of the regime, as well as the purposeful fulfilment of public interests. 
The prison systems in the UK have gone through a painstaking process in developing 
a justifiable and workable set of aims for their operation over their two hundred-year 
history as an outstanding device for the exercise of modern punishment. The general 
framework for orienting the aims of incarceration consists of several elements which 
have been more or less stably established; they include the objectives of punishing  
persons for the crimes they have committed; deterring potential law-breaking 
behaviours by the severe consequence implied in the sanction of imprisonment; 
reforming prisoners in a way such that they can return to society and lead a law-
abiding and meaningful life; and protecting the public by putting dangerous 
offenders in confinement. The HM prison services take the responsibility for 
publishing a statement of their vision and the objectives of the incarceration 
institutions in England and Wales, which normally consists of an affirmation of some 
of the primary elements within the general framework of penal aims. For example, 




    * To provide the very best prison services so that we are the provider of choice 




To protect the public and provide what commissioners want to purchase by: 
 
    * Holding prisoners securely 
    * Reducing the risk of prisoners re-offending 
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Neither the particular statement nor the general framework of the objectives of 
imprisonment contains anything essentially novel, but this does not mean that the 
sphere of such institutional aims has reached a desirable state of maturity and has 
been uncontroversially established. If we examine the actual field and the history of 
such practices, it may be found that confusion and uncertainty is in fact an intrinsic 




 century the most pervasive ideology guiding the practice of imprisonment 
in the UK was the infamous ‘less eligibility’ principle which, based on utilitarian 
logic, presumes that the best means of achieving the deterrent effect on offenders is 
to make sure that the pain of serving the prison term outweighs the pleasure derived 
from the crime. Under this doctrine, the best prison conditions should not rise above 
the worst material conditions in society as a whole. It also implied that during times 
of hardship (e.g. wars, economic recessions) the deterioration of the prisons 
environment is justified in terms of its comparative status in relation to the 
surrounding society. This principle was later abandoned because of its apparent 
incompatibility with the fulfilment of other goals like rehabilitation and the 
humanitarian treatment of prisoners. However, the particular logic that effective 
deterrence is tied up with unpleasant prison conditions is endemic in the later stages 
of prison reform and objectives-orientation, and it continues to have an influence on 




The exposure of serious prison brutality and scandals, which were reflected in the 
report of Gladstone Committee of 1895, marked the abandonment of the ‘less 
eligibility’ doctrine and this led to its replacement by another influential ideology 
                                                 
19
 See the website of HM Prison Service: http://www.justice.gov.uk/about/hmps (visited 20/12/ 2012). 
20
 In the view of some authors, the ‘less eligibility’ principle has even been revived in the latest form 
of performance within the realm of policy-making for imprisonment, in the revival of tough 
approaches which argue in favour of ‘decent and austere’ prisons together with the invention of the 




that dominated the practices of prisons in the UK for a large part of the 20
th
 century: 
this placed the task of rehabilitating and reforming prisoners at the heart of the 
institutional goals of prisons. Under the rehabilitative regime, the role of training, 
education and work was central to the acknowledged task of rehabilitating prisoners 
with a view to their return to society with the ability to live a useful life. As in many 
other western European countries and the US, the correctional scheme maintained its 
dominant status for quite a long period during the 20
th
 century. However, from the 
1960s, the prisons in England and Wales experienced a lasting phase of crisis 
characterised by high-profile prisoner escapes, deterioration of prison conditions and 
a widely-perceived failure in reaching the rehabilitation and crime-prevention goals. 
Consequently the correctional aim lost its dominance and was replaced by a scheme 
of objectives that has a more fragmentary and capricious character.  In the 1970s it 
became increasingly difficult to adhere to the ideal that prisons could be places 
where radical transformation of offenders could take place. Instead, reformist 
proposals such as ‘humane containment’ (Home Office, 1969) and ‘positive 
custodial’ treatment (Home Office, 1979) have tended to take a more realistic 
approach, which no longer embraced the positive aim of reform and rehabilitation 
but focused on  negative ones such as avoiding brutality and restricting the harms 
caused by confinement. The aims of imprisonment thus became more inward-looking: 
what is controllable and worth promoting is to ensure that life in prisons does not fail 
the basic criteria of normal social life and is thus made less difficult to bear. Such an 
objective-defining approach also reflected the rising influence of managerialism, a 
governance rationality that prioritises the process over substantial results and in the 
case of incarceration tends to apply a commercial-style perspective to address the 
roles of the government (as the purchaser rather than the provider of the service) and 
prisoners (consumers in this case, even though they cannot choose not to consume).  
 
The later published Woolf Report (Home Office, 1991a), which is thought to 
represent the most progressive liberal penal agenda, raised the key themes of 
‘security, control and justice’ and demonstrated an effort to bring meaningful values 
and positive ends into the realistic practices of the regime which were then suffering 
from intense practical dysfunctional problems (manifested by a number of prisoner 
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riots) and an overall legitimacy crisis. Despite the fact it was well accepted by penal 
liberals as well as the government on its publication, the critics held that the 
reformist scheme still failed to address the broader social structure and power 
relations that accounted for the unequal consequences of the imprisonment practices 
for different social groups and that, as a result, the liberal definition of aims for 
prison reform also played a role in securing the hegemony of the structural injustices 
underpinning the operation of the prison system (Sim, 1994).  The Woolf agenda 
marked a changing period for the prison service, but it was not a lasting change. The 
Whitemoor escape event in 1994 gave the Conservative Home Secretary Michael 
Howard the impetus to turn to a more punitive and security-prioritised approach in 
determining the operational framework of prisons. And the Woodlock report (1994), 
following the event, also demonstrated that the execution of the liberal agenda did 
not prevent huge insecurity and disorder problems occurring in prisons. Subsequently, 
the Woolf themes of ‘security, control and justice’ were replaced by the lexicon 
‘custodial care and control’, which instead placed the issue of security at the centre 
of prison service objectives (Home Office, 1995: para 3.39). This new balance 
between security, control and positive ends for prisoners seemed to return to the 
early patterns and practices and became the object of heavy criticism. However, after 
the new Labour government took power, more constructive elements were 
incorporated in the selective rebuilding of the framework of prison objectives, 
particularly in the light of the restatement of the rehabilitative end (see the 
framework of aims and objectives of HM Prison Service in 1998). 
 
This process of defining prison purposes is certainly still ongoing, and the present 
strategic framework of aims and objectives of HM Prison Service may be subject to 
some further changes, particularly when there is an increasingly prominent political 
stake in the sphere. This historical overview reveals that the seemingly stable 
framework of prison objectives and the routine language describing them do not 
necessarily suggest that it is just a static and settled sphere within penal practices. 
Instead, we can note the existence of a process of struggle between quite 
contradictory purposes and rationales, which is never immune from uncertainties and 
profound puzzles. For some authors (Scott, 1997), the enterprise of striving for an 
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acceptable set of operational goals for prisons in the UK is like riding on a ‘penal 
merry-go-round’, and there is ‘the clear inability to find a coherent and sustainable 
set of principles to guide what prisons are for. The numerous, and often contradictory 
aims of imprisonment seem to be constantly reinvented when previous aims have 
exhausted plausibility’ (Scott, 2007: 68).  
 
However, it is still important to note the peculiar features and difficulties regarding 
the orientation of prison purposes in the post-1970s context in the UK. Even if it may 
be anticipated that the objectives of reform and rehabilitation will gain a certain 
degree of revival in prisons in England and Wales or get even strengthened in prisons 
in Scotland, where adherence to the correctional ideal has been more consistent than 
in their English counterparts (McAra, 2006 & 2008 and Robinson, 2008), it no 
longer represents the ambition of pursuing any ideal of overall societal reform. By 
contrast, the rehabilitative aim in the present prison reform context mainly addresses 
institutional issues with a view to improving the experiences of inmates within 
prisons and the external social benefits related to this. In this regard, the liberal 
agenda prioritising the normalisation of the inmate’s life and the conservative agenda 
highlighting security issues stay in similar positions. In contrast, the initiation of the 
‘reforming and rehabilitation’ movement in the late 19
th
 century was in a close 
relationship with the trend of optimistic positivism and contained the key element of 
modern universalism. Within the vision of universal normativity, the orientation of 
the prison reform agenda was in its nature outwardly referential and was less 
susceptible to the problems regarding the uncertainty and circularity surrounding the 
definition of the purposes of imprisonment.  
 
This does not imply that the restoration of a universalist normative scheme is feasible 
within the imprisonment field today or that it should serve as the only solution to the 
contemporary puzzles regarding the aims of incarceration. Rather, it serves to remind 
us that this sphere of the purposes of prisons needs to be examined in a way which is 
fully aware of the implications of the decline of universal normativity and which 





iv. Surroundings and Maintenance of Order 
 
The establishment of prison administrative systems and their operational objectives 
provides a framework for the incarceration practices, but they are by no means equal 
to the concrete happenings within the specific sites of the institutions. The physical 
existence of prison buildings, their interior surroundings, conditions of food, health 
care, exercise and facilities, the routine activities of inmates and staff, above all the 
everyday experiences which take place behind prison walls, constitute the very 
sphere of front-line practices of incarceration, which usually reflect the most 
distinctive features of the institution. Yet this is also a realm which has been largely 
concealed from the public gaze. Thanks to the fruitful work and writings of the 
prison researchers in the UK, we can now base our discussion upon a rich body of 
detailed knowledge about the actual conditions and life in prisons.
21
   
 
First of all, the physical device of imprisonment matters - the design of the 
architecture of prison buildings does not only reflect the purpose of imprisonment, 
but also shapes the way in which the effect of imprisonment is achieved. An 
overview of the history of English prison architecture (Jewkes and Johnston, 2007) 
shows that there is a close connection between the structural character of prison 
buildings and the function they  fulfil in exercising confinement: the buildings of 
prisons like Millbank, Shrewsbury, Pentonville, Wormwood Scrubs and Liverpool 
are all attuned to the major penal ethos of  their times.
22
 It is important to note that 
many of these ancient prisons are still being used by the current English prison 
service. This has created a marked tension between contemporary ends and past 




 prisons incorporate into their 
architecture a tremendously repressive and punitive goal, which is quite incompatible 
                                                 
21
 There is a large  range of studies  which investigate  prison conditions and what is going on inside 
prisons, including Liebling (1995 & 2004), Lippke (2003), Edgar et al. (2003), Reuss (1999), Vagg 
and Smartt (1999), Bosworth (1996), etc.  
22
 In the 18
th
 century, the purposely designed prison architecture was an attempt to meet the need for 
‘reform’ and a reduction of the likelihood of the fatal contagion of ‘gaol fever’; in the mid-19
th
 
century the repressive end become dominant and, over a large part of the 20
th
 century, prisons were 
built  to suit the rehabilitative purpose. See Jewkes and Johnston (2007).  
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with the objectives of the current regime. For example, Pentonville, the ‘model’ 
prison which was opened in 1842, and which was designed under the influence of 
some of the mainstream penal imaginaries in the Victorian age, combines a grim and 
austere image with a panopticon-like internal structure that facilitates the supervision 
of prisoners and the enforcement of the ‘separate system’, which was well received 
at that time, and which aimed to promote moral reformation by restricting the 
chances of communication between the prisoners (Jewkes and Johnston, 2007: 185). 
Such a design also sent a clear message to those outside the prison walls that the 
building was totally for the austere purpose of punishment and repression. Many of 
those past prisons still hold hundreds of thousands of prisoners – even though the 
government has carried out programmes of renovation and refurbishment to make 
them suitable for new functions, many of them cannot reach the same level as the 
more recently built prisons.  
 
Entering into the 21
st
 century, the British prison systems do make some attempts to 
embrace some more advanced ideas about prison design, which is reflected in the 
opening of new-generation prisons like Peterborough in Cambridgeshire. These new 
prison designs have manifested some distinctive ideals differing from the 
conventional prisons through their more considerate use of natural light, their 
creative arrangement of space and by taking more care for the psychological effects 
on the inmates and those who work within them. In the case of Peterborough, it has 
been designed to resemble a shopping centre rather than a jail.
23
 However, the new-
generation prisons only form a very limited part of the whole prison regime in the 
UK. For most of the conventional prisons, the architectural designs are far from 
adequate to address the multiple needs of those living there and they also usually 
reflect the influence of the incorrigible ‘less eligibility’ assumption in their choice of 
a bleak and function-based aesthetics. Furthermore, with the growth of the prison 
population, it is likely that the main priority for the future physical development of 
prisons will be placed on their accommodation capacity rather than their quality and 
innovation. This means that the concerns over the positive use of the prison space 
and architecture will have to wait for the longer term for a better outcome. 
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Apart from the physical design of prisons, the internal surroundings, the arrangement 
of activities and the maintenance of order may have a more direct impact on the life 
of prisoners and staff and they also constitute a significant aspect of prison 
performance. One key indicator of the quality of prison performance in this respect is 
whether the prison can provide enough accommodation and sufficient facilities for 
the inmates. The HM Prison Service has defined it as the uncrowded capacity, which 
represents ‘the good, decent standard of accommodation that service aspires to 
provide all prisoners’ (see, Prison Service Order 1900, Certified Prisoner 
Accommodation). According to the measurement of NOMS, at the end of April 2010, 
80 of the 137 prisons in England and Wales were overcrowded. An investigation 
made in 2009 showed that an average of 20,452 prisoners were either doubled up in 
cells designed for only  one, or three of them were held  in cells designed for two, in 
the year 2008-09 – this number accounts for 24.7% of the total prison population 
(Hansard HC, 19 June 2009, c541W, quoted in Prison Reform Trust, 2010). The 
problem of overcrowding is also often associated with a number of other detrimental 
facets of prison life, such as psychological pathologies and mental disorders. In 2008, 
it was recorded that 2,195 in-cell assaults happened, committed by prisoners on other 
prisoners (NOMS, Safer Custodial News, July/August 2009).  It is obvious that the 
overcrowded prison surroundings and the problem regarding the quality of custodial 
operations are due largely to the marked increase in the prison population. Pressures 
on their accommodation capacity, the shrinking of private space and subsequent 
management challenges are also linked with another important sphere of prison 
performance – the maintenance of security and order inside prisons. Since the 
inmates do not live in prisons out of their own free will, there is an unavoidable 
tension between the smooth running of the custodial routines and the disposition of 
some (if not all) prisoners to pursue their own interests in a way that is at odds with 
the limitations of prison surroundings, let alone the fact that there is always a 
proportion of highly uncooperative inmates in each prison, who represent a constant 
threat to the maintenance of daily order inside the institution. The extreme forms of 
the breakdown of order, i.e. prisoner riots and escapes, have happened in the UK 
only rarely since the 20
th
 century.  However, when they did occur, they usually 
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manifested the fact that there had already been enormous problems with the system 
of prison management. It is thus not surprising that high-profile prison riots like that 
at Strangeways in 1990 and prisoner escape events often lead to an overall review of 
the prison service and the subsequent re-orientation of the systemic practices 
(Carrabine, 2004).  
 
Like the other aspects of prison performance, the issue regarding the maintenance of 
order is always related to the definition of the aims of imprisonment. As we have 
discussed in the preceding part of this essay, it remains a highly unsettled and 
problematic sphere in the context of the British prison systems. In the matter of 
prison order, how to strike a balance between security and good order for the sake of 
prisoners’ well-being is central to the orientation of daily activities inside prisons. 
Some of the latest progress in the field involves the Woolf agenda’s recommendation 
of including the legitimate expectations of prisoners as an essential element in the 
achievement of security and meaningful prison order. From the 1990s onwards, the 
viewpoint within the academic field which highlights the significance of justice and 
legitimacy in maintaining prison order has also attained increasing recognition 
(Sparks and Bottoms, 1995; Sparks et al., 1996).  
 
However, within a political atmosphere that often expresses punitive sentiments 
towards offenders and which is in favour for securing ‘law and order’, any  systemic 
arrangement which aims to go beyond the purpose of safe detainment and the 
minimisation of  risks of riot and escape would be hard to achieve. In the following 
section, we will turn to the particular political context of imprisonment in the UK and 
examine how it affects the institutional performance of prisons.  
 
v. The Political Context 
 
As prisons are funded by public money and their operation constitutes one of the 
primary responsibilities of the government, there is certainly a public stake in the 
way that prison works. However, throughout the modern incarceration history, it is 
more often than not the case that the particular practices that predominate are 
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advocated by a certain small group of penal professionals and experts and these are 
to a great extent insulated from the influence of changing public opinion and 
electoral politics. But, in the last few decades, issues regarding almost all aspects of 
imprisonment have loomed large within the sphere of political contention in the UK. 
Many of the themes we have discussed above used to be within the exclusive 
territory of penal expertise under the penal welfarist regime, but they are now 
increasingly subject to politicisation. From the general arguments over what prisons 
are for, to specific issues such as prisoners’ right to vote and even  seemingly trivial 
aspects of imprisonment such as  food provision and prisoners’ leisure activity,  
prison-related topics are capable of generating emotional discussion in the mass 
media as well as stimulating fierce political debates.  
 
However, in the current context of the politicisation of imprisonment in the UK this 
has been observed to be at some distance from the practice conducted by rational and 
well-informed participants: the leaders of political parties have found it a convenient 
route to gain public support if they stick to a tough stand in fighting crime and 
demonstrate their commitment to security and law and order, whereas the majority of 
ordinary people keep expressing huge concerns about the risks of crime. Over the 
past two decades the crime rates in the country have been in stable decrease as a 
matter of fact (actual crime rates have fallen since 1997 with overall crime having 
reduced by 32%) (Prison Reform Trust, 2010: 60), but research shows that most 
people in Britain do not believe that figure and only one in five is willing to accept 
that crime is falling, and that by contrast up to 83% of people think that violent crime 
is rising (Duffy et al., 2007).  The pervasive feeling of insecurity has led to intolerant 
attitudes towards crime and offenders, and their impact on crime control politics and 
policies have in turn shaped the performance of incarceration.  
 
It is thus not surprising that the professional penological perspective in treating 
prisoners and managing prisons often finds itself at odds with the explicit demands 
arising from populist politics and the mass media. As the current trends seem to 
indicate further decline in the autonomy of professionals’ control over British prisons, 
for the purpose of directing imprisonment practices into a morally defensible  
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trajectory it is no longer sufficient to rely in the conventional fashion on the  
reproducing and testing of a normative consensus within the relatively close group of 
penal professionals: such a position often proves to be impotent when it encounters 
the apparently ‘irrational’ forms of public sentiment and political discourses referring 
to prison issues. The reasons why conventional penal rationality has failed to guide 
the public emotions in this case are multifold; yet an important one is related to its 
often self-referential characteristics – in the absence of any universal normativity, the 
performance of the conventional penal rationality and its values is less likely to claim 
overall validity and thus it lacks the necessary strength to win the battle with populist 
politics. We will carry further our study of this issue in Chapter 4, which focuses on 
the dynamics of populist imaginaries of imprisonment.  
 
vi. Key Challenges for Practices of Imprisonment in the UK 
 
Based on the discussion in the preceding section, we are now able to summarise 
some of the key challenges faced by practitioners and theorists working for the 
improvement of prisons in the UK. They include:  
a. Challenge of imprisonment scale 
 
The total scale of the prison population not only makes the UK prison system stand 
out among its European counterparts, but also gives rise to enormous fiscal and 
management problems.  
 
Moreover, the high proportion of prisoners among the general population also means 
that the penal regime of the society keeps a substantial number of its citizens in 
custodial institutions – this inevitably engenders legitimacy questions regarding the 
custodial regimes in the country as well as the existing socio-political arrangement 
which makes them possible. 
 
There are also legitimacy challenges when it comes to the minority groups and non-
citizens detained in British prisons – foreigners, black people and other minority 
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ethnic members, the urban ‘underclass’ and other disadvantaged groups – whose 
representation in prisons is markedly higher than in the general population. 
Investigations made on such grounds should also be associated with more wide-
ranging concerns about social and political justice which need to be addressed 
beyond the practical considerations of constraining inmates’ numbers and the 
expenses of running the institutions. 
b. Problems about prison conditions and good order  
 
The second challenge refers to the improvement of the living conditions of prisons 
and the quality of everyday activities for prisoners and staff. Apparently this 
represents a rather conventional and practical challenge for all prison systems. But, 
as we may note from the preceding discussions, to meet this challenge firstly requires 
an acknowledgement and understanding of the specific context of the incarceration 
practices in the UK, which also involves a broad range of issues (the orientation of 
prison objectives, the public justification and politicisation of prison operations) that 
go far beyond the fulfilment of narrowly defined practical ends. 
c. Controversies about institutional aims 
 
This is not a novel challenge either. As has been shown in the foregoing discussion, 
the uncertainty about the objectives of the custodial institutions raises a direct 
question about the normative grounds of their performance. In the contemporary 
field of imprisonment in the UK, this problem remains a prominent one and it can by 
no means be bypassed in any serious pursuit for a better future for the regime (or its 
alternatives). 
d. Penal rationality vs politicised punitiveness 
 
This challenge mainly refers to the problematic relationship between the operation of 
incarceration and the dynamics of political involvement in the penal sphere in the 
UK. The preceding discussion has referred to the tension between the political output 
and the traditional kind of penal rationality in processing practical and normative 
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issues concerning the exercise of the power to punish. This challenge seems to be 
more UK-specific than the other three, as the phenomenon of the intense 
politicisation of penal issues is not commonly observable outside the Anglo-
American countries (Cavadino and Dignan, 2006; Bondeson, 2005 and Nelken, 
2005). 
 
Yet it also involves more general questions regarding the relationship between 
different patterns of performance in normativity regarding the exercise of penal 
power – even in those penal regimes which operate primarily free from the pressures 
of public sentiment and political involvement, the tension between professional 
rationality and intuitive expression is still inherent in the subject, although in a latent 
way.  
 
It is often noted that the different aspects of the circumstances and challenges 
addressed above overlap and exist in close interconnection. Moreover, the 
preliminary examination of the four categories of challenges may have already 
indicated that none of them are purely technical or speculative; instead they combine 
both practical and normative elements.  
 
vii. Supplementary Discussions 
 
It is important to acknowledge that the discussions offered above are not yet 
sufficient to cover all aspects of the circumstances of the imprisonment practices 
current in the UK. And it requires more efforts to figure out a comprehensive account 
of that. Yet the current section attempts to fulfil the task of providing a descriptive 
framework for addressing the basic context of imprisonment in the UK, upon which 
the studies in the following chapters are carried out. In each of the chapters, more 
contextual information will be added in the discussions where necessary.  
 
We also notice that the circumstances of British prisons have so far motivated intense 
political engagement and public concerns which have generated a need for reflecting 
and reworking the normative foundations of the whole praxis of imprisonment in 
49 
 
terms of its defensible purposes, effects, alternatives and broad socio-political 
implications. In this respect, the dynamics of imprisonment in the UK involve an 
inherent but not yet concluded normative dimension, which is reflected in a variety 
of attempts to tackle, manage, frame, argue for and against the current imprisonment 
complex from diverse points of view. Along with the almost routine political tone of 
adhering to tough crime control policies and ‘prison works’ mottoes,  there are not 
only widely disseminated tabloid reports voicing the populist (and often punitive) 
demand for  penal measures, such as longer and tougher imprisonment, but also more 





Moreover, it has been observed that the operations of incarceration institutions 
themselves have also undergone certain forms of transformation or adaptation in 
terms of the specific techniques, strategies and ‘internal logics’ that are being applied 
in them, which often involve latent but significant changes in - or implicit appeal to - 
the normative assumptions that orient these institutional practices.
25
 Those highly 
divergent sources of practical knowledge, notions, opinions and discourses have 
together constituted the principal cognitive structure upon which any substantial 
changes and reforms in imprisonment practice in this country will have to draw in 
the near future. As we have tried to demonstrate in the introduction section, they 
represent the social imaginary spectrum of post-welfarist imprisonment, which 
provides the starting point for our inquiries into the normative performance within 
the field and the enterprise of re-normalising the imaginaries of imprisonment. In the 
following chapters, we will specify the representative forms of imaginaries that we 






                                                 
24
 We will discuss this further in Chapter 3 (II.ii).  
25
 We will discuss this in more detail in Chapter 5, which investigates the dynamics of risk-oriented 
imaginaries of imprisonment.   
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Chapter 2    Methodology 
 
I. Challenges and Objectives 
 
In the latter part of Chapter 1, we have provided an overview of the current situation 
of British prisons. What stands out in this is the acute tension between the widely 
perceived failures at various practical levels of the regimes and the highly divergent 
and fragmented discursive spectrum which is no longer able to engender any 
fundamental consensus regarding the goals and purposes of the custodial practice. 
Compared with the penal-welfarist era and the earlier penal reform phases in the UK, 
we can observe that the contemporary field of imprisonment is largely devoid of any 
universalist vision of those penal ideals that are vital to modern penal regimes in 
mobilising prison reforms and granting the regime a moral character. Moreover, it 
seems to lack any genuine universalist aspiration at all. Even though, following the 
decline of the traditional rehabilitative paradigm, we have witnessed the emergence 
of various new approaches towards redefining the role and tasks of prison, none of 
them have yet demonstrated any  prospect of constituting a new overarching 
framework for defending the legitimate grounds of custodial regimes and 
illuminating their reformative future. On the contrary, it has become increasingly 
evident that the current discourses about imprisonment are found to be either 
drastically punitive or characterised by cynical retreat or pragmatic calculations. This 
suggests that the contemporary predicament of British prisons is not one that is 
confined to practicality, but has profound normative implications. Our examination 
shows that the legitimacy deficit of the incarceration system cannot be resolved 
simply by pursuing certain practical goals, such as controlling the scale of the 
detained population and allocating more resources to make the prison a more secure 
and less detrimental place for its inmates and staff; instead, it can be addressed 
appropriately only when the ways of conceiving of the role and purpose of 
imprisonment have been  thoroughly reflected upon, revitalised and re-normalised.  
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The challenge we face is thus to find a way of uncovering and making intelligible the 
particular normative realities of the contemporary custodial sphere and finding out 
what is required if we want to make things different from their problematic status 
quo.  In order to carry out this task, we need to deal with an area that has not yet 
received sufficient attention and examination in the criminological literatures, 
namely the normative performance of penal imaginaries. The methodological 
challenge thus concerns how to process the particular normative materials in the 
form of penal imaginaries in a way which can relate the findings adequately to the 
pursuit of our demonstrated objective of revitalising and re-normalising the post-
welfarist imprisonment spectrum. As we will make clear in the later part of the 
chapter, this methodological challenge is intimately connected with the fact/value 
dichotomy in social scientific studies. What we need to do is to search for an 
effective methodological approach to overcome the limitations of the dichotomy and 
make feasible a productive enquiry into the post-welfarist normative performance in 
the imprisonment field. 
 
In this chapter, we will first review two representative approaches to normative 
studies in the penological field. On the basis of that, we will discuss why we need an 
alternative methodological approach to treat the subject matter of our research. In the 
major part of the chapter, we will try to display a broadened perspective of normative 
studies by re-interpreting Durkheim’s moral secularisation project and his social-
historical hermeneutics approach. Drawing on these insights, we will proceed to 
develop and outline the particular methodological scheme for our research project, 
one that is based on the concept of introspective normativity and resorting to its 
analytical-evaluative perspective.    
 
II. Two Existing Approaches to Normative Penological Understanding 
 
i. The Normativist Approach 
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This particular approach covers a wide range of theoretical undertakings which seek 
to ‘reason’ about good penal norms and principles (in their respective perspectives) 
and make them the moral (and usually epistemological) basis for handling the 
contestable issues in the penal field such as the justification of legal punishment, the 
constraints on it, the individual’s moral rights, the nature of a just social order, etc. It 
is easy to see that they employ doctrinal or philosophical analyses as the major tool 
to establish their ideal visions about what a just punishment system should be and to 
decide the specific penal issues in accordance with these analyses. 
 
The normativist approach within the normative penological discipline can be traced 
back to the initiating phase of the modern punishment systems, when the legal 
theorists and moral philosophers, including Kant, Beccaria, Bentham and others, 
managed to delineate the essential ideological landscape for speculation upon the 
normative foundations of legal punishment. All of the major justifying rationales 
which are familiar to contemporary prison students - deterrence, rehabilitation, 
incapacitation and retribution - were addressed by those early modern penological 




However, what interests us here are the more recent theoretical undertakings in the 
discipline of normative penological studies which, in the context of the loss of faith 
in the rehabilitative paradigm and the ‘death of the social’, call for a resurrection of 
the ‘great debate’ about the moral justification of punishment, and a ‘fundamental 
reexamination of goals’ (Bean, 1981; von Hirsch, 1986: 4).
2
 As those efforts have 
been largely oriented to suit contemporary circumstances and audiences, they 
constitute the major sources for us to probe into the current normativist approaches 
dealing with penological topics. Due to the huge amount of literature in this field, in 
the present section we seek to select some representative cases for discussion, and we 
hope that this work can help to illustrate how we view the contemporary normativist 
approach as a particular method within normative penological studies.  
                                                 
1
 As for the normative penological thinkings in the enlightenment phase, we can find their delicate 
elaborations in a number of key texts (e.g. Kant, 1991; Bentham, 1962; Beccaria, 1964) as well as in 
numerous literature which provides reviews of and further discussions on them (e.g. Jenkins, 1984; 
Salter, 1999; Valier, 2002; Beirne, ed, 1994). 
2
 See Rose (1996) for his discussion about the phenomenon of the ‘death of the social’.  
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For most of these normativist analyses, what looms large within their perspective is 
first of all the need to settle the ‘first principle’ for the whole structure of discourses. 
With regard to legal punishment, the predominant effort is devoted to the revelation 
and defence of the fundamental rationale for justifying its employment. Since almost 
every such fundamental justification was articulated in the early penal philosophical 
texts and is by no means novel, such analyses usually involve the genealogical 
discussion of the existing philosophical arguments pertaining to their favoured 
principles. On the other hand, the rival theories and philosophies are often identified 
and subjected to examination so that the righteousness of the claimed theories can be 
further re-affirmed. On the subject of imprisonment, we can find quite polemical 
normativist arguments about its ‘fundamental goals’. One of the most prominent 
refers to the revival of the retributivist approach, which has been closely associated 
with the criticism of the treatment model which featured in the penological debates 
during the 1970s in the UK. A large number of theorists have produced voluminous 
writings in favour of this stand and have provided a rich body of normativist 
defences for it since then (e.g. von Hirsch, 1985, 1986; Moore, 1995, 1993; Kershnar, 
2000). Among those works, we can often discern a strong attack upon the utilitarian 
or consequentialist logic which buttresses the practice of legal punishment, and 
particularly confinement, as a means of crime prevention. From their perspectives, 
moral appropriateness should be held as superior to social utility when it comes to 
punishment. For example, in elaborating his ‘just desert’ theory, Andrew von Hirsch 
made great resort to Kant’s categorical imperative which stated that individuals 
should be treated as ends rather than as means and thus rejected the utilitarian 
premise that the suffering of a few people can be made good by the benefits accruing 
to many. From this moral-philosophical standpoint, a penalty is thus ‘not just a 
means of crime prevention but a merited response to the actor’s deed, ‘‘rectifying the 
balance’’ in the Kantian sense and expressing the moral reprobation of the actor for 
the wrong’ (von Hirsch, 1986: 51).  
 
In accordance with this moral-philosophical style of reasoning is the way in which 
the chief research questions are organised. From the general level ‘grand’ questions 
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to more specific ones, the normativist approach is accustomed to a pattern which 
resembles a philosophical debate. They are put forward in a way which invites 
comprehensive moral philosophical speculation and implies a significance that goes 
somewhat beyond temporal-spatial particularities.
3
  Since those normative questions 
per se are not very context-reliant, abstract analytical models and the method of 
‘gedankenexperiment’ is often applied to process them. In the case of von Hirsch’s 
theory, for instance, the author carried out such an experiment by imagining what 
would happen if society responded to crime in a morally neural fashion, where the 
result of the test, unsurprisingly, led to the confirmation of the author’s moral theory 
(1985: 51).  
 
What if there is a tremendous gap between the ideal moral state of punishment and 
the social reality of structured socio-economic inequality, as well as its damaging 
impact on the individual’s moral agency? Again, the normativist approach often 
resorts to abstract analytical models to address the ‘variations’. Lippke (2007), who 
in his imprisonment studies adheres to the retribuitivist line of argument and 
advocates  ‘less restrictive and degrading forms of confinement’, has offered a 
typical example in this regard. Being fully aware of the disparity between the ideal 
conditions for applying the retributive principle and the problematic social reality, 
the author developed a two-level analysis to address this. The A-level analysis deals 
with what imprisonment should be in a ‘reasonably just society’, whereas the B-level 
analysis addresses cases where such a condition is missing. Depending upon each 
specific missing element in the principle normative scheme for confinement, the 
author then seeks to make corresponding modifications. By applying this strategy, 
the author thus manages to preserve the integrity and coherence of the supported 
moral theory while extending it to a complicated socially realistic context.  
 
                                                 
3
 For instance: ‘Once a murder has taken place, is the only reason for penalizing the murderer to 
prevent subsequent violations by him or others? Or is there, at that point, a retrospective reason for 
punishing – that the murderer deserves to be punished? And if so, how is the notion of deserved 
punishment to be explained? (von Hirsch, 1986: 47)’ And with regard to the prison and prisoners: 
‘Should their basic physical and psychological welfare be assured? Should prisoners be denied access 
to paid labor or, alternatively, forced to work? To what extent should they be granted autonomy over 
their lives? Should they enjoy any privacy? (Lippke, 2007: 1)’   
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Given the prominence of the ‘first principle’ within the normativist approach, it is 
hardly surprising that its application has scarcely eliminated the moral theoretical 
perspectives which are derived from disparate ‘first principles’. In the imprisonment 
discipline, there are also alternative approaches to retributivist theories, but whose 
method of discursive construction is rather analogous to such approaches. We may 
take the abolitionist approach as an illustration of this. Its central claim is totally 
contrary to that of the retributivists: there is no acceptable moral basis for the state to 
inflict penalties and the existing penal system should be replaced by non-penal 
alternatives.
4
  Yet the abolitionist theory may also employ a similarly normativist 
approach to establish and defend its claims. In one such undertaking, Boonin (2008, 
chapter 3) in fact advances his abolitionist analyses in a way that is parallel to 
retributivist theories but by making counter-arguments against retributivist reasoning. 
On the other hand, abolitionist theories also involve extensive ‘revival’ of grand 
moral philosophical questions, but they tend to resort to a different genealogy from 




Furthermore, we may also see the application of the normativist approach outside the 
academic sphere. It is not uncommon, for instance, to find it in the public discourses 
about legal sanctions and prisons, which may be generated by diverse actors, ranging 
from religious leaders to victim-rights representatives. In those cases we can discern 
very wide disparities regarding their respective normative appeals.  
 
Let us consider then whether the normativist approach can work as a suitable method 
for treating the subject-matter of our research project and achieving its target?  
 
In the first place, we can see that it represents the most straightforward way of 
advancing normative thinking, and there are plenty of powerful ideas that have been 
engendered in this broad tradition. Most often they also enable audiences to 
                                                 
4
 There are great variations in perspectives and analytical approaches within the abolitionist tradition, 
in this section we only touch on some limited aspects of it and pay major attention to its normativist 
representation. For more comprehensive visions on the topic, see the penal abolitionist works: 
Mathiesen (1974 & 1990), Boonin (2008) and Christie (2004).  
5
 In this case, more diverse sources of ideas are consulted, such as Aristotle, Hegel, Rousseau, Spinoza, 
etc. See, for example, one of the recent abolitionist works by Ruggiero (2010).   
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recognise what constitutes the essential normative foundation which underlies 
specific penological claims, particularly when their different normative premises are 
exposed as being in sharp contrast with each other.   
 
However, such a methodological approach also has obvious shortcomings when it 
has to address audiences who do not share its substantive ‘first principle’ 
assumptions – a situation which would frequently occur in those contemporary 
societies where value pluralism has been a dominant feature in the discourses of 
public life. This is also related to the inconclusive nature of the normativist approach 
per se. As the foregoing discussion shows, the normativist style of argument may be 
applied within divergent moral theoretical perspectives and yet achieve the same 
level of internal coherence. Under such conditions, the normativist approach may 
well succeed in reinforcing the allegiances of those people who share its core claims 
and expanding the approach to include others whose beliefs are logically associated 
with it but to whom it is not yet normatively ‘obvious’, but its persuasive effect 
would probably shrink considerably once it reached beyond the circle of the target 
audience and had to compete with other normativist discourses which are not short of 
logical coherence and whose central appeals attract and resonate well with their 
respectively targeted audiences. For this reason, we can hardly expect the normativist 
approach to reach any substantive consensus regarding normative understanding in 
the post-welfarist imprisonment sphere. On the contrary, in the face of the multiple 
pluralistic strands of penal imaginaries, it tends to consolidate the tensions and 
contradictions between their respective moral premises rather than to reconcile or 
integrate them in any decisive direction.  
 
Secondly, the normativist approach in essence clings to the ‘value/fact’ dichotomy, 
whereas it tends to conceive the normative facet of the penal sphere as a realm of 
debate between different abstract values and norms. This means that it has a rather 
limited capacity to address the particular normative realities in a given context, 
particularly with regard to the post-welfarist penal dynamics.
6
  Accordingly, it also 
                                                 
6
 Garland (1983 & 1990) argues that the moral philosophical approach within the penal field lacks a 
proper understanding of the complicated social underpinnings of punishment and simply treats the 
question as an abstract one of how to respond to those individuals who commit offences. In his view, 
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lacks any appropriate means to establish an inherent connection between its 
normative queries and the examination of multiple forms of penal imaginaries in 
their concrete socio-political settings.  
 
Finally, and most importantly, the decline of universal normativity is considered by 
us as constituting the chief normative predicament in the current imprisonment field, 
but this challenge can rarely be met by a methodological framework based on the 
normativist approach. In fact, it usually shares the universalist assumption that there 
is one essential normative solution to the problems of punishment and that the 
disagreement between different normativist theories mostly refers to what this 
solution is. However, in a context which is deeply divided and fragmented by 
pluralistic normative visions, the normativist approach can seldom capture its 
idiosyncratic character but is inclined to impose one homogeneous model upon the 
inherently non-homogeneous normative realities. Yet to seek to eradicate differences 
within the spectrum has proved not only infeasible, but also counterproductive for 
the endeavour to direct and mobilise its transformation. 
 
Drawing on the discussion above, we can reach the conclusion that in order to pursue 
our research goal, we need a methodological approach other than the normativist one.   
 
ii. The Sociology of Punishment 
 
The other approach we want to discuss refers to the enterprise of the sociology of 
punishment. It is noteworthy that this is by no means a single approach, but consists 
of very diverse research bodies and methodological perspectives. There are 
Foucauldian approaches which centre upon the analyses of the relationship between 
power, discourse and the technology of government (Foucault, 1977; Smart 1983; 
Burchell et al., eds, 1991); and Marxist approaches which examine the connections 
of the penal system with the particular political-economic and class-struggle 
                                                                                                                                          
the moral choice is only possible when the social implications of the penal dynamics (power, ideology, 
domination, cultural sensitivity, etc) have been adequately examined, and this forms the weakest point 
of the moralistic theories. We will consider this point of view again in the following section which 
discusses the sociological approach.     
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structures in the industrialised societies (Rusche and Kirchherimer, 1968; De Giorgi, 
2006); and also social psychological and cultural studies of punishment which 
explore the cultural sensitivities underlying society’s penal performance (Ferrell et 
al., 2004; Ferrell, 2008; Young, 2007); and also feminist approaches (Rafter and 
Heidensohn, eds, 1995; Heidensohn, 2000; Naffine, 1996).  Apart from these grand 
perspectives, there are also massive middle and lower-scale empirical sociological 





Among those sociological works, it is relatively unusual for them to place normative 
inquiry at the centre of their studies, since their primary interest lies in explaining 
certain social implications and structural underpinnings of the penality regimes. 
Some of those approaches, typically the positivist sociological studies, explicitly 
reject any direct normative engagement within their theoretical pursuits, and many of 
them implicitly adhere to the critical distinction between the realm of facts and that 
of values.  
  
However, this does not mean that these sociological approaches are in principle 
detached from the normative queries related to the puzzles within the penal field. As 
we will soon discuss, over the past three decades there has been a growing concern 
within this discipline about the need to address the political implications of the 
sociological understanding of penal phenomena. In fact, even the most ‘detached’ 
approach among them – the positivist sociology – is nonetheless engaged in certain 




In the present section, our aim is to examine the ways in which these sociological 
approaches are entangled with a normative penological understanding so as to find 
out whether they can possibly meet the methodological requirements of our research 
project. Due to the extensive scope and scale of the sociology of punishment (the 
works listed above are certainly far from exhaustive), it is quite beyond feasibility, in 
                                                 
7
 See Sykes (1958), and many others, e.g. Bosworth et al. (2005), Liebling (1999) and Simon (2000).  
8
 We will shed more light on this point in our interpretation of the positivist and non-positivist 
elements of Durkheim’s work, which will be carried out in the next part of the chapter.  
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such a limited space as we can afford in this chapter, to give a comprehensive review 
of each of the major theoretical traditions pertaining to the enterprise. However, there 
is still another alternative approach to the process of our inquiry. Since sociological 
studies started to become a prominent undertaking within the penal academic field, 
there has been an ever-growing self-reflexive literature within this discipline, which 
seeks to uncover what it can aspire to accomplish in the changing social settings, 
what forms its proper subject-matter, how to make use of the legacy of the classic 
social theorists, and what role it has to play in addressing the current political 
atmosphere concerning penal issues (Garland and Young, 1983; Garland, 1990; 
Sparks, 1997; Loader and Sparks, 2005; Garland and Sparks, 2000).  Apart from this, 
there is also a rich body of concrete researches dealing with contemporary penal 
issues, which are closely associated with it (some of them are produced by the same 
authors, e.g. Garland, 2001a). Those works together present a general self-
understanding of the sociological strand of studies in the UK and also provide 
resources for comprehending how it is actually carried out. Drawing upon them, we 
are thus able to figure out how the sociological approach is, actually and expectedly, 
applied to deal with the contemporary penal phenomena and whether it constitutes an 
appropriate method to address the post-welfarist normative predicament and to meet 




The sociological approach in studying these penal issues, in particular the strand of 
social analysis which has invested a broader interest than the positivist-empiricist 
research approach, started to thrive in the UK from the 1960s, when the orthodox 
penological framework was undergoing harsh criticism within the academic realm. 
The emergence of critical criminology questioned the very premise of traditional 
penology that views penal practice exclusively as responses to crime and offenders 
by articulating a theoretical angle which exposes how criminal justice produces its 
own objects (the deviants) and exerts control over them through its selective 
                                                 
9
 We are aware that this strategy for narrowing down the scope of the sociology of punishment which 
is to be examined has a marked limitation in excluding the important methodological insights 
embedded in certain prominent theoretical traditions. In order to remedy this limitation, we will 
extend the methodological discussion to include some more in-depth issues regarding the sociological 
approach when we undertake the task of interpreting and reconstructing Durkheim’s work in the 
following section.  
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labelling strategies. This undertaking thus called for a thorough re-examination of the 
social and political underpinnings of the penal systems. On the other hand, the 
revival of the interpretation of the social theory classics and the publication of 
Foucault’s studies on discipline provided a broad range of theoretical perspectives 
for understanding the practices in the penal realm in a way which is far more 
comprehensive and multidimensional than orthodox penology. Such works, 
especially those which emanated from Marxist-Foucauldian perspectives, sought also 
to install a political dimension into penological studies, not least with regard to the 





Therefore, in the development of contemporary social studies of punishment within 
the UK, there has been an abiding interest in overcoming the conventional technicist 
and positivist ways of accounting for penal practice and promoting an understanding 
which is not purely descriptive and explanatory, but more politically sensitive and 
normatively reflexive than ‘administrative penology’ (see also, Sparks, 2007b and 
Garland and Sparks, 2000). It is this particular normative bearing that captures our 
chief attention in our probe into these sociological approaches.   
    
To start with, we may roughly differentiate between two general types of normative 
engagement within the contemporary sociological approaches identified above. One 
is radical and the other moderate. The radical strand mainly sprang from the critical 
deviance criminology of the 1960s and those adopting a Marxist analytical 
perspective. Its methodological appeal is characterised by the point that the social 
analysis of penal practice should be at the same time a form of ‘political calculation’ 
(Garland and Young, 1983). Under this perspective, ‘the theoretical and the practical 
must be seen as inseparable, as ontologically equivalent. In other words, analysis, 
evaluation and theorising are properly understood as inherent, necessary and 
irremovable elements in any social practice – whether these practices conserve 
existing social arrangements (as in the case of technicist penologies), or revolutionise 
them’ (ibid.: 32). How can this aim be accomplished in social analysis? The key 
                                                 
10
 For more discussion about the rise and development of the social understanding of penality in the 
British academic field, see Garland and Young (1983).  
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point lies in the exposure of alternative arrangements, which can function to 
illuminate the partial and arbitrary nature of the status quo of penal practice through 
demonstrating themselves to be ‘more socialist, more popular, more democratic – 
which aspire to the paradox of a liberative penalty’ (ibid.: 33). Such alternatives 
include ‘popular involvement, community discipline, local and informal sanctions 
[which] are possibilities (and have occasionally been actualities in China, Cuba and 
elsewhere) with a progressive potential to be developed’ (ibid.: 35). In essence, the 
radical approach has adopted Marxist attitudes towards the role of theory: it must be 
oriented to changing the world rather than merely explaining it.  
 
The moderate perspective, instead, gives more credit to the explanatory power of 
social studies and tends to adopt a two-step analytical strategy to handle the relation 
between the explanatory and the normative. The first step is to account for how the 
realities in the penal sphere can be comprehend pertinently; drawing on that, people 
are expected to be able to carry out the task of the next step: to figure out the 
normative implications of such findings and decide on the favourable directions and 
goals of reform and corresponding actions to materialise them. The moderate view is 
typical of Garland’s (1990) work on the re-interpretation of major social theoretical 
traditions in comprehending the penal phenomena. Like many other works by this 
author, it has a close connection with the attempt to address the immanent 
problematics of ‘the present’. Through the critical evaluation of a plurality of 
perspectives on punishment (including those of Durkheim, Rusche and Kirchheimer, 
Foucault, Weber and so on), Garland proposes a multidimensional analytical 
framework which takes punishment as ‘a social institution’ that involves multiple 
layers of significances and mechanisms of social functions and representations. This 
work suggests that in order to respond to the predicament of modern punishment – 
which has suffered from the ‘lack of a future’ in terms of its ability to re-define a 
vision that is different from the present configuration, it is necessary to expand the 
analytical scope of the phenomena – from the narrowly defined framework of 
administrative penology towards a broader sociological understanding. The diverse 
angles of those multiple theoretical traditions, despite their disagreement as to what 
constitutes the essence of punishment, are held to be capable of  coexisting within the 
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same explanatory framework and they can jointly shed light on penal dynamics, after 
a process of critical examination and reconstruction (Garland 1990).  
 
Apart from this work of theoretical re-interpretation, Garland’s (2001a) study of the 
post-1970s penal complex also provides an example of the moderate form of 
normative undertaking adopted by the sociological approach. In The Culture of 
Control, the author sought to account for the new penal policies, ideologies and 
patterns of institutional practices that have arisen in the post-1970s Anglo-American 
societies and to explore their political, social and cultural underpinnings. This 
investigation led to the conclusion that what occurred in the post-1970s penal field 
constituted a fundamental transformation from the conventional regime of penal 
welfarism towards a more control-oriented and exclusive complex of practices and 
representations, in which we witness simultaneously the growth of politicised 
punitive sentiments and the prevalence of pragmatically designed techniques and 
economic-style calculations. Here it is not our aim to go deeply into the topics 
handled by this work, as there are already numerous articles and books carrying out 
extensive reviews, criticisms and further developments of the thesis (e.g., Zedner, 
2002 and Matravers, ed., 2005). Our focus is instead on its methodological logic 
which pertains to the normative undertakings of the sociological approach in general. 
In this respect, Garland’s use of ‘the history of present’ type of analysis is in line 
with what he proposes in Punishment and Modern Society (1990), as we discussed 
above. It is basically an analytic approach engaged in  the task of uncovering penal 
reality as it is, and it explicitly understands itself as logically prior to any serious 
normative engagement, based on the conviction that the latter is possible only when 




Now we are in a position to consider further the two types of normative undertaking 
with regard to the sociology of punishment. To start with, let us examine the 
outcome which has been generated in these sociological studies. In the case of the 
                                                 
11
 As the author alleged, ‘[the] present book proceeds with the same critical intent [as Foucault’s], but 
I have chosen to subdue that normative voice until completing my analysis of how this field of 
practice is constituted in all its complexity and contradiction. One of the abiding lessons of Foucault’s 
example is that if critical theory is to be taken seriously, it will have to first engage with things as they 
actually are’ (Garland, 1990: 3). 
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moderate approach, which is mostly adopted in mainstream sociological penal 
studies, there is little doubt about its analytical fruitfulness and the depth of its 
discoveries. But is it the case that normative insight also follows its social analytical 
accomplishments, as many of those authors envisage? In this regard, the result would 
appear to be quite dismal. The analysis of The Culture of Control, for example, has 
boosted the revelation of the puzzles and predicaments within the post-1970s penal 
sphere, but it has not yet led to any remarkable changes in the normative domain 
pertaining to it. The fact is that what is entailed in social analysis as such is most 
often the re-affirmation of some general and abiding normative claims and 
dispositions (e.g. those against suppression and exclusion – in short, the ‘iron cage’ 
style of social control - and those supporting more ‘democratic’, ‘emancipatory’ 
alternatives).  But it is hard to say whether the triumph of the social analytical 
enterprise increases the purchase of such normative claims among their audiences (or, 
if possible, converts any of those with conservative views of punishment). It is also 
difficult to assert that this enterprise has brought any substantive changes to the 
normative landscape of the post-welfarist penal sphere per se.   
 
The discernable lack of normative revitalisation (which was supposed to follow the 
analytical success) in this problematic field suggests that the moderate approach has 
crucial limitations in terms of realising its normative aspirations. One marked 
shortcoming of the approach is that it has not truly overcome the assumption of the 
fact/value distinction. Indeed, what differentiates it from positivism is that it is 
mobilised by a strong interest in challenging the routine normative framework within 
the penal realm and stimulating reforms. This interest, however, would not 
necessarily engender any feasible and self-conscious methodological insight as to 
how to make explicit in a concrete way the normative implications of these social 
analytical findings. This is not to deny the critical strength of those works, or to 
suggest that their findings lack any normative relevance. Yet it is important to note 
that there is great obscurity in the assertion that a value-laden social inquiry would 
automatically lead to normative discoveries or the settlement of normative puzzles. 
The two-step logic of the moderate approach somehow underestimates the difficulty 
of integrating the social analysis and the normative pursuit, and what it actually 
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achieves is still subject to the separation of facts and values.  Despite their analytical 
richness, we can often find in contrast rather ambiguous, unspecific and vaguely-
defined ‘progressive’ statements or suggestions following the completion of the 
explanatory task of those studies adopting the moderate stand. In fact, even in those 
cases in which such ‘normative conclusions’ take a more sophisticated form than 
they usually do, they still have to demonstrate that they are an inherent result of the 
social analysis instead of deriving from the author’s personal political or moral 
preferences, and that the audience should be bound to accept them should the 
‘analytical part’ be recognised. However, such success is not commonly to be 
discerned.
12
     
 
For this reason, the ‘moderate’ sociological approach is in our view not an 
appropriate perspective for advancing inquiries into the normative performance of 
the contemporary imprisonment field. What we want to target is instead an approach 
which would be able to concretely engage in the resolution or transformation of the 
post-universalist predicament, as opposed to mere negotiations about its socio-
cultural causes. In this respect, we need to deal with the normative reality per se 
within this realm and avoid reducing it to certain ‘analytic’ dynamics, whether they 
are those of political economy, or the late-modern socio-cultural complex, or 
neoliberal governance: in the ultimate sense those perspectives can assist, but not 
replace, the task of re-normalising the present incarceration field. 
 
The ‘radical’ sociological approach, on the other hand, proposes a higher level of 
unity of social analysis and normative engagement than the ‘moderate’ one. However, 
in this respect, just as in the latter case, celebrated accomplishments in such 
theory/practice integration have been rare.
13
 As we have discussed already, the 
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 Apart from Garland’s work, mentioned above, we can also see the relatively ‘feeble’ normative 
output (in comparison with their analytical potency) of many mainstream social studies of punishment 
which adopt the moderate type of normative undertaking. For example, Simon’s (2007) influential 
work which probes into the dynamics of ‘governing through crime’ in the contemporary United States 
provides a wide range of empirical analyses upon the subject, but in terms of generating normative 
claims from these analyses (a task that the author alleges  he will undertake from the start) seldom 
goes any further than re-affirming certain allegiances of ‘ordinary Americans’ to a more ‘democratic’, 
less ‘radically polarised’ and ‘innovation stimulating’ society.    
13
 As Garland and Young (1983: 30) have observed, ‘the questions of the unity of theory and practice 
remain continually at the level of potential, rather than fulfilment.’ 
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radical type of sociological approach understands its role as one of producing new 
ideas and indicating alternatives. However, in most cases those ‘alternatives’ remain 
external to the penal reality under examination; that is, they at most present the 
particular form of ‘political calculation’ favoured by the author, but which would not 
necessarily gain allegiance from those audiences who equally recognise the flaws of 
the current penal systems but who are apt to make different normative responses. In 
fact, many critical criminological publications face the somewhat embarrassing 
situation that their critical exposure of the dominant practical realm gains much 
appreciation and applause, whereas their ‘alternative’ normative proposals have been 
largely ignored, particularly by the policy-making bodies.      
 
This relatively infertile normative accomplishment suggests that the ‘radical’ method 
still lacks a concrete and maturely developed framework to process the normative 
reconfiguration of the contemporary penal spectrum. If we trace the origins of these 
methodological thoughts, we may understand better what has hindered the ‘radical’ 
approach from realising its normative potential.   
 
The most complete and influential form of ‘theory/practice’ integration among 
methodological perspectives was presented by the Marxist theories, and the 
contemporary radical type of sociological studies that we have discussed has 
inherited its core insights. Under the Marxist perspective, the role of theory is 
defined as an instrument to change rather than to explain the world, and it is 
intimately associated with the proletariat’s urgent ‘mission’ of class struggle and the 
development of ‘class consciousness’. In contrast to the positivist approach, the use 
of theory is to not governed by the need to uncover objective ‘truth’, but to serve the 
purpose of illuminating the conditions of social existence of the working class, 
exposing the distortions of the ideologies of capitalist society, defining the imminent 
requirements of the class struggle and, ultimately, motivating and guiding the 
realisation of a non-class society. Thus in essence the Marxist theory, in its way of 
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reflecting upon social reality, is an inherent part of the socialist campaign and is 
inseparable from the domain of practice.
14
     
 
It is important to note that this methodological perspective is intrinsically connected 
with a typical political project of modernity, which is characterised by a single route 
of social development (the replacement of the capitalist socio-economic order and its 
representations within the ideological sphere). Thus the ‘political calculation’ 
boosted by the theoretical enterprise has a universalist character which is in 
accordance with the utopian aspirations of Marxism. Though its performance is 
conditioned by the particular socio-historical occasions and is thus not achieved in 
any pre-determined fashion, it implies an intrinsic commitment to such a universalist 
project, without which the immanent content of ‘the political’ in Marxist social 
analysis would be reduced to a drifting and uncertain state.   
 
From this point of view, we may understand the dilemma of the contemporary 
radical sociological method dealing with penal issues. To a great extent it has to face 
circumstances in which this utopian vision is no long in place. As a result, the 
‘political calculation’ inherent in its social analysis effectively lacks any overall 
‘guide’ for illuminating a concrete direction of normative innovation, and it thus can 
only appeal to vague notions about ‘more progressive’ and ‘more socialist’ forms of 
criminal justice. This way of making a normative appeal has no inherent superiority 
over the normativist approach that we discussed in the previous section, and it 
instead signifies the awkward situation for radical sociology of striving to promote a 
value-laden analysis of penal dynamics in a post-universalist context. For the task of 
addressing the problems of the highly pluralistic normative spectrum of the 
contemporary incarceration field and mobilising its transformation in a positive 
fashion, the radical sociological approach, as well as the moderate one, is then 
considered to be devoid of any effective methodological solution of the kind required 
in our research.   
 
                                                 
14
 The account we offer of Marxist methodological ideas is only a generalised one. There are a number 
of texts which give a fuller and more comprehensive elaboration of it, such as Marx’s ‘Theses on 
Feuerbach’; also see Luk cs (1971), Korsch (1970) and Althusser (1999).  
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iii. Discussion  
 
In the above two sections we have examined two representative approaches in 
dealing with the normative dimension of the penal complex and have found that 
neither of them was capable of carrying out the research task proposed by our project.  
 
The major methodological problem refers to the dichotomy between the factual and 
the normative, which renders counterproductive much of the endeavour to uncover 
the innovative potentials of the normative penal spectrum and to revitalise its 
performance. In the case of the contemporary sociological approach, there has been 
inspirational reflexion upon the necessity of overcoming the dichotomy, as well as 
proposals for a better unity of the two aspects in analysis, but not sufficient means to 
its fulfilment.  
 
As we can see from the foregoing discussions, both the normativist and the 
sociological approaches understand their role in normative undertakings as one of 
providing ‘new ideas’ or ‘alternatives’ to the existing penal practices. Yet for the 
post-welfarist imprisonment field, which is characterised by the decline of universal 
normativity and the fragmentation of pluralistic normative claims, we need a method 
that can enable us to work with the particular normative realities in a self-conscious 
and reflexive way and to direct their transformation.  In this respect, the two existing 
approaches we have discussed are lacking any holistic perspective for systematically 
engaging in the transformation of the post-welfariest normative realities in the 
imprisonment field. Their specific normative claims thus lack any more solid basis 
than the demonstration or suggestion of individual authors’ political and moral 
preferences. There are no strong grounds for them, then, to ask for the allegiances of 
the public to their normative orientations, or to attach a morally superior status to 
them as against all the other post-universalist normative claims. 
 
Therefore, we need new methodological tools to carry out our investigations. In the 
rest of the chapter we will seek to provide such a methodological framework by 
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probing further into the possibilities of bridging the factual and the normative on the 
basis of interpreting Durkheim’s work and exploring its applications within 
contemporary incarceration studies.  
 
 
III. The Method of Examining the Performance of Introspective Normativity 
 
i. Durkheim’s Social-historical Hermeneutics: the Methodological Source 
  
As has been indicated in the preceding paragraphs, we need a peculiar research 
method to address the normative performance in the imprisonment field without 
alienating it or reducing it to something else (e.g. political-economic structural 
change, the transformation of sovereign power in globalisation
15
) and without 
detaching it from the specific social and political settings that constitute its major 
background. Furthermore, such an approach should also be able to shed light on the 
direction in which penal norms and ideals can be transformed constructively. In other 
words, it is supposed to be an analytical tool for illuminating the normative realities 
of the current dynamics of imprisonment which are reflected in penal imaginaries 
with a view to improving their performances.   
 
Under such a requirement there at once emerges the tension between the factual and 
the ideal, the explanatory and the prescriptive. Hitherto there have been a large  
number of research perspectives which have sought to discuss the distinctive features 
of the penal ideological sphere in the post-1970s era and which have already 
produced  a rich body of knowledge.
16
 However, most of them follow the route of the 
sociology of punishment and treat the phenomena mainly from an external 
perspective, that is, they explain them as a particular object of ‘knowledge’ and of 
scientific observation. And, as we noted before, when such approaches go beyond 
their own explanatory undertakings and try to make their own normative claims 
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 See De Giorgi (2006) and Garland (1996). 
16
 There are authors like O’Malley (1999) and Bauman (2002) as well as Sparks (2006) who have 
proposed their respective explanations of the current ideological penal spectrum.  
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concerning the desirable status of imprisonment, they usually could not do anything 
more than resorting to certain exterior doctrines or belief systems which are 
embraced by the individual authors. Indeed, the critical exposure of the post-modern 
societal transformation (or the rise of neo-liberal politics, depending on the 
respective locus of analyses) in explaining some of the prominent features of current 
penal imaginaries does not automatically settle the issue whether they should be 
dispelled and replaced by the state in favour of some other values: in the 
methodological sense these two matters cannot be made identical. Since the spectrum 
of penal ideals is characterised by a tremendous diversity in opinions, the tension 
between the explanatory and the prescriptive becomes even more crucial and 
irreconcilable under those perspectives. After all, the challenge that we face is not 
that of applying a set of agreed principles to judge and rectify the operation of the 
custodial system, but rather to deal with the perplexing state of penal ideals and 
principles themselves. Accordingly, we can scarcely anticipate that the research 
approaches based on the value/fact distinction can manage to tackle the puzzles we 
confront. 
 
Our research thus requires an analytical method that can overcome the limitations in 
this dichotomy as it can be observed in the mainstream sociological studies of penal 
ideology. In this respect, Durkheim’s works have provided resources for inspiring an 
alternative approach to dealing with the sphere of social moralities. In the following 
sections, we will try to identify the particular methodological elements in 
Durkheim’s sociological approach that are relevant to our concerns and will 
demonstrate how they can be re-organised to inform the research method we will 
apply in our analysis of penal imaginaries in the contemporary imprisonment sphere. 
 
a. Why Durkheim? Positivist sociologist versus moral philosopher  
 
At a first glance, Durkheim’s works may not appear to be the most appropriate 
source for the inspiration we seek, because he is usually viewed as one of the leading 
figures whose theories represent the positivist approach in social studies. He is also 
the author of The Rules of Sociological Method, a book which is concerned with 
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building a positivist system of sociological research methods. In it he famously 
claims that social facts should be treated as ‘things’ and should be studied objectively 
as phenomena that are external to individuals (Durkheim, 1938). His classic analysis 
of suicide can be viewed as an typical example of how social phenomena can be 
studied as independent facts regardless of the individual mentalities in society, even 
in those cases which involve certain apparently personal dimensions of an 
individual’s life (such as suicide decisions) (Durkheim, 2002). In this respect his 
approach has something in common with today’s social studies of punishment, which 
are likewise inclined to treat penal phenomena as a factual realm that is itself 




However, what distinguishes Durkheim from most of the contemporary positivists is 
that he explicitly alleged that his approach should be described as a ‘moral science’ 
and that social morality forms the primary subject matter of his sociology.
18
 While 
insisting that morality is subject to scientific understanding and should be examined 
in terms of its reality sui generis in a given society, he also maintained the idea that 
‘moral science’ cannot be separated from ethics and that it is supposed to be capable 
of ‘determining the ideal toward which we are heading confusedly’ (Durkheim, 1964: 
34). And it is meant to reconcile ethics and science, for ‘at the same time that it 
teaches us to respect the moral reality, it furnishes us the means to improve it’ (ibid.: 
36). This position was also clear in the later phase of his research, particularly in his 
sociological studies of education and religion, which were allegedly directed and 
instructed by his peculiar normative scheme.
19
 Apart from his typology of social 
organisations, the author is also remembered as one of the prominent advocates of 
social solidarity and collective ends. That may be the reason why, in the eyes of 
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 Durkheim (1964 & 1992) also made his own particular contribution to penological studies and has 
inspired contemporary reflections on penal phenomena (e.g. Garland, 1990). Some of his 
contributions will be discussed in Chapter 4 (II.iv) in relation to the understanding of populist ways of 
imaging imprisonment.  
18
 In the very early phase of his academic career, Durkheim had already demonstrated that his primary 
concerns were linked to the issue of social morality in the rapidly changing times of 19
th
 century 
France. For example, this standpoint was stressed in his first preface to The Division of Labor in 
Society (Durkheim, 1964: 32-34). It was also manifest across extensive areas of his research, despite 
the fact that its particular focuses shifted during different research stages.  
19
 See Durkheim (1975, 1973 & 1961). We will return to this point with more discussion in the 
following sections.  
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commentators like Ernest Wallwork (1971), Durkheim is above all a moral 
philosopher.  
   
The contrast between the positivist sociologist and the moral philosopher indicates 
that Durkheim’s approach may somehow involve very different angles from that of 
contemporary ‘social facts’ oriented studies. However, the academic critics who have 
commented on his dual pursuits (science and morality) have scarcely taken any pains 
to probe into the particular mechanisms in his works which are related to this 
dualism. Most of them tend to attribute it simply to Durkheim’s confusion of two 
quite different spheres. For example, George E.G. Catlin, who wrote the introduction 
to the English version of The Rules of Sociological Method, asserted that one of the 
main weaknesses of Durkheim’s approach was that it confused science and ethics 
(Durkheim, 1938: xix). This opinion is not so different from contemporary 
perspectives assuming the non-transcendable gap between the sphere of value and 
that of fact. Based on that perspective, to deduce moral principles from the studies of 
social facts is not legitimate. To resolve this confusion, Durkheim’s sociological 
legacy has to be divided into two distinct parts: one refers to his positivist research 
into the objective social facts and the other to the author’s own solidarity-oriented 
moral theory.  
 
However, if we examine carefully Durkheim’s work in the light of the purpose he 
aspired to pursue, we will realise that the image that has been created is rather 
inaccurate and impoverished. For concerns about social morality, rather than pure 
scientific curiosity, serve as the very starting point of Durkheim’s sociological 
undertaking. In essence, his endeavour was aimed at a profound accomplishment in 
reconstructing and refounding the moral foundations of the society of his time which 
was undergoing tremendous transformation. As we will see later, the characteristics 
of this pursuit are in many respects comparable to the challenges in the contemporary 
imprisonment field targeted by our research project. It is upon such a basis that we 
consider Durkheim’s work as a distinctive source of inspiration for us to rethink and 
refine its methodological framework with a view to overcoming the limitations of 
positivist approaches.  
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Let us proceed further in considering this point. Durkheim’s major ambition and his 
overall research scheme (which consists of a host of specific research topics) receive 
systemic expression in his lectures which form the basis of the book Moral 
Education (Durkheim, 1961). Although the main target of those lectures was to 
provide guidance for school teachers as to how to nurture the moral temperament and 
habits of their pupils, at the very beginning they propose a sophisticated theory 
which not only elaborated a general rationale for moral education, but also outlined 
some broad objectives pertaining to Durkheim’s ‘moral science’. To describe it 
briefly, his project was set up as a response to the social and political changes which 
had created the supremacy of ‘modern principles’ (rationalism and individualism) as 
against the traditional revealed religions in the social-moral sphere and the primary 
target of his sociology, or moral science, was to facilitate the establishment and 
enhancement of moral bonds under the rationalistic premises of modern society. In 
other words, it is an endeavour directed towards the building of a secular morality. 
To achieve this goal, Durkheim assumes that the moral science must make progress 
in performing two interconnected tasks: the first is to discover the essence of 
morality and separate it from its religious intermediary without impoverishing it; the 
other is to investigate how such moral realities should be developed and oriented 
towards the present social conditions (Durkheim, 1961).  
 
It is worth noting that the task of secularising morality is itself a moral pursuit within 
Durkheim’s scheme. It becomes necessary because, with the rise of modern 
rationalism and individualism, revealed religion can no longer serve as the shelter for 
accommodating the moral authority of society. In the modern context, sufficient 
reasons must be given if they are to claim adherence from the members of society. In 
the social-moral realm non-reflexive orthodoxies and doctrines could no longer claim 
obedience from individuals as they did in the ancien regime. Instead, they tended to 
become targets of criticism by those who sought to push the rational principle to 
cover all social spheres.  However, in Durkheim’s view it is dangerous to destroy the 
entire religious underpinning of morality while merely substituting for it certain 
reductionist ‘rational moral systems’: ‘It was enough, so they said, to teach the old 
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morality of our fathers, while avoiding recourse to any religious notion. In reality, 
the task was much more complex. It was not enough to proceed by simple 
elimination to reach the proposed goal. On the contrary, a profound transformation 
was necessary’ (Durkheim, 1961: 8). The critical challenge lies in the difficulty of 
preserving the substantial element of morality while making it secularised and 
rationalised. In essence, it amounts to reconciling the sphere of reason and that of 
belief. Notably, this task resonates with our primary methodological concern as to 
how to overcome the limitations of the contemporary approaches in addressing the 
normative aspect of the imprisonment complex. However, when Durkheim 
elaborated the scheme of ‘moral science’, the tricky side of the situation (in his view) 
was the danger of anarchy, which implied that the traditional moral authority became 
vulnerable before various attacks which questioned its legitimacy and which even 
sought to pull it down altogether.
20
 To avoid an anarchic state thus required the moral 
science to contribute to the creation and development of a new form of morality that 
would be capable of preserving its force under conditions where rationalism prevails 
and authoritarian doctrines are not automatically justified.  
 
It is significant to note that in expressing the ideal of a moral science Durkheim 
refused to adopt any exterior approaches in addressing the predicament of morality in 
his time. For him, morality per se lies at the centre of his scheme and it cannot be 
reduced to subordinate representations of some other social phenomena. This 
position was quite different from the fashionable evolutionary theories (such as the 
theory of Herbert Spencer, one of his main intellectual rivals) that were current in his 
time, which were inclined to view moral notions as the result of material 
development and the adaptation of human organisations (in the same sense it was 
contrary to classic Marxist dialectical materialism, which treated morality as a 
superstructure dependent on the circumstances of the dominant economic 
relationships in society).  For Durkheim’s moral science, the threat of anarchy was 
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 ‘For we are living precisely in one of those critical, revolutionary periods when authority is usually 
weakened through the loss of traditional discipline – a time that may easily give rise to a spirit of 
anarchy. This is the sources of the anarchic aspirations that, whether consciously or not, are emerging 
today, not only in the particular sects bearing the name, but in the very different doctrines that, 
although opposed on other points, join in a common aversion to anything smacking of regulation’ 
(Durkheim, 1961: 54). 
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firstly a matter concerning morality rather than undesired outcomes measured in any 
utilitarian fashion. Thus its task was not to find substitutes for morality, but to re-
discover, strengthen and develop the moral reality so that it could survive and thrive 
in the modern environment. This is also why religions (particularly primitive 
religions) formed an important subject matter for his sociology, for they have been 
the principle sources of the society’s moral representations and therefore they are 
considered as the starting point for the task of uncovering the moral reality and 
transforming it into a rational form. In Durkheim’s words, ‘[w]e must seek, in the 
very heart of religious conceptions, those moral realities that are, as it were, lost and 
dissimulated in it. We must disengage them, find out what they consist of, determine 
their proper nature, and express them in rational language. In a word, we must 
discover the rational substitutes for those religious notions that for a long time have 
served as the vehicle for the most essential moral ideas’ (1961: 9).  Therefore, the 
purpose of moral science is ultimately morality itself: it is not merely about scientific 
discovery and explanation, but is itself a moral pursuit and constitutes a significant 
part of the enterprise of the secularisation and reconstruction of morality.   
 
It becomes clear then that the core of Durkheim’s scheme is practice-oriented and is 
essentially concerned with settling the problematic issues in the moral sphere per se. 
Now we can question how this can be made possible within a research approach 
which is directed towards treating social facts rather than abstract moral notions? 
This question is closely associated with our own methodological challenge, as we 
also face a particular normative predicament and need feasible theoretical tools to 
address it with a view to improving the normative performances within (rather than 
merely the understanding of) the imprisonment field. Further exploration in 
Durkheim’s works can hopefully shed some light on this question. In the following 
section we will find that the methodological source of Durkheim’s enquiries is far 
from homogeneous and one-dimensional; it is instead composed of multiple angles 
and unsolved tensions between each of them. Among them we can identify a specific 
methodological approach which can be termed social-historical hermeneutics. It is 
this peculiar methodological source that will play a key role in informing our 
introspective normativity analysis.  
 75 
 
b. Directing social studies towards moral reconstruction: Durkheim’s strategies 
 
We have discussed the moral element in Durkheim’s sociology and have also 
mentioned the criticism that it risked confusing the relations between science and 
ethics. Indeed, under the positivist principle of social studies, knowledge about 
‘facts’ cannot determine the sphere of beliefs. Then how can Durkheim’s ‘moral 
science’ fulfil its goal of directing the project of substantive moral reconstruction and 
how can it defend itself against the accusation that in doing this it confuses the roles 
of science and ethics?  
 
In the first place, we can observe that many aspects of Durkheim’s sociological 
studies demonstrate a strong positivist character and it is by no means fortuitous that 
he is viewed by many as one of the representative figures in positivist sociology. In 
many of his works, he stresses repeatedly that social phenomena should be treated as 
‘things’, which are external to and independent of the individual’s consciousness.
21
 
But how can such collective and exterior facts tell us how to act according to the 
requirements of morality, which is mostly conceived of as falling within the sphere 
of individual conscience?  
 
One of the strategies that Durkheim employs to address the issue is to establish a set 
of criteria for distinguishing the ‘normal’ and the ‘pathological’ with regard to the 
performance of social solidarity. If this distinction is plausible, the aim of his 
sociology can then be reasonably described as facilitating the transformation of 
morality from the pathological state to the normal one. The crucial point of these 
strategies refers to how the ‘normal’ and the ‘pathological’ should be defined 
‘scientifically’ rather than in any arbitrary or value-laden ways. Durkheim believed 
this was possible and in his The Rules of Sociological Method (Durkheim, 1938: 
chapter III) he took great pains to establish some applicable principles for its exercise. 
In general, his attempt was greatly influenced by 19
th
 century biological science. He 
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 See, for example, Durkheim (1964: 35; 1938: 64; 1961: 5).  
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developed the notions of the normal and the pathological by analogy with the healthy 
and morbid states of an organism. What lies at the heart of the dichotomy is the 
concept of the average type: ‘We shall call ‘‘normal’’ these social conditions that are 
the most generally distributed, and the others ‘‘morbid’’ or ‘‘pathological’’. If we 
designate as ‘‘average type’’ that hypothetical being that is constructed by 
assembling in the same individual, the  most frequent forms, one may say that the 
normal type merges with the average type, and the every deviation from this standard 
of health is a morbid phenomenon’ (ibid.: 55). Under this perspective, what is normal 
can be judged on the basis of observable facts: that it is most widely distributed. But 
the observation of external facts is not sufficient: the ultimate determination of the 
normal state requires the revelation of its logical necessity, which is the task of a 
sociological analysis that uncovers the underlying cause of the dominance of the 
average type.  
 
It can be noted that this way of establishing normality is deeply oriented towards an 
evolutionary vision of society. The average types are first of all considered as the 
most general types and their great frequency is deemed to be ‘a proof of their 
superiority’ (ibid.: 58). Indeed, as a research tool, this differentiating principle can 
inspire very revealing findings in terms of the not-so-explicit functions of those 
social phenomena which assume great generality but are not morally desired in the 
opinions of lay persons, such as crime and punishment.  However, this strategy based 
on the evolutionary view can hardly justify the claim that the normality established 
by ‘scientific’ analysis ought to serve as the right grounds for the norms of the 
society. For example, in a Durkheimian analysis, the existence of crime, due to its 
ubiquitous distribution, should be viewed as the normal state of society rather than 
one of the pathologies (ibid.: 66-73).
 
Yet there is an obvious gap between this 
sociological finding and the penological norms that decide what should be the just 
response to crime. As a matter of fact, the evolutionary understanding of social 
normality is no longer accepted as a legitimate way of bridging facts and values in 
the contemporary imaginaries.  
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There is yet another strategy that is applied by Durkheim to integrate social studies 
with moral construction and we can also review it briefly here. It refers to the 
peculiar kind of narrative arrangement that incorporates a normative element into the 
depiction or ‘storytelling’ of the social world. In Durkheim’s case, the grand 
narrative or ‘world view’ constitution centres upon the idea of collective 
consciousness or social solidarity. On the one hand, it is a descriptive-analytical 
concept that explains the operations and attributes of specific societal organisations. 
For example, in The Division of Labor in Society, it is applied to account for the 
different forms of social bonds and their corresponding legal representations. On the 
other hand, it also suggests what the ideal state of society through the organisation of 
various elements in the sociological account which gives different meanings as well 
as different values to various social sectors, goals, behaviours and groups of people. 
As a result the narrative has succeeded in incorporating its specific moral ends into 
its descriptive scheme. This is why in Durkheim’s works we usually get an integral 
impression that his sociological accounts ‘naturally’ lead to the desirable goal of 
pursuing social solidarity and collective ends.  
 
However, such a ‘natural’ integration of the descriptive and the normative cannot 
always be sustained when we expose it to reflexive examination. The main reason for 
this is that the narrative per se is never a fixed account. In fact, there are always 
counter-narratives (e.g. there are Marxist narratives which involve very different 
ways of organising the normative status of the elements constituting the social world). 
In the meantime it is hardly plausible to identify a criterion for deciding which 
narratives are more ‘true’ than the others. Thus we cannot consider this strategy as 
competent to bear the task of directing social studies towards reconstruction in the 
moral field.  
 
c. Social-historical hermeneutics and rationalised morality 
 
We have thus examined two particular strategies that are applied in Durkheim’s 
works and concluded that they are not pertinent in terms of serving the moral 
reconstruction endeavour, which is a critical concern for both Durkheim’s ‘moral 
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science’ and our own proposed research scheme. But we will see in the paragraphs 
below that Durkheim’s research also involves a methodological strategy which is 
rather distinct from (and even contrary to) the positivist approach and grand narrative 
approach but which turns out to be more effective in realising the author’s aspirations 
as well as meeting the methodological challenge that we confront.  
 
In discussing the moral facet of Durkheim’s sociological project, we have already 
noted that, unlike many other moral theorists, he is rather sensitive to the unique 
characteristics of performances within the moral domain, which he often treats as 
analogous to the ‘sacred domain’ in terms of religious experiences. As he pointed out, 
‘[t]he domain of morality is as if surrounded by a mysterious barrier which keeps 
violators at arm’s length, just as the religious domain is protected from the reach of 
the profane. It is a sacred domain. All the things it comprises are as if invested with a 
particular dignity that raises them above our empirical individuality’ (Durkheim, 
1961: 10). Thus, while he was consistently stressing the point  that moral phenomena 
should be treated as ‘social facts’ and ‘things’, he also realised that these moral 
‘facts’ are quite different from those of the material world:  ‘There is something 
about prescriptions of morality that imposes particular respect from them. While all 
opinions relating to the material world – to the physical or mental organisation of 
either animals or men – are today entitled to free discussion, people do not admit that 
moral beliefs should be as freely subjected to criticism…. The response is quite 
different from that which a scientific heresy might arouse. It resembles at every point 
the reprobation that the blasphemer arouses in the soul of the believer’ (ibid.: 9).    
 
What we are concerned with here is not merely the unique nature of the moral sphere, 
but also the proper method of handling it. The tricky part of the job is that if it should 
it be treated in the same way as the material world is by natural science, then the 
particular dignity of morality would be lost and, accordingly, it would fail to 
continue to be itself. What has been left is only an ‘impoverished and colourless’ 
form of morality. Therefore, in order to approach the realities of morality, it is 
essential to preserve the moral character of morality and avoid reducing it to 




 This requirement actually raises the issue of integrating 
sociological enquiries with moral development. The former must manage to 
rationalise and secularise morality without losing its moral nature; in this respect it 
becomes part of the moral pursuit itself, as throughout its progress it cannot be 
detached from the moral reality sui generis and its concrete appeals to the members 
of society. From this point of view, the positivist approach can scarcely support such 
an undertaking, for it is always inclined to substitute something else (something 
neutral and devoid of moral essence) for the moral domain and thus it is unable to 
present it as it really is.   
 
How then does Durkheim seek to fulfil this task? The preceding examination has 
revealed that his methodological strategies are far from singular. And we have 
already concluded that his positivist facts-based approach and solidarity-oriented 
narrative construction are not capable of doing this. However, as we will soon try to 
make clear, his works also contain one important resource for taking up the 
endeavour and realising the ambition of his ‘moral science’. This is the hermeneutic 
element in his sociology.  
 
By examining and interpreting a number of sociological accomplishments of 
Durkheim, we will be able to shed light on this particular element of his method. It is 
dispersed among different territories of his research and by no means constitutes a 
consistent theoretical framework. However, its application can be reorganised and 
may form the foundation of a coherent methodology which we will term ‘social-
historical hermeneutics’. In the paragraphs below, we will demonstrate how this can 
be achieved and what its major contours encompass.  
 
Firstly, the most significant feature of this social-historical hermeneutics is that it 
attempts to shed ‘rational’ light on the various forms of performance in the moral 
domain and in the meantime to preserve and develop its moral realities sui generis.  
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 Durkheim stressed the same requirement in his studies on religion; in his contribution to the 
discussion ‘Religious Sentiment at the Present Time’ he demonstrated that ‘in brief, what I ask of the 
free thinker is that he should confront religion in the same mental state as the believer. It is only by 
doing this that he can hope to understand it. Let him feel it as the believer feels it; what it is to the 
believer is what it really is’ (1975: 184).   
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For Durkheim, one of the most troubling aspects of the moral domain is its 
exteriority to individual consciousness. He observes that morality functions in a way 
that is rather similar to physical forces: it commands individuals to behave as it 
requires rather than follow their own desires. In short, it is not any abstract system of 
ideas and notions, but a living force. Thus at the centre of his theories there is the 
assumption that morality is a substantive reality in spite of its intangibility. It is 
important to note that the substantive concept of morality is not merely employed to 
account for the empirical social phenomena, but serves as the normative basis for 
deciding what the desired circumstances of societal organisation are. In the view of 
Durkheim, any particular society has its own morality, and thus the modern moral 
values are not justified in the context of primitive society. In short, there are no 
exterior standards beyond the moral realities of a specific society which can have an 
ultimate say in judging its normative issues. Instead of belonging to the 
individualistic and idealistic sphere, morality is a real and collective domain. It is 
factual as well as normative.  
 
However, as we have discussed before, there is a tremendous tension between the 
two realms. If the collective morality is considered as something substantive and 
factual, there are no reasons why it should not be studied in the same way as the 
material world is. But in that case how can its unique moral character, which 
stimulates individual’s obedience and respect, be preserved? As we shall see soon, 
individualism itself has been acknowledged by Durkheim as one of the core elements 
of the modern morality, and its essential claim is that moral behaviour must be 
derived from autonomy rather than heteronomy. Accordingly, if morality is 
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 In fact, the Durkheimian notion of a substantive social being (morality) is one of the most 
controversial among his commentators.  On one hand, it is not purely empirical and cannot be 
established on the basis of any observable evidence. On the other, it seems to strengthen the 
conservative disposition against social reforms. See, for example, the discussion of criticisms of 
Durkheimian sociology by Adorno (Hagens: 2006). However, these critiques seldom notice the 
essential connection between the idea of substantive morals and the inherent goal of Durkheim’s 
studies in pursing the construction of a secular morality.  
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Therefore, the gap between the exterior moral reality and individual autonomy poses 
a critical challenge to Durkheim’s pursuit of moral reconstruction. This 
methodological difficulty, however, is also related to the author’s efforts in 
developing certain strategies to reconcile this tension identified as such. Unlike the 
strategies we have discussed hitherto, they are mainly conducted in a hermeneutic 
style. By exposing the moral sphere in a rational but non-reductionist fashion, they 
seek to make it internalisable by individuals, who previously tended to accept its 
dominion as something imposed from outside, real but incomprehensible. These 
hermeneutic strategies thus try to reveal the realities of morals to those who have 
been practicing them and enable them to understand and recognise such realities as 
part of their own being.  As the result of this hermeneutics, the rationalised morality 
still preserves its moral character and its own reality sui generis, but it is also 
developed and more tightly incorporated into the realms of individual consciousness, 
moral choice and decision-making, which in turn participate more dynamically and 
more consciously in the society’s moral representations and practice.   
 
In the early research phase of Durkheim’s work, there was already a hermeneutic 
element, but it is usually expressed in some kind of semi-biological or semi-
psychological terminology. For example, in The Division of Labor in Society, apart 
from his functional-structuralist account of morality, he invested great efforts in the 
task of uncovering and presenting the moral realities of the social collective 
phenomena as they are. He was not only interested in revealing the structural levels 
of different types of moral bonds, but also their concrete dynamics. In this way he 
tried to make intelligible not only the indirect rationale of morality but the 
mechanisms through which it got realised: ‘Every strong state of conscience is a 
source of life; it is an essential factor of our general vitality. Consequently everything 
that tends to enfeeble it wastes and corrupts us. There results a troubled sense of 
illness analogous to that which we feel when an important function is suspended or 
lapses. It is then inevitable that we should react energetically against the cause that 
threatens us with such diminution, that we strain to do away with it in order to 
maintain the integrity of our conscience’ (Durkheim, 1964: 96-97). In analysing the 
performance of the moral domain, the hermeneutics focused on the exposure of its 
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living dynamics with a view to enabling the individual readers who would have 
already experienced it to grasp its comprehensive representations and thus to 
understand it in a rational light. It is worth noticing that such understandings are 
different from those informed by professional knowledge. They do not point to any 
external and previously-unknown factors which objectively cause the phenomena, 
but work by stimulating the self-reflection of the individuals and acquire their 
particular strength through the integrating of the exterior and the interior.  We may 
consider another example in which Durkheim provided a hermeneutic account of 
moral performance in the sphere of punishment and revenge. He vividly described 
the mechanism through which the society responds to its deviant members; by 
exposing that, he succeeded in relating the individual reader to the representation of 
the living realities of such types of moral performance.
24
 As a result, such realities 
also enter the sphere of individual consciousness (but not as knowledge of exterior 
facts) and participate in nurturing the inherent experiences which can underpin the 
individual’s autonomous moral reflection and praxis. Certainly, the hermeneutics 
does not decide what the individual should believe or whether she should adhere to 
the realities that it uncovers. Its unique objective is instead concerned with  
displaying such realities effectively: they are not presented as external phenomena 
which do not correspond to the individual’s moral being, but as a particular sphere 
that is activating and, in a sense, real for her self-understanding. 
 
However, there are notable limitations in such hermeneutic cases. As they are deeply 
influenced by the logics borrowed from psychology and biology, they are not entirely 
accurate and pertinent by virtue of displaying the moral realities. Such a hermeneutic 
strategy has the merit of making its content more accessible to its audience (who are 
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 See Durkheim’s example of a hermeneutic analysis of social response to deviancies: ‘That is why a 
conviction opposed to ours cannot manifest itself in our presence without troubling us; that is because, 
at the same time, it penetrates us, and finding itself in conflict with everything that it encounters, 
causes real disorders. Of course, in so far as the conflict ensues only between abstract ideas, there is 
nothing disastrous about it, because there is nothing deep about it. The realm of ideas is at the same 
time the most elevated and the most superficial in conscience, and the changes which it undergoes, not 
having any extended repercussions, have only feeble effects upon us. But when it is a question of a 
belief which is dear to us, we do not, and cannot, permit a contrary belief to rear its head with 
impunity. Every offense directed against it calls forth an emotional reaction, more or less violent, 
which turns against the offender. We inveigh against it, we work against it, we will to do something to 
it, and the sentiments so evolved cannot fail to translate themselves into actions. We run away from it, 
we hold it at a distance, we banish it from our society, etc’ (1964: 97-98). 
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familiar with the psychological and biological reasoning-style and tend to accept 
metaphors and analogies based on that), but it risks losing the idiosyncratic character 
of morality per se, which is by no means identical to any psychological and 
biological process. To solve this problem hermeneutics must be made more morally-
oriented and should aim at exposing the unique realities of the moral domain per se.  
 
There are, however, also other hermeneutic resources within Durkheim’s works 
which involve attempts to meet the requirement mentioned above. Such resources 
can often be observed to be entangled with the strategies already identified in this 
chapter and they are not systematically organised as a single unitary approach. For 
this reason we need to gather together those discrete hermeneutic elements from 
multiple texts of Durkheim and re-organise them in the hope of showing how they 
may inform a coherent approach. Such hermeneutic elements are more commonly 
found in his later works, in particular the studies of primitive religions and moral 
education. Based on a thoughtful examination of these works we can identify a 
Durkheimian approach in the hermeneutics of norms, which consists of two parts: the 
hermeneutics of the formal aspect of morality and the hermeneutics of substantive 
norms.  
 
The former is represented by his sophisticated theory of moral education, in which he 
tries to provide a rational account of the social representation of morals (Durkheim, 
1961). This effort is closely related to the goal of the secularisation of morality which 
we have previously discussed. The major challenge of this task, in Durkheim’s view, 
is to disengage moral norms from their religious symbols, and present them in their 
rational ‘nakedness’ so that their reality can be felt without any mythical 
intermediaries: ‘[t]his is the first order of business: we want moral education to 
become rational and at the same time to produce all the results that should be 
expected from it’ (ibid.: 11). Therefore there is a need to provide an account of what 
morality is without having recourse to any exterior notions (like revealed religions). 
What Durkheim provides is a social-formalistic theory of morality. It views morality 
as consisting of three elements: the spirit of discipline, social attachment and 
individual autonomy (We are not going to go into details here but are primarily 
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concerned with highlighting his peculiar methodological perspective). It is 
noteworthy that the theory distances itself from the positivist understanding of 
morality by taking pains to reveal the internal dynamics in which the realities of 
morality get presented. The three elements of morality are discussed not as certain 
testable factors viewed from an exterior vantage point, but are hermeneutically 
established, in accordance with an internal gaze upon the living moral performance 
of individuals. For example, in studying the first element (the spirit of discipline), 
Durkheim’s angle is not oriented towards its role in the normal functioning of the 
social world, but instead he highlights how it is made possible as an inherent part of 
the social performances of individuals. Discipline as a moral characteristic is thus not 
simply viewed as a necessary constraint on individual wills that targets some 
collective utilitarian ends, but primarily as those interior phenomenological 
representations that are indispensable to the realisation of the moral essence of every 
social being: ‘If we believe that discipline is useful, indeed necessary for the 
individual, it is because it seems to us demanded by nature itself. It is the way in 
which nature realizes itself normally, not a way of minimizing or destroying nature’ 
(ibid.: 50-51). According to this formula, discipline is inherent in  those social beings 
who are by nature ‘limited’ and whose moral existence can only flourish within 
certain limitations (in terms of moral ideas and sentiments). In other words, the 
dynamics of moral performance essentially involve the restriction of the individual 
will: this must not be understood in terms of means and ends, but as a fundamental 
facet of the realisation of the moral sphere per se.  
 
Durkheim’s specific notions about discipline may be contestable, yet it is important 
to note that his strategy of presenting morality largely dispenses with the biological 
or psychological perspectives which can be observed in many of his early studies of 
social morality, and it turns instead a hermeneutic gaze on those inherent dynamics 
of moral realities which unavoidably pertain to individual consciousness but which 
nevertheless preserve a ubiquitous and objective character. In this way, the elements 
of moral phenomena are unpacked and made understandable for the targeted 
audience of moral education and, in the meantime, the hermeneutic strategy renders 
them able to be felt by the audience without losing their ‘natural dignity’, or the 
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moral nature of morality. In fact it is also a re-establishment of such dignity within a 
rational context, and in doing so it strengthens it with the effective interaction and 
participation of its targeted audience. In this respect, the hermeneutic approach is 
itself part of the moral pursuit: it enables members of modern society to embrace and 
revitalise the moral domain reflexively without alienating it or making it become 
something exterior.  
 
However, we can note that Durkheim’s theory of the three elements of morality is 
mainly concerned with the formal aspect of the moral performance rather than with 
substantive norms. This means that it is a general perspective and it can be applied in 
the same way to different contexts of various societies and moralities.
25
 However, in 
doing this, the moral science has to restrict its capacity for responding to concrete 
moral questions in a given social-historical setting, in which people unavoidably face 
the divergence of substantive norms and the urgency of making choices. The case of 
Durkheim’s pursuit of a moral science demonstrated this clearly: in the author’s own 
time there existed tremendous tensions between conflicting orientations regarding the 
construction of national morals (e.g. should laissez-faire libertarianism or social 
solidarity be determined as the guiding principle for the future of French society?). 
Such an essential choice can scarcely made on the basis of a formalistic theory of 
morality.   
 
Therefore, if hermeneutics makes the formal or the ubiquitous aspect of morality its 
sole subject-matter, that means that it is still at a significant distance from its goal, 
namely that the targeted audience of moral education needs to be empowered to 
approach the realities of the moral traditions which appear to them as exterior, to 
comprehend them as they are and integrate them proactively into their self-
understanding and moral actions. In short, we can hardly anticipate that a formally 
understood morality can claim any ‘sacred’ character in relation to its audience, for 
whom it still cannot be fully distinguished from the general ‘factual sphere’, despite 
its being presented in hermeneutic depth. Moreover, a moral science which is 
stripped of the substantive content of its norms and which is concerned merely with 
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 The third element, ‘autonomy’, however, is deemed by the author to be unique to modern morality.  
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their common constituent features risks playing down the moral nature of morality 
and opens the door to the manipulation of the moral sphere. In the extreme case, 
‘being moral’ would be detached from the question of ‘what moral end should we 
pursue in our concrete living circumstances?’ and it would be held as a sufficient 
condition in itself for realising the individual’s social identity as well as the solidarity 
of society. Differing from plain moral relativism, which tends to refrain from 
engaging in orthodox moral construction, such a position adheres rather closely to 
the practice of ‘moral engineering’: its major goal is to help  the society become 
effectively moralised, whereas it does not matter much what specific norms are 
selected to meet the goal. Apparently to treat the moral sphere in this way involves 
great dangers, as is manifested in the history of 20
th
 century, and it is also utterly 




Therefore, for the purpose of moral reconstruction, we also need to extend the 
method of hermeneutic introspection into concrete norms and the specific moral 
systems. It is not rare, in Durkheim’s studies, that the specific content of substantive 
norms is treated as their subject matter. In spite of the fact that the positivist 
approach prevails in most of them, there are also a number of noteworthy cases 
which involve the application of hermeneutics. This can mainly be observed in his 
studies of penological norms and family norms.
27
 In those cases the author tended to 
situate his enquiries within a particular social-historical context. His strategy will be 
summarised in the following paragraph. 
 
At the beginning of these studies the audience is presented with a set of particular 
norms (e.g. the penological norm of proportionality, the prohibition of incest and 
norms regulating sexual relationships) which are dominant in her time, but which 
nonetheless are experienced by her as external forces: she knows that she should 
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 Durkheim (1961: 118) also realises the tension between autonomy and the commanding nature of 
morality, and his tactic to reconcile the two spheres is related to the belief that good understanding, or 
knowledge, of the moral forces and their rationales will lead individuals to embrace and adhere to the 
discipline of morality out of their own free will. However, as we have discussed, knowledge of 
morality per se cannot transform the exterior nature of morality and fully resolve the tension between 
it and individual autonomy. In its place there is a need for hermeneutics, which is capable of 
empowering the individuals as well as the society to re-discover the moral realities as part of their pre-
existing beings and to make authentic moral decisions in accordance with them.    
27
 See Durkheim (1964, 1992, 1979 & 2003). 
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obey their commands and she can intuitively perceive the norms as something real 
and vibrant, but she yet does not know why they are as they are and what are the 
sources of their moral authority. Most often she has to depend on various 
commonsensical discourses (for example, crime would increase if the principle of 
proportionate penalty was dismissed; incest leads to genetic diseases) to justify her 
moral intuitions and adherence to those norms. But, under rational scrutiny, such 
discourses would receive little support from empirical evidence. In a word those 
discourses are vulnerable to serious challenges and, as a matter of fact, they are a 
compromise with the exteriority of those norms that they buttress, rather than 
effectively transforming it into the sphere of autonomous moral decision-making. 
 
The strategy of social-historical hermeneutics is developed in order to address such a 
situation by uncovering the performances of the norms within a social-historical 
context. First of all, it accounts for how the patterns of these norms have changed 
over time and how their moral realities have sustained and develop into their present 
forms. By doing this it manages to provide a rational framework for understanding 
these norms as they are. Secondly, it is concerned with unpacking and transmitting 
the sacred nature of the moral domain to its audience. In this respect, it does not only 
require a macro account of why the norms are what they are, but also an 
introspective hermeneutics which is capable of making the concrete realities of the 
‘moral’ sphere effectively present to the audience who presumably already accept 
and have even internalised the norms but who previously perceived them as 
something exterior to their autonomous moral consciousness. The effect of this 
introspective hermeneutics is then to connect the macro social-historical account of 
norms with their living performances, which penetrate and contribute to the 
construction of the individual’s own moral being. As a result, the moral realities of 
those norms which are being hermeneutically investigated are no longer perceived as 
exterior, but are established as the introspective realities which are inherent in 
autonomous moral decision making (of individuals as well as particular social groups, 
both of whom can be considered as both the audience and the subject of moral 
science and moral education).  
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It is worth noting that the outcome of such social-historical hermeneutics is not 
merely knowledge or a rational account about norms, but also the enrichment of 
morality itself, for it ultimately participates in the vital task of moral reconstruction 
(of various under-rationalised but still vibrant normative resources and traditions). 
For its audience, the norms which have been hermeneutically unpacked can thus 
effectively constitute what she can embrace and draw upon in exercising her 
particular moral autonomy. And this outcome is in total accord with the purpose of 
Durkheim’s moral science, i.e. establishing a secular morality which is both rational 
and moral.   
 
The social-historical hermeneutics strategy, however, is an ideal case that is based on 
an interpretation of various studies of Durkheim. It is only partially realised in his 
works. His studies of the penological norms, for example, achieve a potent social-
historical account of patterns of penal practice (Durkheim, 1964 & 1992), but they 
are deeply influenced by functionalism. The hermeneutic element is relatively weak 
in that case.  
 
In his later research phases, however, this element has become more and more 
evident. His studies in the field of fundamental family and sexual norms have 
provided a rich body of resources in this respect (Durkheim, 1898, 1915 & 1979). On 
the one hand, his research extended  to include those phenomena in  primitive 
societies in which the earliest forms of family and sexual relations can be found (e.g. 
the exogamy system in clan societies); on the other, it sought to identify the 
contemporary norms regulating such relations (e.g. the prohibition of incest). What 
the author tried to highlight was not simply the history of ‘changes’ in sexual and 
familial norms, but the connection between those distinctive systems in the light of 
their hermeneutic reality for the members of particular societies. The introduction of 
a social-historical framework serves to enable a re-discovery of what constitutes the 
binding nature of the norms that are still living in the audience’s daily sexual and 
familial interactions. Such an approach does not only aim to explain and provide 
insight, but it also fulfils the task of moral education. Unlike the traditional dogmatic 
and authoritarian way of instilling familial and sexual values into pupils, the 
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Durkheimian approach based on social-historical hermeneutics first  acknowledges 
the profoundly perplexing and even ‘mysterious’ character of sexual norms 
(Durkheim, 1979: 147-149), and then tries to expose it to  a rational hermeneutic 
light. This process essentially requires the engagement of the audience: only when 
they are able to approach the reality of such a normative domain with all its 
perplexing and even paradox facets can the goal of successful moral education be 
met. In an ideal situation, the norms with their particular reality are reflexively 
recognised by the individual, who is then enlightened as well as empowered to make 
authentic decisions in pursuing the peculiar moral ends involved in her familial and 
sexual life.   
 
Therefore, social-historical hermeneutics can be viewed as more effective and 
pertinent than those other strategies (especially positivist methods) which have been 
discussed already for meeting the challenge within the Durkheimian project of moral 
construction. However, it is also necessary to be aware of the fact that this effect has 
been proved merely in a very limited area within Durkheim’s studies (familial and 
sex norms).  Its potential for informing our research method for dealing with the 
normative performances of imprisonment still needs to be carefully examined. 
 
ii. Developing Durkheim’s Methodological Thoughts to Serve A Different Context 
 
The approach of social-historical hermeneutics identified above can be viewed as 
aiming at the essential requirement of bridging  factual research and normative re-
construction (as pursued by Durkheim’s ‘moral science’). Notably, this is also the 
central concern of our thesis. As we showed at the start of this chapter, what puzzles 
contemporary custodial practice in the UK has a profound normative dimension, 
which has not yet been addressed appropriately in the current literature studying the 
post-1970s ‘penal crisis’. Both the normativist analytical and the positivist 
sociological approaches, as we discussed earlier, have failed to carry out the task of 
pointing out the direction of the normative enterprise in the post-welfarist 
imprisonment field. The former inherits a logic and a conceptual structure which 
essentially serves a universal normativity which is no longer in place, and its 
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capacity for dealing with the current dilemmas pertaining to the fragmentary and 
pluralist normative landscape is limited. The latter, on the other hand, lacks any 
suitable theoretical tools to address the issue of normativity per se, and this has 
weakened its capacity to defend its own particular normative orientations and to 
contribute prolifically to normative pursuits within the current custodial spectrum. 
What is implied in both of these two approaches is the crucial dichotomy between 
value and fact, which in effect renders sterile the endeavour of addressing the 
challenges in the post-welfarist incarceration field and re-normalising it 
constructively. In order to overcome such shortcomings, we need an alternative 
method which is sufficiently normativity-sensitive and at the same time capable of 
achieving a more integral appreciation of the relationship between the factual and the 
normative than either the positivist or the normativist approaches.  
 
In this regard, Durkheim’s social-historical hermeneutics is particularly inspiring as 
it demonstrates the potential for advancing moral studies in a way which creatively 
bridges the factual and the normative, and it also proves to be much more 
normativity-sensitive than the positivist approaches. In the following paragraphs, we 
will consider how this methodological insight may be transformed to meet the 
particular needs of our own research project.  
 
In the first place, it is vital to recognise the great contextual difference between 
Durkheim’s moral science and our research into the contemporary imprisonment 
field. This means that in order to adequately fulfil our research purpose, the strategies 
we identified in interpreting Durkheim’s works need to be modified in significant 
ways. 
 
Durkheim’s moral science aimed to preserve and protect the existing moral resources 
from being completely torn down by the radical rationalism of his time. The 
hermeneutics applied by him is thus mainly directed at revealing the realities of 
traditional moral resources, like those of revealed religions, with a view to re-
expressing them in a rational language and incorporating them into the secular moral 
education scheme. Thus, for Durkheim, the first and most important thing is to 
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rescue what is still living and effective in traditional morality; then there comes the 
‘new’ morality which develops on the basis of it and in the meantime reflects the 
needs of the changed social milieu. Moreover, the whole secular moral construction 
project is basically conceived of as a single-route development. For, within the 
perspective of Durkheim, what marked modern society was the realisation of a 
definite set of organisational principles and patterns of solidarity, thus the ‘truth’ of 
the societal reality is singular in nature, and so is its corresponding system of 




In the contemporary imprisonment field, however, the situation is quite different 
from that of the ‘classic’ modern context. What troubles the normative spectrum is 
not a dominant orthodox system which requires rationalisation in order to regain its 
moral authority, but rather the tremendous diversity between multiple heterogeneous 
rationales, most of which have established their own sophisticated discourses and 
typical approaches towards generating normative imaginaries and claims. Under such 
circumstances, it is rather implausible to assume that there is a singular reality that 
can justify a unique rationale for guiding custodial practice. The first crucial task is 
then to address the plurality of such ‘realities’ regarding the normative performances 
of the contemporary imprisonment field.  
 
On the other hand, we also have to face the excess of discourses and ways of 
rationalisation within the present custodial sphere. Whereas in Durkheim’s case, the 
objects of social-historical hermeneutics were norms that were previously under-
rationalised but were still functional in the sense that they were ‘living’ in social 
praxis, the present imaginaries of imprisonment are characteristic of a variety of 
discourses regarding the purposes and desirable practical patterns of imprisonment. 
Furthermore, the excessive resources of these penal imaginaries and normative 
discourses are not always accurate or pertinent by virtue of reflecting the realities 
they address. Contrarily, they often possess a kind of symbolic inadequacy which 
                                                 
28
 To appreciate Durkheim’s notions about the linear development in the patterns of social 
organisation, we can look at his thesis on the division of labour in society (1964).  As for the study of 
social norms, his analysis of homicide and property crime in Professional Ethics and Civic Morals 
(2003) gives examples showing that the path of the development of norms is primarily to be 
understood as a singular one.  
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marks their difference from the religious worldview which was targeted by 
Durkheim’s moral science. In the latter case, the problematic facet refers to its 
inadequacy in meeting the requirements of rationalism (religious representations of 
morality are based on their own peculiar orthodox systems). But what is symbolised 
in them, within the perspective of Durkheim’s moral science, is real and not an 
illusion. The challenge lies in how the reality that is symbolised in religious 
discourses can be made subject to the test of rationalism. As we can see from the 
preceding discussions, his social-historical hermeneutics aimed to meet this 
requirement by providing an alternative symbolic framework which is rational in 
character and which is also able to preserve and re-express the realities of the norms 
inherited from traditional normative resources to the targeted audience of secular 
moral education.    
 
In the former case (contemporary imaginaries of imprisonment), however, it is rather 
questionable as to whether the discursive performances within the imprisonment 
field can be viewed as accommodating respective normative realities. Many of them 
(even the populist imaginaries) have been taking great pains to compile ‘persuasive’ 
discourses in order to gain recognition. This means they mostly tend to base their 
arguments on reasoning rather than on command. However, in advancing their 
specific reasonings, the strategies involved are far from unproblematic. It is very 
common to find in them the tactics of resorting to external ‘politically correct’ 
discourses, stereotypical notions, seemingly irrefutable instrumental logics, etc 
(numerous examples have been provided in the first chapter). In doing this, these 
contemporary imaginaries usually succeed in advocating certain coherent and 
‘rational’ visions regarding the ideals of imprisonment, but they are nonetheless 
inclined to be self-referential and detached from those realities and perspectives that 
are contrary to them. As a result, it becomes uncertain as to whether the excessive 
discourses are in accordance with the normative realities in the custodial sphere or 
whether, instead, they distort the expression of such realities, hinder their adequate 
realisation and in effect impose a normative closure. (The examination of those 
imaginaries of imprisonment in Chapters 3, 4 & 5 will suggest that the latter situation 
is more often the case.)  
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Thus we face a paradox: the symbolic system of religions (particularly the primitive 
religions studied by Durkheim) may be illusory in their particular notions and ideas, 
but they nevertheless represent the moral realities of their societies and thus are real 
in that sense; in contrast, the contemporary imaginaries of imprisonment have 
abundant discursive resources, most of which are rationally organised, but they face 
tremendous difficulties in responding to the normative challenges within the field 
because they are mostly detached from the particular normative realities regarding 
the imprisonment complex. In this sense, the latter’s symbolic structures and 
performances fail to fulfil their normative task and may be viewed as reflecting the 
pathology of symbolic inadequacy.  
 
The contextual difference then poses a question to us: is social-historical 
hermeneutics also an effective approach in dealing with the latter case, that of the 
normative spectrum of the contemporary imprisonment complex?  
 
The answer is yes, given that necessary modifications are made to it. As has been 
shown in the foregoing discussions, what distinguishes Durkheimian social-historical 
hermeneutics from positivist social studies is that it manages to expose the 
introspective dimension of the norms of the society in a way which bridges the gulf 
between grand social-historical understanding and the moral re-identification of 
individuals. It is at the same time a social-scientific enquiry and a process of moral 
education and reflexion. What makes this possible is its hermeneutic strength, which 
renders the audience’s participation and moral reflexion an inherent part of the whole 
endeavour. What it accomplishes, then, is not merely an explanatory account of the 
moral phenomena from an external point of view, but an active revitalisation of the 
moral ideals per se.  
 
However, the particular hermeneutic strength of this method is not necessarily tied 
up with Durkheim’s project of moral secularisation. Firstly, it does not have to 
assume that there is a single truth in the social normative realm. Such an assumption 
primarily reflects the modern belief that there is an optimal direction for the progress 
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of civilisation (including its moral performance). But, even in Durkheim’s age, this 
belief was hardly in accordance with social reality. Despite the fact that some of the 
dominant trends within the modern moral sphere could be identified (as Durkheim 
did in his social studies) they nonetheless formed merely part of the whole picture. 
The resources of norms in society are multiple and by no means confined to religions. 
For example, cultural theorists have demonstrated that the modern discourses have 
largely repressed the existence of varied unofficial discourses and sub-cultural 
representations which are at odds with the singular, hierarchical and single-direction 
reasoning which characterises modern rationality (Bakhtin, 1984). Under this 
perspective, if the hermeneutic studies of norms are only targeted at the dominant 
and official strands of discourses, they risk resulting in a partial and limited view of 
the whole spectrum which unavoidably and inherently involves diversity and 
plurality.  
 
Secondly, the Durkheimian project of moral education assumes that the trajectory of 
modern moral development is relatively fixed and predictable, as the dominant trend 
of individualism and rationalism is being gradually realised. His social-historical 
hermeneutics is thus granted the task of revealing such evolving moral realities to the 
audience of moral education and facilitating the process of their becoming 
indispensable to the exercise of moral autonomy. However, the belief in this kind of 
determinism has also lost ground as grand theories have been considerably 
discredited. Now we are in a position to recognise that the moral development of 
society does not necessarily follow a pre-determined trajectory. Just as it is rooted in 
multiple resources of norms, so its ‘future’ can stretch in different directions. That is 
why Durkheim’s moral education project, like many of the other overall modern 
schemes for transforming the inner nature of individuals, has eventually remained 
unfulfilled. The moral phenomena of society always contain an aspect of emergence 
and becoming; that means that the legitimate use of hermeneutics has to have an 
awareness of ‘limits’: it must always be prepared to be open to new living 
experiences and normative angles emerging from some previously unnoticed societal 
sectors. Accordingly, we can hardly envisage a fixed trajectory of moral evolution 
within society.  
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However, the hermeneutic element we have identified in Durkheim’s works is less 
tightly linked to this singular and determinist vision of moral development than the 
positivist element is. For its most important purpose is not to give an objective 
explanation or prediction, but rather to expose the moral realities that are immanent 
in under-rationalised symbolic traditions (like revealed religions and a society’s 
familial and sexual discourses) and make possible the individual’s autonomous 
adherence to them. Indeed, in Durkheim’s scheme, this is supposed to facilitate the 
accomplishment of his moral reconstruction project; and in many cases the 
hermeneutic approach does operate to endorse the author’s standpoint in terms of a 
specific moral spectrum (e.g. its application has the result of defending the 
fundamental penal and family norms of modern society). But in its nature it is neither 
deductive nor determinist. What it exposes as the reality of social morality may be 
compelling enough for its audience to adopt a particular normative approach (as is 
illustrated in Durkheim’s works), but the method itself does not presume or pre-
determine any normative output, nor does it mean to impose a fixed choice on its 
audience. Instead, by displaying the introspective dimension of the social-moral 
phenomena, it enables its audience to approach the realities of what they normally 
perceive as externally binding and to re-discover the living life of morality that 
factually forms part of their selves. Thus what the hermeneutics creates is not any 
pre-given normative outcome, but a reflexive sphere that makes authentic moral 
choices possible.  
 
Therefore, this social-historical hermeneutics may well serve normative enquiries in 
a different context which faces hugely pluralistic discourses and an uncertain future 
in terms of agreement on its normative ideals. This is the reason why such a 
methodological approach can greatly benefit our studies on the normative spectrum 
of the contemporary incarceration field in the UK. As has been described before, this 
field is characterised by the fragmentation of normative discourses and imaginaries, 
and it still lacks any prospects of paradigmatic integration. Such a situation generates 
great difficulties for traditional approaches in dealing with the normative facet of 
imprisonment. The hermeneutic approach, in contrast, may provide a useful tool to 
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carry out the task of uncovering and developing the normative performances in the 
field, which is comparable to Durkheim’s moral science scheme in its aspiration to 
integrate social studies with the imminent need for normative re-construction.     
 
However, in order to apply this approach appropriately to the subject matter of our 
studies, we need to fully recognise the significance of the idiosyncratic nature of the 
contemporary settings and make any necessary modifications according to that. In 
the following section, we will try to outline a methodological scheme which has been 
particularly designed for our research project.  
 
 
iii. Our Methodological Scheme: Introspective Normativity and its Four Analytical-   
evaluative Patterns 
 
Our methodological scheme can be described as one that is centred upon 
introspective normativity. In this section, we will seek to clarify its peculiar 
implications, the major materials to be dealt with, and its working rationale and 
strategies.   
 
a. Hermeneutics centred on introspective normativity 
 
As we showed earlier (Chapter 1), the decline of universal normativity has been 
characteristic of post-welfarist imprisonment in the UK, which means that the 
normative reality in this field is by no means the same as that which Durkheim’s 
hermeneutics sought to tackle. In our case, we can no longer envisage that a singular 
normative reality, along with a monovocal form of rationalisation, is to be captured 
by the hermeneutic effort and held as the ubiquitous foundation for the practice and 
justification of confinement. However, this does not mean that to reflect upon the 
normative reality in today’s context and strive for its transformation is pointless. To 
‘do the normative’, in accordance with the aspirations of Durkheim’s moral science, 
would be possible and meaningful for the contemporary custodial field, provided that 
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the focus of our hermeneutic undertaking shifts from universal normativity to 
introspective normativity. Whereas the former refers to the effort to establish (or re-
establish) a singular and universalist paradigm for incarceration practice, the latter 
(introspective normativity) embraces the pluralistic realities within the normative 
spectrum and strives to revitalise and re-invent the categories, presumptions, ideas 
and mentalities underpinning the imprisonment complex and to make sure that the 
existing imaginaries and practical routines are never exempt from  critical re-
assessment from diverse and ever-renewing normative angles.  
 
The methodological approach required to meet our purpose can acquire its essential 
rationale from Durkheim’s social-historical hermeneutics, but some modification is 
necessary to serve the particular purpose of introspective normativity. We can start 
by considering the possible ways that a hermeneutic approach can understand the 
relationship between normative reality and its symbolic forms within a given context. 
For Durkheim’s approach, the problem with the moral domain in the author’s time 
was that its major symbolic forms (religions and orthodox traditions) no longer fitted 
the rise of rationalism and the modern development of moral reality which values 
individual autonomy. The unbalanced interrelationship between normative reality 
and its symbolic forms thus engenders the need for re-construction. Durkheim’s 
social-historical hermeneutics can be viewed as a particular method of addressing 
this relational inadequacy through the process of moral education, which in effect 
recasts the under-rationalised moral reality in the hermeneutic light of the moral 
autonomy of modern individuals. It is worth noting that the re-invented balance 
between moral reality and its symbolic forms is not simply a discursive transmission 
that seeks to apply the ‘right’ symbolic forms to replace ‘misleading’ ones; it actually 
also results in the transformation of the moral reality per se: having incorporated the 
elements of rational reflexion and individual autonomy, the moral reality would 
become renewed and revitalised and would suit better the movement of 




Returning to our study of post-welfarist imprisonment, we may likewise understand 
the problem of its normative performance as one of inadequacy in the relationship 
between the normative reality and its symbolic forms.  In our case, the normative 
reality had better be identified as multiple ‘realities’, for they are characterised by 
plurality and they factually stimulate hugely diverse attitudes and dispositions 
concerning the exercise of carceral power. Meanwhile, their symbolic forms are also 
remarkably diversified compared with what was targeted by Durkheim’s project.  
Yet the situation of an unbalanced relationship between the normative realities and 
their symbolic forms still exists, though in a different pattern. Those symbolic forms 
– penal imaginaries and discourses about incarceration – involve varied types of 
reasoning and strategies of justification to buttress their respective penal ideals, but 
all of them have to face the crucial facet of the normative reality in the current 
custodial sphere: the decline of any universal normativity. As we have discussed 
earlier, none of those existing symbolic forms have yet demonstrated any 
competency to undertake the role which was played by penal welfarism – the last 
overarching symbolic paradigm guiding custodial practice. Therefore, it can be 
detected that there is continuous tension between the existing kinds of symbolic 
performance and their ability to accommodate the post-welfarist normative realities 
within the imprisonment field. From this perspective, to work towards an adequate 
and productive relationship between the normative realities and their symbolic forms 
is a significant way to confront the dilemmas in the contemporary incarceration 
realm.  
 
However, at the heart of our task we do not have any universal normative reality 
which is to be rationally expressed, but instead the absence of it. This forms the 
essential attribute of the post-welfarist normative reality we have to face and it is the 
major difference between our methodological approach and Durkheim’s. For any 
hermeneutics which seeks to re-normalise the imprisonment field must address it 
pertinently. This means that its focus is not an attempt to restore universal 
normativity but to revitalise the performance of introspective normativity: this is an 
endeavour to explore the possibilities of those symbolic performances that are more 
appropriate to the normative realities of post-welfarist imprisonment and in the 
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meantime creatively promote their transformation. Under this methodological 
perspective, neither the normative realities nor their symbolic forms should be held 
as static or as bound by a fixed future (or trajectory of evolution); they are constantly 
open to reconfiguration.  If the symbolic forms capture well the post-universalist 
normative realities (or at least certain aspects of them) and facilitate their 
revitalisation, we may judge that they demonstrate a good performance of 
introspective performance (we may also term this ‘normative innovation’); if instead 
they are alienated from the normative realities and hinder their transformation, we 
may term them bad performances of introspective normativity (we may also call this 
‘penal nihilism’). In both these cases, the leading feature of the contemporary 
normative reality in the custodial field – the decline of universalism – should serve as 
a touchstone for such examination. (On that basis we can further clarify four 
distinctive patterns regarding the performance of introspective normativity, including 
detachment, oblivion, confrontation and transformation, which will be discussed 
shortly). Our hermeneutic effort starts then with an enquiry into the prominent 
symbolic forms within the imprisonment field, and it concentrates on uncovering and 
assessing their performances in this normative domain.  
 
Despite the fact that our methodological scheme withdraws from grand normative 
constructions, it maintains an essential perspective from Durkheim’s social-historical 
hermeneutics: the integral approach to the factual and the normative. Just as 
Durkheim’s project is at the same time a clarification of the moral phenomena and a 
purposeful pursuit that is engaged in their improvement, our study of the symbolic 
performance of imprisonment is also an endeavour both to account for and to re-
normalise the imaginaries of the incarceration complex in the UK.  
 
b. Penal imaginaries as the materials to be examined 
 
The above discussion also helps to make clear why our research makes penal 
imaginaries of imprisonment the main materials for examination. In the current 
imprisonment field within the UK, they constitute the major sources of the symbolic 
forms of the normative realities and they provide the concrete grounds for our 
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research. We will firstly clarify how we define the category of penal imaginaries in 
our research context and then explain in detail the strategies we will employ to 
examine each specific strand of the imaginaries of imprisonment in the UK. 
 
Our perspective on penal imaginaries shares some key points with Charles Taylor’s 
notion of ‘social imaginaries’ (2002). In Taylor’s view, ‘[t]he social imaginary is not 
a set of ideas; rather it is what enables, through making sense of, the practices of a 
society’ (2002: 91). And they are implied in ‘the ways in which people imagine their 
social existence, how they fit together with others, how things go on between them 
and their fellows, the expectations that are normally met, and the deeper normative 
notions and images that underlie these expectations.(2002: 106)’ In his analyses of 
modern social imaginaries, the author seeks to uncover how the moral order, along 
with the corresponding political and economic framework of modern western 
societies, has been linked with and boosted by the prevalence of a particular cluster 
of such imaginaries, which were first theorised by intellectuals such as Locke and 
Grotius and then spread to the broader society and became its taken-for-granted self-
understanding.   
 
The penal imaginaries of imprisonment defined in our research scheme have three 
important facets. Two of them are in accordance with Taylor’s conceptualisation of 
‘social imaginaries’. Firstly, they are not abstract ideas which can be separated from 
the domain of practice. By contrast, they are intertwined with the constitution and 
operation of concrete custodial regimes and should be understood as part of the 
reality of that sphere. Secondly, they contain both factual and normative elements. In 
them the understandings of the status quo of the current prison system are intimately 
connected with the perspectives on the purposes of incarceration and its role and 




Apart from that, we need to stress a third point, that is, that penal imaginaries also 
include a dimension of introspective normative performance, which is responsible for 
                                                 
29
 In Taylor’s terms, these social imaginaries are both factual and normative, for ‘we have a sense of 
how things usually go, but this is interwoven with an idea of how they ought to go, of what missteps 
would invalidate the practice’(2002: 106). 
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symbolising the normative realities of the penal sphere to their targeted audiences. 
As we can see from the foregoing discussions, this dimension is where we hope to 
identify the dynamics of introspective normativity and seek to hermeneutically 
revitalise it. It is the introduction of this dimension that imposes more 
methodological requirements on our research subject than Taylor’s study of ‘social 
imaginaries’ and many of the sociological studies of the ideological penological 




In the following chapters, we will provide a detailed elaboration of some of the most 
representative imaginaries of imprisonment in the current UK society. Here it is 
helpful to outline some of the general research strategies we will use to carry out our 
investigation.  
 
To start with, there is great disparity regarding the sources of imaginaries of 
imprisonment, and we need to adjust our approach to collecting them according to 
their respective strands. For example, the liberal imaginaries are involved in sources 
as diverse as academic journals, government documents, guidelines of custodial 
institutions, and so on. And, in order to examine them, we need to start our analysis 
based on those influential texts which are most indicative of the ways in which penal 
liberals imagine the current imprisonment complex. Populist imaginaries, on the 
other hand, have gained an audience mainly through the populist media and have 
their typical spokesmen ranging from ‘prison works’ politicians to (often but not 
always) victims’ rights advocates and community safety campaigners. This disparity 
determines that the method of collecting these sources and identifying their 
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 Apart from Taylor’s approach to ‘social imaginaries’, there is also another sociological perspective 
dealing with the ‘sociological imagination’, which is represented by the American sociologist C. 
Wright Mills in his influential book The Sociological Imagination (1959), and which has its echo in  
contemporary criminology (e.g. Young, 2011). Mills’ approach instead focuses on the liberating 
potential of a proactively pursued, insight-oriented imagination which manages to relate the seemingly 
isolated frustrations in individual experiences to the grand structural aspects of social and political 
arrangements.  As our study mainly treats imaginaries of imprisonment as a reality sui generis within 
the penal domain and takes them as existing materials for the introspective normativity analyses, it 
basically adopts Taylor’s perspective. But as we will discuss in the final section of the chapter 
(especially regarding the ‘transformation’ pattern of introspective normativity), our research also has 
an inherent interest in exposing the possibilities of emancipation within the normative penal field. In 
this respect, it shares Mills’ aspirations concerning what is to be achieved by the ‘imagination’.  
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respective imaginaries is subject to adaptation in order to suit the study of each 
specific strand of them. 
 
In spite of that, our approach to investigating those varied imaginaries involves some 
common perspectives and strategies which are outlined below. 
 
c. Strategies for examining contemporary imaginaries of imprisonment 
 
Unlike Durkheim’s hermeneutics, which sought to uncover the moral reality in the 
symbolic guise of religions and traditional normative systems and to express and 
develop it within a rational framework, our approach needs to examine the 
contemporary forms of imaginaries about imprisonment and find how they are 
introspectively generated in relation to their particular visions of the normative 
realities in the field. On the basis of that approach, our interest is not in an attempt to 
‘rescue’ or defend any substantive penological norms, but to hermeneutically expose 
whether their performances are effective in representing the normative realities 
within the field or whether instead they result in closure and detachment. 
Strategically, what we will target as the primary resources of our research will be a 
variety of strands of penal imaginaries instead of one single comprehensive 
symbolic-praxis system like primitive religions.  
 
In the first place, those strands of penal imaginaries will not be treated as static 
aggregates of notions and ideas, but as living symbolic dynamics which take place in 
concrete social-historical settings. It is then important to link our subject-matter with 
the present conditions of prisons and their specific socio-political atmosphere. In 
Chapter 1, we have provided an overview of contemporary imprisonment in the UK 
and identified the critical factors that are associated with the landscape of penal 
imaginaries in this regard. 
 
In the second place, our research needs to probe into the introspective construction of 
the normative realities in each strand of the penal imaginaries which embody very 
different approaches to imprisonment. For this purpose, we select three of the most 
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representative forms of penal imaginaries and examine how they develop their 
particular visions of the issues regarding imprisonment. They include the liberal, 
populist and risk-oriented imaginaries of imprisonment (we have already discussed 
how to identify and collect their sources). To facilitate the evaluation of their 
normative performance, we have identified four types of introspective dynamics, 
namely detachment, oblivion, confrontation and transformation (which will be 
discussed shortly).  
 
It is worth noting that the selection of these three forms of penal imaginaries is not 
intended to be exhaustive. The same pattern of evaluation can and should be applied 
to other forms of imaginaries and discourses in this realm. But the examination 
conducted in Chapters 3 to 5 does provide a basis for constituting a more general 
view of the normative status quo of the imprisonment field, since they represent the 
three most typical approaches within it. Meanwhile, unlike Durkheim’s goal of 
revealing a consensual ground and direction for the moral reconstruction project, our 
examination does not assume that there is a single pathway towards overcoming the 
predicament of the incarceration systems; it first of all tries to expose the pluralistic 
forms of normative construction and assesses what accounts for the effective forms 
of normative performance and innovation. In other words, it is concerned with the 
removal of the factors (social as well as discursive) which impede the authentic 
representation of moral realities in penal imaginaries and which cause normative 
closure. This will constitute the main task of Chapter 6. 
 
Finally, based on the understanding of the critical condition of the decline in 
universal normativity, the investigations of our research need to go beyond those 
things which are positively represented in those imaginaries, and to deal with the 
dimension characterised by ‘the lost’ and ‘the absent’, namely the implications of the 
decline of universalism for contemporary normative pursuits within the 
imprisonment field. This particular requirement, together with that of acknowledging 
diversity and plurality, have then featured in our analytical approach and made it 
different from Durkheim’s hermeneutics, which was primarily oriented towards a 
positive reconstruction of the moral domain. We can shed more light on this 
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methodological particularity by introducing a set of ideal types that will address four 
distinctive forms of the performance of introspective normativity in penal 
imaginaries. 
 
d. Four analytical-evaluative patterns of introspective normativity 
 
Those patterns are conceived as analytical-evaluative tools for examining the 
normative performance of the contemporary imaginaries of imprisonment in the UK. 
Each of them indicates an ideal type referring to how introspective normativity is 
realised in the face of the predicament of universalism in specific post-welfarist 
imaginaries of incarceration. To apply those categories resembles the use of a unique 
coordinate: on this basis we can unpack hermeneutically each strand of the penal 
imaginaries and illuminate how they manage to symbolise the post-universalist 
realities of imprisonment and thus jointly participate in the normative construction of 
this realm. In the meantime, those patterns also help us to diagnose the problematics 
within those forms of imaginaries if their performance of introspective normativity 
matches one (or more than one) of the four categories. As we will soon show, each of 
the patterns either indicates a pathological approach or, contrarily, an innovative one 
to the pursuit of normativity within the post-welfarist incarceration field. Thus, on 
the basis of that approach, we hope to receive  guidance for the purpose of assessing 
each of the existing approaches in question to the imagining of imprisonment and, 
furthermore, the promotion of  its re-normalisation.     
 
The four analytic-evaluative patterns include detachment, oblivion, confrontation and 
transformation. Most of them are derived from the studies of the specific imaginaries 
of imprisonment that are carried out in the chapters which follow. This may cause the 
problem that to articulate the patterns in this chapter would appear to be very much 
in advance and hence rather abstract. Yet we can see it as a preliminary explanation, 
which will help us to clarify further our methodological framework and shed light on 
our studies of the different concrete imageries of imprisonment.  
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These patterns are all intimately associated with the relative position of the lost 
universal appeal within the normative constructions of penal imaginaries.  
 
‘Detachment’ refers to the peculiar disposition of the penal imaginary to accept the 
fading of the universal ideal as a fait accompli and renounce any attempt to restore it. 
Penal imaginaries of the ‘detachment’ type may still engage in a variety of normative 
constructions which aim to guide custodial practice, but such constructions are 
mostly permeated by the crucial consciousness that they by no means lead to any 
ultimate justification of the system, but on the contrary are determined and 
conditioned by its very impossibility. Thus in fulfilling the normative end within the 
penal sphere, the focus of ‘detachment’ approaches is not a ‘substantive good’ to be 
pursued in penal reforms, but an avoidance of, or at least minimization of, the 
tangible evils engendered by the systems. Doing this, they may be characterised by 
different ‘temperaments’ – ranging from the nostalgic to the rationally realistic – but 
the normativity performed in them has the same kind of passive character: it endorses 
a detachment from any struggles for the ultimate ideal of legitimisable forms of 
carceral power and the orientation of understandings the concrete order of penal 
norms in accordance with this.  
 
In the contemporary imprisonment field, we encounter many cases of penal 
imaginaries which resort to this pattern in their introspective normative constructions. 
For example, when contemporary penal liberals and reformists try to rescue some 
core values from the sinking welfarist prison scheme by bringing in the discourses of 
penal moderation, cultural re-identification and excess of penal consumption, we can 
detect this pattern being applied in those imaginaries to construct their normative 
appeals. In the following chapters we will have various chances to use it in dealing 
with a variety of specific forms of penal imaginaries.  
 
‘Oblivion’ refers to the tendency of the penal imaginary to disregard altogether the 
besetting predicament of the loss of universal normativity from its agenda while 
pursing its own definition of the ‘problems’ and practical ends within the custodial 
sphere. In this pattern, the issue of ultimate legitimization has been exiled to a state 
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of oblivion so that its normative burden no longer gets recognised. Usually, as the 
term ‘oblivion’ suggests, such exile is not intentionally performed within the relevant 
penal imaginaries. Instead, it occurs as a result of the devoted proactive pursuit of 
certain ‘goods’ that are determined and defined by those imaginaries. This can be the 
objective of minimising risks relating to prison release, or ‘community safety’, or 
conversely ‘human containment of prisoners’. The process of elaborating, developing 
and evaluating such specific goals seems to be able to form a self-sustaining circle 
which keeps running according to its own rationale and its own norms without being 
bothered by the dilemma of the loss of universal penological ideals. In our discussion 
of the ‘Kafka-like’ pursuit of prison reforms (in the introduction to Chapter 1), we 
can see a typical example of how imaginaries of imprisonment may involve the 
‘oblivion’ pattern. In the following chapters we will also have the chance to see this 
in  our investigation into more concrete forms of penal imaginaries.  
 
The ‘confrontation’ pattern describes the ways in which the penal imaginary 
recognises the predicament of universal normativity and bears the crucial normative 
burden thus engendered. Firstly, ‘confrontation’ implies that there is sufficient 
consciousness of the normative challenge in the post-universalist context of the penal 
imaginary. In this situation it refuses to withdraw from it, and takes pains to confront 
all the imperfections and legitimacy deficiencies resulting from it. In many cases it 
can be seen to adopt the ‘gesture of denial’, that is, to expose and refute any false 
substitutes for the lost universal normativity, no matter how attractive they may 
appear in the current socio-political context. Through ‘denial’, the performance of 
confrontation retains and safeguards a space of authenticity within the normative 
spectrum before the role of universal penal paradigms is taken up competently by 
their qualified successors.   
 
‘Transformation’, on the other hand, is used to indicate the penal imaginary’s 
successful unfolding of the emancipating possibilities of renewed and revitalised 
realities, and its triumph over the chronic tension between the legitimacy demand and 
the decline of universal normativity within the custodial sphere. In our perspective, a 
‘transformation’ occurs when the performance of a penal imaginary symbolises and 
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vitalises the post-universalist penal realities in such a viable and illuminating way 
that the unfulfilled ‘desire for universalism’ ultimately fades into a more vibrant 
horizon of consciousnesses that confidently welcome openness, innovation, plurality 
and differences in mobilising the relocation of penal relations in society. By 
definition, it is not possible that ‘transformation’ will be realised solely within the 
domain of penal imaginaries; it implies the utter transformation of those social 
realities that underpin the custodial complex, for only in this situation can penal 
imageries be rendered the complete and adequate symbolic forms of the normative 
realities in the imprisonment field and meet the standard of an authentic 
‘transformation’. 
   
Therefore, it is more appropriate to apply the ‘transformation’ pattern to address the 
broad penal imaginary spectrum as a whole than a single specific strand of these 
imaginaries. In our study, it more often refers to that of becoming rather than what 
already exists. Yet it is meaningful to retain a place for this pattern, as it helps us to 
understand and appreciate many anti-conventional and anti-status quo imaginaries 
which, to greater or lesser degree, involve such potentialities in the custodial sphere 
as are indicated by the ‘transformation’ pattern. 
 
The four patterns for examining the performance of introspective normativity also 
imply evaluative standards in themselves. The first two patterns – ‘detachment’ and 
‘oblivion’ – are nihilistic forms of introspective normativity. Both of them, despite 
their varied approaches, withdraw from the normative burden engendered within the 
post-welfarist penal realm and engage in the imposition of normative closure, which 
in turn hinders the endeavour to re-normalise the field. For this reason, they can be 
termed forms of ‘handicapped normativity’; the hermeneutic effort to uncover them 
in concrete performances within penal imaginaries will then facilitate the normative 
revitalisation and reconstruction of the custodial realm. 
 
The other two patterns - ‘confrontation’ and ‘transformation’ – represent the 
innovative forms of introspective normativity. They respond to the post-universalist 
predicament in authentic ways and reject the temptation of alienating it or imposing 
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any sort of normative closure. The hermeneutic exposure of their performance within 
the contemporary imaginaries of imprisonment also helps to promote the re-
normalisation of this field in a positive and constructive direction.  
 
The four patterns together constitute an analytical-evaluative perspective for our 
hermeneutic investigation into the penal imaginary sphere concerning the 
imprisonment complex within the UK. Based on them, we can understand better the 
normative performances of the different strands of imaginaries and diagnose their 
respective strengths, their pathologies as well as their potential for improvement. 
This undertaking, as we have tried to clarify in the earlier pages, thus hopes to shed 
light on the pathways to re-normalising the current imprisonment field and meeting 
the post-welfarist challenges it faces.  
 
Here it is worth re-emphasizing the point which we made in discussing penal 
imaginaries as the materials to be examined. That is, we must treat the panel 
imaginaries as the particular post-welfarist realities within society rather than 
abstract conceptual systems detached from any given social settings. Thus the four 
analytical-evaluative patterns - and the introspective normativity investigation in 
general - are designed to apply to the dynamics of penal imaginaries in the concrete 
socio-political context of the contemporary UK. Moreover, as we will show in 
Chapter 6, in order to fully realise the potential of our hermeneutic approach, as a 
normative enterprise, it must have a self-conscious engagement with the struggles to 
promote the transformation of actual social relations.   
 
At the end of this section, we are in a position to summarise some of the key points 
of our methodological scheme.   
 
Our method is centred on the dynamics of introspective normativity, which we define 
as the particular performance of the penal imaginary to symbolise the post-
universalist penal realities and to construct their respective normative visions of 
imprisonment. Based on this concept we develop an analytical-evaluative framework 
which is informed by distinctive ideal types of introspective normativity. In our 
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examination of concrete contemporary imaginaries of imprisonment, it serves as a 
source of theoretical guidance both for uncovering and for assessing their normative 
performances.  
 
In an essential way, our research method follows the pathway of social-historical 
hermeneutics as has been identified in the interpretation of Durkheim’s work. And in 
particular it adopts its holistic understanding of the relationship between the factual 
and the normative. On the other hand, our approach has its own characteristics due to 
its peculiar subject matter and its context of studies. It needs to firstly probe into 
multiple forms of imaginaries in the current imprisonment field and it faces the 
pluralist ‘truths’ and ‘realities’ implied in them. Secondly, it needs to examine the 
introspective dynamics of those different forms of imaginaries in terms of their 
adequacy in symbolising and normalising the post-welfarist realities of imprisonment. 
On the basis of this work, we will proceed to carry out a general assessment of the 
contemporary penal imaginary spectrum within the UK in the light of its 
performance of introspective normativity. By doing so, we will then seek to provide 












i. Three Representative Forms of Penal Imaginaries within the Imprisonment Field 
 
In this chapter and the following two we will examine three representative forms of 
contemporary imaginaries of imprisonment within the perspective of introspective 
normativity. In the introduction part of Chapter 1, we have already undertaken a 
preliminary discussion of these and we identified them as the liberal, populist, and 
risk-oriented imaginaries of imprisonment. Before we set out to undertake our 
investigation, it would be helpful to undertake some clarification as to how these 
three forms of imaginaries have been selected as the major object of our enquiries 
and what role they are expected to play in the fulfilment of the research purpose of 
the thesis.  
 
In the first place, it is important to be aware that to categorise penal imaginaries as 
‘liberal’, ‘populist’ or ‘risk-oriented’ has the shortcoming of failing to capture the 
reality accurately, since the discursive boundaries of the field of incarceration are 
never clear-cut nor are they subject to any convenient labelling. Furthermore, the use 
of such general terms tends to create the false impression that each of the particular 
imaginaries is a coherent whole in itself and that it is exempt from tensions and 
contradictions engendered from within. As will become clear in the following 
examinations, the dynamics of penal imaginaries which are discussed under the same 
term (e.g. the ‘risk-oriented’ category) actually comprise quite diverse and non-
homogeneous phenomena.  
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However, the essentialist way does not have to be the sole way of employing those 
terms. Instead, they can be used to analyse the penal imaginaries in a strategic way so 
that they can help us to map some of the distinctive aspects of the post-welfarist 
discursive realm. In this case, each of them refers to a certain strand of the penal 
imaginary by signifying a particular area of penal relations. For example, the liberal 
imaginaries are thus viewed as the symbolic representations and interactions which 
occur among those actors who are engaged in the enterprise of defending, reflecting 
and reviving the possibilities of shifting the current custodial practice on to a more 
liberal and restrictive, less reactive, basis. They do not necessarily imply that there 
should be a single discursive framework which is composed of hierarchical values 
and which can be captured by a general prescriptive theory of liberal prison schemes. 
Understood in this fashion, the three general forms of penal imaginaries play the role 
of a tentative guide to direct us within the territory of imprisonment without 
imposing any pre-given doctrines on our enquiries. And this is important for our 
research aims because, without a preliminary idea of the overall penal imaginary 
spectrum, it would hardly be feasible to comprehend any of the specific forms of 




However, as we cautioned earlier, it is important to recognise the limits of using 
general categories in our investigations. Each of them should be viewed as indicative 
rather than definitive: they are intended to outline the discursive spectrum of 
imprisonment only from an external point of view and are not meant to conceptualise 
it or place any pre-determined constraints on the in-depth scrutiny and analyses of it. 
Apart from that, the examination of the three representative penal imaginaries 
functions as a way to illustrate rather than exhaust the types of normative 
performance in the imprisonment field.  
 
These three types of imaginaries are arguably not only representative of the most 
influential approaches to incarceration at  the present time, but also are dynamically 
                                                 
1
 In this respect, to base the research on the study of strictly confined imaginary forms cannot 
pertinently serve the goal of uncovering the normative performance of the contemporary imaginaries 
of incarceration, for they tend to ignore important facets of it which are better captured in a grand 
theoretical perspective, and are amenable to the trap of ‘abstracted empiricism’ which is described by 
Jock Young (2011).  
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connected to the practices and outlooks of the major actors and audiences within the 
field. For example, the phenomena of an intensified fear of crime, a punitive reaction 
to and exclusion of prison inmates and ex-prisoners, and the politicisation of prison-
related issues, bear a close relationship with the current ‘populist’ imaginaries of 
prison and prisoners, which provide all the images, slogans, stereotypes and 
justifications for them. On the other hand, the prevalence of risk calculation and risk 
management schemes in the ‘modernising’ of the custodial institutions is inseparable 
from the flourishing of ‘risk-oriented’ imaginaries within the field.
2
 The three 
imaginaries together are then considered by us as capable of  covering a substantive 
discursive territory within the current imprisonment complex; and to make them the 
major object of our inquiries has various advantages (compared with isolated studies 
of specific cases of penal imaginaries) in acquiring a general view of the normative 
performance within the field.  
 
ii. About Liberal Imaginaries of Imprisonment 
 
As our overview in Chapter 1 indicates, the objective-definition and policy-making 
process of incarceration in the UK have been under growing pressure from populist 
politics and have been swayed in the direction of exclusion and incapacitation rather 
than inclusion and integration over the past few decades. Under such circumstances, 
it is also notable that the role of the liberal elites has diminished considerably within 
the policy-making spectrum compared with the heyday of penal welfarism (Loader, 
2006; Loader and Sparks 2010; Garland, 2001a). Nonetheless, among academics and 
practitioners within the custodial field, the ‘liberal’ approach to comprehending and 
evaluating prison issues maintains a strong, if not overwhelmingly prevalent, 
presence  and to a great extent assumes the status of ‘political correctness’. This is 
reflected in the fact that in contrast with the punitive tone of the tabloid papers and 
‘prison works’ politicians, the majority of academic journals, publications and 
conferences have been continuously distancing their views from the populist stand 
and have been re-expressing the core principles of liberal penalology: legal 
                                                 
2
 Further discussion of the social linkages of the populist and risk oriented imaginaries will be given in 
Chapter 4 and Chapter 5 respectively.  
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restrictions on the state power to impose incarceration, proportionality, respect for 
the dignity and basic human rights of prisoners, and social re-integration. Upon this 
basis, along with other public forums (prison inspectors’ reports, broadsheet 
newspapers, expert-chaired broadcasting programmes, and so on) which share a 
similar line of opinion, we can identify a prolific cluster of sources of current liberal 
imaginaries of imprisonment in this country.  
 
It is noteworthy though that these ‘liberal’ viewpoints are by no means homogeneous 
or uniform with regard to particular issues. By contrast, they involve marked 
differentiation in terms of specific attitudes and opinions. But to talk about ‘liberal 
penal imaginaries’ in  collective terms nevertheless makes sense if we are attempting  
to address some peculiar manners and dispositions in understanding and generating 
discourses about the practices and corresponding social dynamics of incarceration. In 
the context of the UK it is not a difficult task to identify some major characteristics 
of the liberal penal approach: it is basically opposed to the excessive and punitive use 
of penal measures, in particular imprisonment, it finds itself uneasy with the enticing 
tone of the media coverage of crime and punishment issues and with retributive 
language and sentiments in general, favours the traditional virtue of due procedure 
and proportionality, embraces the dignity and fundamental rights of individuals 
(especially those who are vulnerable to the coercive forces of incarceration 
institutions) and has affinity with the ‘social’ understandings of crime problems and 
the positive aspirations of the operation of prisons, such as the improvement and 
rehabilitation of the inmates (despite the fact that they are not as popular as they used 
to be), etc. And if we have a look at the major academic journals and publications, it 
is also not hard to identify a rough contour of liberal approaches towards tackling the 




                                                 
3
 For example, one of the leading criminology journals in the UK published a special edition in 2010, 
in which we can see how a diverse array of academic undertakings participated in the joint endeavour 
of defending and reflecting on the opportunities in the age of financial crisis to bring changes to the 
sphere of penal practices and mentalities and to restore the liberal penal virtues like parsimony and 
moderation (Theoretical Criminology, 2010: 14 (3)). We will examine this in more detail in the next 
section of the chapter.  
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It is also important to realise that the liberal penal imaginaries are far from static. 
When taking into account the historical dimensions of their representative forms, we 
can readily recognise that instead of being defined by any concrete patterns of ideas 
and values that are ‘inherently liberal’, this peculiar commitment of liberal penal 
imaginaries usually develops its substantive content in interaction with the specific 
historical environment and with rival forms of penal values and ideas. For instance, 
in the time of John Howard, the major line of liberal penal thoughts was concerned 
with the inhuman jail conditions and the arbitrariness involved in criminal justice 
procedures and their unjust intrusion into the civil societal order. And what it sought 
to confront and resist was the notions and patterns of practices inherited from the 
medieval regimes of penality, some elements of which were still supported by the 
conservatives at John Howard’s time. However, the focus of liberal penal ideas 
altered significantly in the late 19
th
 century and especially the early 20
th
 century, 
when penal liberals in England were embracing a positive vision of imprisonment. 
The aim of systematically reforming and rehabilitating offenders was placed at the 
centre of a liberal incarceration scheme. What the penal liberals of the ‘positive era’ 
had to oppose was not only the old-fashioned penological attitude of making prison a 
‘less eligible’ place where wrong-doers are literally ‘punished’, but also the legal 
traditionalists who held there was a vital ‘free will’, a ‘culpability’ in criminal 
behaviour, and who advocated the strict application of retributivist and 
proportionality principles in the delivery of prison sentences. Notably, it was the 
latter, whose views had resonated well with those of the liberal reformers of the 
previous decades, who played the part of ‘anti-liberal’ bigots and obsolete opponents 
of reforms.
4
 Therefore, if we want to identify the liberal imaginaries of imprisonment 
as a viable part of the social realities, it would be counterproductive to seek to 
theorise them within a single logical framework. This also accounts for the diversity 
in their performances in terms of introspective normativity, which we will analyse 
individually in later paragraphs.  
 
                                                 
4
 See the review article of David Scott (2007) and also see Tonry (2001a) and Sullivan (2000).  
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iii. Contents of the Chapter 
 
In the substantive part of this chapter, we will investigate how the contemporary 
liberal imaginaries perform, especially in relation to the normative predicament 
within the post-welfarist context, and we will examine their normative performance 
from the analytical-evaluative angle of introspective normativity. Firstly, we will 
give an overview of the current circumstances of liberal imaginaries of imprisonment 
and will shed light on how their characteristics in the present day context might be 
understood. The major part of the chapter tries to uncover four distinctive approaches 
to normative construction which are implied in the multiple contemporary forms of 
liberal imaginaries of imprisonment and to assess their performance in the light of 
introspective normativity. They include the exterior normativity approach, the limits 
acknowledgement approach, the penal consumption approach and the culture identity 
approach. On the basis of our investigation of each of them, we aim to illustrate both 
the innovative and the nihilistic aspects of the normative construction implied in the 
contemporary liberal imaginaries, and to shed light on their potential for pursuing 




i. Liberal Imprisonment Agendas in the Post-Welfarist Phase   
 
Since the 1970s, when the ‘nothing works’ attack marked the decline of the 
rehabilitative ideal, the liberal prison scheme has been subject to immense doubt and 
has had to face the competition of  dystopian  pragmatic approaches as well as  
populist suppressive proposals. Against this background, the liberal consensus on 
prison issues was considerably blurred, until a major prison reform agenda was draw 
up on the basis of a public inquiry into the causes of a series of severe prison riots 
and disturbances in the early 1990s.   
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The inmates’ occupation of Manchester’s Strangeways Prison in April 1990 marked 
the beginning of this series of prison disturbance events, which caused grave physical 
injuries to inmates and prison staff, as well as serious damages to some of the 
accommodation. They also quickly became one of those high-profile events that 
received massive media attention. The Home Office then appointed Lord Justice 
Woolf to carry out an independent inquiry into the causes of these events. His report, 
published in 1991, revealed that the conditions in prisons had deteriorated to an 
intolerable degree and recommended a whole package of reform proposals.
5
 The 
Woolf recommendations were directly associated with the goal of preventing similar 
riots in the future; meanwhile, they implied an in-depth redefinition of the purposes 
of prisons and the key rationales in fulfilling them. Once the report was published, it 
won widespread recognition and praise among the society of legal professionals and 
academics and was taken as the best example of thoughtful liberal prison reform 
agendas (Morgan, 1992 and Sparks et al., 1996). Although the implementation of 
Woolf’s recommendations was recognised to be problematic in the practical sectors 
and many of them even got dismissed in the punitive political climate of the time 
(Liebling, 2006), they succeeded in delineating certain grounds of consensus for the 
post-1970s liberal penal thinking and stimulated the formation of a new emphasis in 
prison studies. The issues of justice and legitimacy thus received increasing attention 
within the public discourses and academic publications with regard to 
comprehending the prison system (e.g. Sparks et al., 1996; Sparks and Bottoms, 1995; 
Liebling, 2004).  
 
Woolf’s recommendations in their entirety are quite wide-ranging and 
comprehensive, and it is only possible here to identity some of the key points which 
have had a remarkable influence on the liberal imprisonment agendas thereafter. 
Firstly, there is ‘one principal thread’ which draws together all the proposals and 
recommendations: the requirement for the prison service to set security, control and 
justice at the right level and to provide the right balance between them (Home Office, 
1991a: 17).  In Woolf’s perspective, the three elements of ‘security’, ‘control’ and 
‘justice’ are equally important, and the prison service’s excessive emphasis on 
                                                 
5
 See Home Office (1991a). For more information about the riots, see Jameson and Allison (1995) and 
Carrabine (2004).  
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security, leading to inappropriate control measures, resulted in its failure to give 
sufficient consideration to  ‘justice’, which is of great significance for explaining the 
cause of the prison riots. ‘Justice’ in Woolf’s recommendations implies the 
obligation on the part of the prison service to treat prisoners with ‘humanity and 
fairness’; it also means due process in decision making and consistency between 
prison policies and the whole criminal justice system. To guarantee the right level of 
justice is also considered to be vital for the maintenance of ‘security’ and ‘control’ 
within prisons.  
 
What is particularly noteworthy in Woolf’s recommendations is that the concept of 
‘justice’ is associated with the idea of a ‘compact’ or ‘contract’. In Woolf’s view, a 
prison term should be served in a way such that each prisoner can set out his/her 
expectations and responsibilities, whereas ‘improved standards of justice’ within 
prisons involve ‘the giving of reasons to a prisoner for any decision which materially 
and adversely affects him’. Specifically, the prison service should make clear from 
the beginning of the term what the prison expects to provide for each prisoner and 
what it requires from him/her in return. This ‘contract’ might be determined in 
discussion with individual prisoners and it can be altered according to his/her 
progress through the prison sentence (Home Office, 1991a: 23).  
 
The impact of Woolf’s recommendations has gone much further, beyond the sphere 
of prison riots research; they are widely viewed as representative of the 
contemporary liberal responses to the problems of imprisonment. Some of their 
underlying rationales have largely acquired the status of ‘common knowledge’ in the 
preceding liberal prison reform agendas. The ‘contract’ perspective, for example, has 
penetrated into a variety of prison management sectors and has become widespread 
in imagining the relationships within prisons. The dimension of ‘justice’ within 
prisons has also received widespread attention in prison researches. It is not only 
examined in relation to the maintenance of order within prisons, but it is increasingly 
acknowledged as an imperative and independent element in understanding the 
normative foundations of the incarceration institutions. Since the publication of 
Woolf’s report, several important academic works have been produced which imply 
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further exploration of the ideas implied in it. They include the extended examination 
of the issues of legitimisation and their relation to the order in prisons (Sparks et al., 
1996; Sparks and Bottoms, 1995).  
 
Whereas the decency agenda can be viewed as reflecting the liberal vision of 
imprisonment which is mainly the products of the liberal penal elites and external 
observers and critics, it may not be an accurate depiction of the practice in actual 
prisons. How the penal practice has been shaped by liberalism is quite a different 
case from designing and negotiating a set of guiding principles and criteria. As 
Alison Liebling (2004) observes, a significant factor causing the liberal project to 
have gone wrong in the post-Woolf period was that its important concepts like 
‘justice’, ‘liberal’ and ‘care’ failed to achieve sufficient clarity when they had to be 
communicated to those working and managing prisons and to apply in the daily penal 
practice. In this respect, Liebling’s work (2011, 2004 & 1999) provides in-depth 
analyses of how the actual practice in prisons is shaped by liberal values and in what 
way their performance can be measured accordingly.   In the paragraphs below we 
will have a closer review of her study on the ‘moral performance’ of prisons and 
discuss how it may extend further the boundaries of contemporary liberal penal 
imaginaries. 
 
Liebling’s framework of her prison study is based on the understanding that prisons 
are ‘special moral places’. That means, what matters in prisons cannot be measured 
simply through the lens of managerial efficacy and outcome, but should be identified 
in terms of ‘values’: values which are essentially ‘interpersonal and civic’ (Liebling, 
2004: 454). To clarify those values in the prison context and to measure the 
performance of specific prisons on the basis of them has formed the primary goal of 
her prison studies, which employ a set of research strategies that together constitute 
the framework of prisons’ ‘moral performance’. The key dimensions of ‘moral 
performance’ in prisons were identified by Liebling and her research team on the 
basis of investigating what is perceived by prison staff and inmates as important to 
the prison experiences. They were summarised as ‘relationship dimensions’, ‘regime 
dimensions’, ‘social structure dimensions’ plus two individual items (‘meaning’, 
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‘quality of life’).  Those dimensions consist of a number of delicately defined items 
including ‘respect’, ‘trust’, ‘humanity’,  ‘relationships’, ‘support’, ‘fairness’, ‘well-
being’, ‘personal development’,’ family contact’, ‘decency’ and so forth. The 
measurement of each of these in the environment of specific prisons (which is based 
on a score system processing the feedback of prisoners and prison staff responding to 
questionnaires and interviews) is then used to present the overall picture of their 
moral performance and to reveal the variation of such performance among different 
incarceration institutions. As Liebling’s study shows, the prisons which score low are 
also more likely to relate with empirical factors (i.e. high rates of prisoner suicide 
and self-inflicted harms) signifying that they are less survivable than those with 
higher score in their moral performance (2004 & 2011). 
 
The framework of ‘moral performance’ then helps to present the liberal value of 
imprisonment in concrete and measureable forms within the context of mundane 
prison life.  In effect it carries out the task of proving that the ‘humane and decent’ 
treatment in prison can be conceptualised and subjected to measurement and 
comparison.  By doing so it also accomplishes a more in-depth articulation of ‘what 
matters’ in the liberal imaginary of prisons. In this respect, it provides more 
sophisticated guidance than a generalised ‘decency agenda’ for the policy makers 
and researchers to understand and advance reformations in line with the values which 
are vital to the performance of the prison. Moreover, it sheds light on the possibility 
of investigating how empirical evidence in prison experience may help to clarify a 
number of critical terms related to liberal penological perspective (such terms include 
‘dignity’, ‘respect’, ‘care’, ‘fairness’, ‘meaning’, ‘personal development’, etc.) as 
they are in practice.  Such findings are also considered to be meaningful for 
addressing the broader penological principles set by the European Court of Human 
Rights, such as ‘inhuman and degrading treatment’ (Liebling, 2011).   
 
ii. Penal Moderation Proposal  
 
One of the most prominent aspects of the contemporary liberal imaginaries of 
imprisonment is that they have to face a crucial political climate which turns a 
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cynical face to penal experts’ opinions and which makes imprisonment a highly 
politicised issue. Thus to address the punitive penal response and politicisation of 
prison problems has become a vital task for contemporary advocates of liberal 
approaches to imprisonment. In this regard, there has been a wide array of academic 
work following the development of liberal penal thoughts. Under present 
circumstances, such undertakings are represented by the aspiration for a revived 
penal moderation philosophy. 
 
The penal moderation proposal was treated as the central topic of a special edition of 
the journal Theoretical Criminology in 2010. The contributors to the edition 
employed diverse theoretical angles to explore the possibilities for a broad spectrum 
of penal practices designed to shift towards ‘other qualities, such as restraint, 
minimalism, moderation, maybe even mercy’ (Bosworth, 2010a: 252). The 
intensified financial crisis of the time and the government’s willingness to reduce 
public expenditure are considered as providing a worthy opportunity for promoting 
such values within the penal realms. The moderation proposal is targeted at a broad 
range of penal measures, but the use of imprisonment apparently forms one of its 
primary concerns. To make prisons less central to the current penal system and to 
discredit the notion that prison can solve the problem of crime is a shared goal of the 
advocates of the penal moderation proposal. In essence, it envisages a criminal 
justice system which ‘does less’ rather than advocating new purposes for it. In the 
perspective of Ian Loader, penal moderation as a public philosophy of punishment 
should comprise the elements of restraint, parsimony and dignity. In the first place, a 
sense of restraint is considered as necessary in the ways of delivering penalty and 
generating discourses about it. This requirement is related to the task of penal 
moderation to bring the particular moral ambivalence of punishment – which is often 
reflected in the conflicting emotional states associated with penal dynamics - into the 
public discursive sphere and to make it a vital aspect of the endeavour to fight 
against the tangible ‘penal enthusiasm’ evident at the present time. Parsimony is 
related to the awareness of the ‘tragic’ nature of penal institutions – it is wise not to 
invest too much in them in terms of positive social ends, for they are a rather infertile 
apparatus to achieve such ends. In this case, parsimony is put forward as being in 
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accordance with the particular consciousness of the limits of penal institutions and a 
‘Treasury mindset’ favouring reducing its unnecessary use.  Apart from that, penal 
moderation requires that the penal systems should treat all those brought under their 
control with human dignity and should guarantee the basic human rights of those 
involved (Loader, 2010).  
 
Penal moderation is viewed as a realistic option for the current British prison systems 
and other criminal justice sectors to adopt, as the in-depth criticisms of penal excess 
and popular punitivism over the past few decades and the changed economic 
circumstances have prepared the necessary conditions for its gathering strength. But, 
for its advocates, what is still needed for its realisation is a ‘secure political platform, 
coherent ideological articulation and institutional embeddedness’ (Bosworth, 2010a: 
255). 
 
iii. Liberal Imaginaries of Imprisonment and Universal Normativity 
 
The limited space available in the chapter does not allow us to extend our 
investigation to include every representation of contemporary liberal imaginaries of 
imprisonment. The Woolf prison reform agendas and the penal moderation proposal 
that we have discussed above, however, are able to demonstrate some of the 
prominent characteristics of the current liberal approaches to imprisonment. In the 
first place, it is notable that they implicitly or explicitly involve a shift away from the 
attachment to any universal penological ideology. The moderation proposal is based 
on the recognition of the limits of penal measures and it shrinks from the 
identification of any positive purposes for them. The Woolf report and the prison 
reform agendas which adopt its stands are also inclined to construct the notions of 
‘justice’ and ‘legitimacy’ in ways which are detached from any essentialist belief 
systems. As a matter of fact, such notions are restrictively defined and are not meant 
to constitute a holistic ideology for custodial practice.  
 
In this respect, they differ greatly from the traditional liberal paradigms within the 
penal welfarist phase or the earlier prison reform era. In those cases, the liberal 
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imaginaries of imprisonment had a significant linkage with the vibrant modern 
aspiration for universal normativity. This means that the faith in a desired vision of 
the future, or in an ideal state of society, is an indispensable element of the normative 
structure underpinning those liberal penal imaginaries. In spite of the divergence in 
the standpoints regarding what elements the ‘ideal society’ should contain and how 
they might be implemented effectively, those imaginaries normally implied a longing 
for completeness and for the ultimate good. This aspect was vital to the normative 
construction of those liberal penal imaginaries, as all the specific prescriptions they 
made were underpinned and given life by allegiance to the universal ideals to which 
they aspired. In contrast, what characterises the challenges faced by the 
contemporary penal liberals is the decline in the faith and the horizon of any 
convincing form of universal normativity. This inherent lack of any ‘normative 
future’ has significant implications for the effort to build some sustainable ground for 
legitimising the practices of incarceration and directing reforms towards improving 
them.  
 
In this particular context, the liberal values and visions of imprisonment may be 
embraced by people in those societal circles who share the corresponding 
presumptions and narratives (particularly liberal academics and their audiences), but 
for those who do not (e.g. many tabloid journalists and their audiences, ‘underclass’ 
youth, victims of serious crime and their relatives, in certain cases), it is questionable 
how the validity of liberal claims can be established. This difficulty per se suggests 
that the contemporary liberal imaginaries have to face a challenge within the 
normative realm which may be more profound than the material crisis within the 
prison institutions.  
 
Therefore, it is crucial to inquire how the contemporary liberal imaginaries are able 
to succeed in providing a valid normative construction without the support of 
traditional universal ideals. This will lead to the examination of their performance in 
relation to the introspective normativity approach, whose methodological principles 
we have discussed at length in Chapter 2.  
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The following investigation will uncover some of the more in-depth mechanisms of 
liberal imaginaries in their attempt to achieve their respective normative visions 
under contemporary circumstances. On this basis, we will be able to scrutinize how 
the performances of introspective normativity are conducted within them and also to 
shed light on their innovative potential for confronting the predicaments within the 
contemporary imprisonment field.  
 
III. Four Approaches to Normative Construction in the Contemporary Liberal 
Imaginaries of Imprisonment 
 
As the preceding discussion indicates, the contemporary liberal imaginaries of 
imprisonment face the challenge of defending the validity of their normative claims 
in the post-welfarist conditions, in which the conventional universalist ideology 
previously employed for championing the liberal prison regime is no longer viable. 
Against this background, we can detect a number of strategies adopted by advocates 
of liberal prison agendas on various occasions which imply different forms of 
normative construction. What makes them distinct is that they seek to detach the 
normative question of incarceration from holistic penal ideologies. Some of these 
strategies are not entirely novel within the lineage of liberal penal thinking, yet their 
potential for displaying innovative types of performance of introspective normativity 
have become particularly noteworthy while the prospects of universal normativity 
are declining within the imprisonment sphere.  
 
Below we will discuss four such approaches and examine whether they are capable 
of playing the role of effective normative construction for liberal penal thinking in 
the post-welfarist imprisonment field. Although the four approaches are not meant to 
exhaust all the existing forms of normative performance of the liberal imaginaries, 
they can be considered as quite representative in a contemporary context. Our work 
in investigating in them can hopefully also give us some insights about the 
possibilities of further normative innovations concerning the performance of liberal 
approaches to incarceration.  
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i. The Exterior Normativity Approach 
 
This approach is related to the phenomenon that among the advocates of liberal 
prison schemes there is a notable inclination to rely upon certain established 
discursive value-systems to bear the burden of normative argument. Some of the 
value-systems that are most often resorted to include human rights, international 
treaties and conventions, and the jurisdictions of the European Court of Human 
Rights (ECtHR) (e.g. van Zyl Smit and Snacken, 2009; Snacken, 2010; Livingstone, 
2000 and Coyle, 2002). 
 
As those value-systems are well recognised at the international or European level, 
they can easily serve as the ‘normative guarantee’ for the penal policies or rationales 
which have suffered from the attenuation of the validity of their possible ideological 
foundations, provided that meaningful correlations can be shown to exist between 
them. The effort to establish such a correlation is evident in some of the 
representative forms of the liberal imaginaries of imprisonment.       
 
For example, the liberal stand which acknowledges prisoners’ rights (particularly the 
right to vote) is traditionally associated with the universalist vision of individuals 
(including prisoners) as agents who own moral autonomy and take responsibility for 
the decisions made by their independent will.
6
 However, this underlying 
philosophical assumption enjoys little allegiance in the present political milieu, 
which is permeated with law and order discourses and the ‘us/them’ dichotomy used 
to represent the images of prisoners. Under such circumstances, the rulings of the 
ECtHR are thought to constitute an authoritative source for buttressing the liberal 
approaches to protecting prisoners’ rights. Van Zyl Smit and Snacken (2009), for 
example, advance an interpretation of the decisions of ECtHR, the reports of the 
Committee for the Prevention of Torture (CPT) and the European Prison Rules (EPR) 
and, based on that, they put forward a regulatory framework which solidly embraces 
the recognition of prisoners’ rights that are guaranteed by the European Convention 
                                                 
6
 For more discussion about the ‘liberal subject’ and its implications for modern penality, see Brown 
(2005).  
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on Human Rights (ECHR). In this perspective, the ECtHR decision delivered in the 
Golder case in 1975 settled the principle that detention should not imply any 
‘inherent limitation’ to the human rights of prisoners, which was re-affirmed in the 
European Prison Rules of 1987.
7
 As the judicial decisions made at the EU level and 
the human rights value-system that underpins them possess a relatively 
uncontroversial status within the normative-discursive spectrum, they provide a 
much needed ground for the liberal proposals on prison schemes (like the protection 
of prisoners’ rights) to depend upon. Yet, in this case, what matters most is the 
apparent immunity of those established value-systems from serious opposition and 
criticism within the public forum: this very quality is what determines the success of 
the strategy in question in fulfilling its normative construction. It is not concerned, 
however, with what peculiar normative realities are associated with those value-
systems and how they might be linked to the imprisonment field in some inherent 
way. In other words, what is involved in this approach is merely a kind of ‘exterior 
normativity’: insofar as the value-systems it resorts to are held (exteriorly) to be valid, 
they are considered to be capable of undertaking the role which the traditional 
universalist liberal ideal had previously played.  
  
Such a strategy of normative construction is also operational within those penal 
imaginaries which seek to pursue a more systematic representation of the connection 
between the exterior value-system and liberal penal approaches. Snacken (2010), for 
instance, tried to develop a framework with a view to transforming the empirical 
findings about the correlation between differed levels of ‘punitiveness’ and emphasis 
on value-systems such as democracy, dignity and human rights across European 
societies into normative arguments for the reduction of penal excess. In her account, 
the relationship between the constrained use of punishment and a high level of 
welfare, a strong emphasis on democracy and human rights can be established as an 
empirical fact, and this finding, in turn, strengthens the normative argument that a 
moderate approach to penality should be favoured if ‘those fundamental values 
cherished by many Europeans’ are to be defended (Snacken, 2010: 287). In this 
                                                 
7
 Golder v. United Kingdom, 1975, 1 EHRR 524. Similarly, the European Prison Rules of 1987 
stipulate that deprivation of freedom itself is sufficient punishment and no other deprivations, pains or 
restrictions should be imposed on prisoners. See Van Zyl Smit and Snacken (2009: 360).  
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perspective, the status of the exterior value sources as the ‘sponsor’ of normativity 
for the penal imagination is also evident, though the two spheres are placed within  a 
more integral network of meanings than that which the single-direction interpretation 
of ECtHR decisions or human rights discourse achieves in the former case.  
 
It is noteworthy that the sources of this ‘exterior normativity’ are quite diverse and 
invocation of them may occur on a variety of occasions. In fact, in our review of the 
methodological approach of sociology of punishment (Chapter 2, II.ii), we also 
uncovered the tendency of sociological studies of imprisonment to resort to certain 
‘commonly’ acknowledged abstract values, like democracy and civic freedom, in 
order to give their undertakings a normative anchor.  
 
The exterior normativity approach identified above does not imply that there is no 
intrinsic connection between those exterior value systems and the substantive content 
of the traditional liberal penological vision. It is feasible to elaborate, for example, 
how the human rights system or ideas of democracy imply the fundamental elements 
of the liberal visions of the ends of incarceration regimes. However, the defining 
character of the exterior normativity approach is the particular way in which liberal 
imaginaries benefit from the apparent ‘politically correct’ status of those value-
systems rather than the effort to explore possibilities of the re-normalisation of the 
liberal imprisonment ideal on its own account. As a result, this strategy requires that 
the normative performance of such penal imaginaries is contained within a trajectory 
circumscribed by orthodox discourses and it has rather limited chances of getting 
inspiration and achieving self-reflection through encountering and acknowledging 
‘the unsettled puzzles’ within the present custodial regime as well as the multiple 
divergent ways of presenting their normative significance.  Thus in terms of their 
performance in introspective normativity, it represents a static type and becomes  
detached from the dimension of normative innovation based on in-depth self-
reflection and open-ended interaction with heterogeneous dynamics and perspectives 
within the imprisonment field.  
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The problem of the exterior normativity approach can then be described as one that 
imposes normative closure on the liberal imaginaries of imprisonment. Whereas the 
popular profile of the value-systems it resorts to does help it to shun some of the 
oppositional reactions from the public audience, such an adherence also results in a 
non-reflexive way of presenting the normative reality of the contemporary 
imprisonment field. Considering the challenge of the decline of universal normativity 
in the post-welfarist context, the exterior normativity approach does not own 
sufficient normative strength to recognise and confront it properly; it actually 
excludes it from its agenda. In this respect, it represents a counterproductive form of 
normative performance.  
 
ii. The ‘Limits’ Acknowledgement Approach 
 
This approach is related to the idea and perception that the time for penal optimism is 
gone and that the liberal penological assumption that the prison system can be 
designed and operated in ways that would benefit the well-being of individual 
inmates and serve the best interests of the whole society is no longer sustainable. In 
this case, the particular sense of the ‘limits’ of incarceration as a means of 
punishment can also participate in the performance of introspective normativity in 
favour of the liberal penological approaches: since the exercise of custodial power is 
represented as intrinsically ‘tragic’, and as being hopeless for achieving meaningful 
social ends in a definite and undamaging manner, the liberal stand that supports the 
approach of penal moderation and prudence then gains credit. In other words, the 
‘limits’ acknowledgement approach reconstructs the liberal normative vision in a 
way that emphasises the impotence and the limitations of the positive use of prisons. 
Unlike the exterior normativity approach, the predicament of the sphere of normative 
performance in the imprisonment field instead gets acknowledged and serves as the 
very basis for advancing the liberal penolgocal virtues of moderation against the 
background of current custodial practices in the UK. 
 
The penal imaginary which makes the ‘limits’ of penal measures the central part of 
its understanding about them can be traced back to the Durkheimian theory of the 
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social function of punishment. Within Durkheim’s (1964) perspective, the key 
function of penality is to maintain the moral order of society by confirming to its 
members the condemnable nature of deviancies. In other words, the extinction of all 
crimes is never the reachable goal for the ‘normal’ function of the penal system; on 
the contrary, the continuous exposure and enforcement of penal responses to crimes 
and deviancies are indispensable to it. Thus apart from their moral-symbolic role, the 
penal measures are thought to involve intrinsic limits in realising the positive goals 
of deterring the occurrence of offences and making society a crime-free world. The 
idea of ‘limits’ has also been elaborated in numerous empirical researches, 
particularly with regard to the practice of incarceration. Many of them support the 
view that deprivation of freedom per se inevitably entails serious damages to the 
inmates’ well-being and cannot be an effective way of achieving their rehabilitation 
and the  prevention of future crimes, no matter how thoughtfully or ‘decently’ its 
institutional practice is organised (Sykes, 1958; Crewe, 2011; Cohen and Taylor, 
1972).  
 
Whereas the Durkheimian theory of punishment presents such ‘limits’ mainly as 
objective sociological findings, they tend to have particular normative bearings on 
the contemporary liberal imaginaries of imprisonment. In the latter case, the 
disenchanted recognition of what prisons cannot achieve paves the way for the 
justification of the self-conscious restricting of the use of prisons. In the same way, it 
can serve as the cognitive grounds for defying the populist penal discourses which 
invest excessive social expectations in the prison system and tend to ignore the 
restrictions on penal power that form the major concern of traditional liberal 
penological thinking.  
 
Ian Loader’s elaboration of this penal moderation philosophy has offered a typical 
example in this regard.  He identifies penal moderation as an approach which focuses 
‘on the limits rather than the purposes of punishment’ (2010: 355) and it ‘recalls and 
works with the well-documented fact that the prison is a perennially failing social 
apparatus about which it is wise never to be sanguine, or to invest much hope’(2010: 
354). Under such a perspective, the sense of restraints should be prior to any 
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acknowledgement of positive penal ideologies, no matter whether they seek to 
reform or to achieve proportionally delivered justice, and it is important that the 
public learns to accept and embrace a vision of restricted penal scope and scale. If 
this stance is accepted, some key liberal penological appeals centred on the idea of 
constraining the use of penality will be rescued from the apparently indeterminate 
ideological debates and controversies within the post-welfarist context. Even though 
they are not derived from any kind of ontological assertion, under the ‘limits’ 
acknowledgement perspective they can be justifiably taken as the most appropriate 
principles for responding to the current circumstances within the penal field.      
 
It can be noted that this approach addresses the difficulties and complexities in the 
penal ideological realm in a way which is more sophisticated than the exterior 
normativity approach. The distinctive characteristic of this approach is that in its 
normative construction it does not take as necessary the adherence to any 
overarching penal ideology or exterior value-system; instead, the core contents of its 
normative implications are closely connected with its deliberately maintained 
distance from any such discursive frameworks as attaching positive values and ends 
to penal interventions. It also acknowledges the paradoxical aspect of penal 
phenomena in drawing out their normative implications, as it agrees that 
‘[p]unishment—for a penal moderate—is an occasion for, and source of, sorrow and 
regret: it does and should make us feel uncomfortable’ (Braithwaite and Pettit, 1989: 
6, quoted in Loader, 2010: 353). Thus the place which the ‘moderation’ imaginaries 
have reached is not built upon affirmative normative realities or external dogmas, but 
instead is built on a deeply ‘fluid’ basis which consists of uncertain and paradoxical 
experiences.  
 
Compared with the exterior normativity approach, the ‘limits’ acknowledgement 
approach rejects the ‘oblivion’ response to the predicament of universal normativity; 
and it provides a different way of establishing its normative claims. Its normative 
performance has a passive character: its particular advice to the imprisonment 
practice is not derived from any conviction as to the universal ‘good’ achievable 
through the penal institutions, but from profound doubt about its feasibility. In this 
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perspective, the only way to make sense of the decline of universal normativity 
within the imprisonment field is to live with its inherently imperfect circumstances 
and minimise its negative impact on civil society and the individuals at stake.  
 
Yet this ‘withdrawal’ type of normative performance also places a particular sort of 
normative closure on the penal imaginaries based on it. This is related to the way in 
which it constructs and makes sense of the ‘tragic dimension’ of penality. The idea of 
‘limits’ often implies a fixed way of  representing the turbulent and abnormal nature 
of penality and, broadly, the sphere of crime, violence and social pathologies, in 
which they are  presented as the opposite of the regular civil social order and as 
inherently different from it. As for the ‘limits’ acknowledgement imaginaries, this  
bitter aspect  of penal phenomena is beyond any complete cure, and is only subject to 
realistic management which aims at possible control and reduction of this aspect. 
However, the more weight is placed on the necessity of including an awareness of 
the ‘limits’ of penality (to bring the abnormal back to the normal), the more fully 
confirmed is the dualistic assumption about the opposition between ‘normal’ civic 
society and the ‘abnormal’ penal realm. This somehow severs the connection 
between the two domains and presents the former as something unwelcome, 
unfamiliar and threatening to normal social life. In principle it reflects the orientation 
of the mainstream, ‘law-abiding’ social sectors towards the ‘dark’ institutions of 
incarceration. When the positivist ideal of prison reform has fallen into disrepute, for 
them the ‘limits’ acknowledgement approach appears to represent an acceptable 
compromise and an alternative to purely administrative penological constructions. 
But for the social sectors who are regularly exposed to the turbulent environment of 
‘captive society’ or prevalent criminal victimisation, the compromising nature of its 
normative construction would remain particularly exasperating, as it amounts to a 
consolidation of the normative status of the experiences related to them and a denial 
of any possible contribution to the transformation of the extant normative order of 
the incarceration complex. In this regard, the problem of the fading of universal 
normativity can hardly be remedied by the ‘limits’ acknowledge approach. 
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Furthermore, it also places constraints on the potential for normative innovation, 
which can occur only when the boundaries of such settled social realms are 
challenged and reshaped.  As far as the dualistic vision of the normative status of the 
normal social order and the captive world is maintained, the former would possess a 
status which appears to be distanced from the upheavals implied in the latter and thus 
serves as the standard for penal thinking. Such a separation puts a closure on the 
effort to reassess the normativity of the former and to take the tragic side of the latter 
as being part of the whole society rather than as an autonomous aspect of 
imprisonment per se. Thus, for the task of revitalising the normative performance of 
imaginaries of imprisonment, it is important that this boundary-fixing effect be 
realised and overcome.  
 
iii. The Cultural Identity Approach 
 
This particular approach is premised on the separate system of incarceration in the 
UK, which we discussed in the overview section of Chapter 1. Under this system, the 
custodial institutions in Scotland and Northern Ireland are separate from those in 
England and Wales and are not subject to the administration of the HM Prison 
Service. Instead, their prison policies are determined and implemented mainly at the 
local level and under the impact of local politics and the cultural self-understanding 
of the decision makers. It is against this background that the particular ‘cultural 
identity approach’ is considered by us as being active in the normative construction 
of liberal visions of imprisonment.  
 
Let us take the prison reform trajectory in Scotland, for example. As early as the era 
prior to Scottish devolution, it can be noted that it has been entangled with the 
important local political movement to promote a national identity which is ‘other-to-
England’. As Lesley McAra (2005, 2008) has documented, whereas the penal polices 
in England and Wales were turning in a punitive direction, the criminal justice 
system in Scotland maintained the continuity of its welfarist commitments until the 
1990s. Such a ‘resistance’ was closely connected with the relatively autonomous 
status of the elite networks of penal decision-makers in Scotland, which had formed 
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the custom of pursuing separate policies which were tailored to suit a  distinctively 
Scottish context, particularly its peculiar civic culture that values cooperation, 
inclusion and the welfare of the young and the vulnerable. The rise of Scottish 
identity politics and the devolved modes of governance, on the other hand, have 
prepared the conditions for this civic culture to continue to thrive and for nurturing a 




This peculiar ‘cultural identity’ also plays a role within the discursive spectrum of 
the championing of the liberal approach to imprisonment. While there is ever 
diminishing ontological ground for buttressing liberal claims within the 
contemporary imprisonment field, this shared cultural identity seems to be able to 
provide an anchor for the conservation of this approach. In this regard, the excluding 
and illiberal attributes of incarceration practice are conceived as a ‘rotten source’ 
which inevitably undermines the cultural self-understanding and solidarity of the 
community. The prevention of this from happening thus forms a task with particular 
political appeal to those who no longer find the regular rationales underpinning the 
liberal penal measures convincing. And this task would appear to be especially 
urgent in a condition where such ‘cultural identity’ is perceived to be vulnerable and 
worthy of meticulous protection. Yet, as we will see shortly, it is not merely 
employed by those with the aim of defending an ‘other-to-England’ cultural identity, 
but also influences penal thinking with regard to the English prison system per se, as 
criminologists are induced to consider the possibility of revising the dominant 
political ethos and the cultural self-understanding within England which encourages 
penal expansion.  
 
We can see a typical representation of the cultural identity approach, for example, in 
the governmental documents in Scotland which involve an elaboration of ways of 
comprehending prison issues. The influential report of the Scottish Prisons 
Commission, which was published in 2008, purported to link the reformatory future 
of the prison system with Scotland’s choice of a global identity: whether to follow 
the example of its neighbour in the south (England) which is ‘engaged in the most 
                                                 
8
 See more discussion in McAra (2005).  
 133 
significant expansion of its penal system’, or conversely, to follow the neighbours in 
the north (the Scandinavian countries) where ‘high levels of social equality and 
welfare go hand in hand with low imprisonment rates’ (Scottish Prisons Commission, 
2008: 10). The report determines that the prison system in Scotland should choose a 
‘distinctively Scottish path’ which ‘builds on local practices and institutions while 
looking to the best practices from abroad’, so that it can be made into an 
‘international model’ (ibid: 10). Accordingly, prison policies should be adjusted to 
suit this particular self-understanding of Scotland’s cultural characteristics: the 
illiberal features of the incarceration system then need to be removed on the basis 
that they apparently undermine the deliberate construction and preservation of such 
an identity. In this regard, should the population detained in Scottish prisons reach a 
level markedly higher than that in Norway (or the other countries with which 
Scotland culturally identifies itself), that should be held to be a warning signal that 
the expectations related to the nation’s self-image have been ill met.
9
    
 
A similar logic also underlay the decision made by the Scottish prison authorities to 
grant compassionate release to Abdelbaset Ali Mohmed Al-Megrahi, the prisoner 
who was convicted of the Lockerbie bombing. Among the reasons given by the 
Cabinet Secretary for Justice Kenny MacAskill, the self-identification of Scotland 
and the Scottish people as the embracers of ‘justice, humanity, mercy’ stands out as 
the major justifying ground: ‘[i]n Scotland, we are a people who pride ourselves on 
our humanity. It is viewed as a defining characteristic of Scotland and the Scottish 
people. The perpetration of an atrocity and outrage cannot and should not be a basis 
for losing sight of who we are, the values we seek to uphold, and the faith and beliefs 
by which we seek to live…. Compassion and mercy are about upholding the beliefs 
that we seek to live by, remaining true to our values as a people. No matter the 
severity of the provocation or the atrocity perpetrated.’10 In those discourses, the 
normative validity of liberal penal values is somehow disconnected from their 
                                                 
9
 In the words of Kenny MacAskill (the Cabinet Secretary for Justice): ‘[t]he Government refuses to 
believe that the Scottish people are inherently bad or that there is any genetic reason why we should 
be locking up twice as many offenders as Ireland or Norway’ (Scottish Prisons Commission: 10). 
10 See, ‘Decisions on the applications for prisoner transfer and compassionate release in relation to 




universal adequacy in handling questions relating to prisons and prisoners, but 
instead gets established by the act of confirming a particular cultural disposition and 
temperament as representing the defining attributes of ‘a people’. The latter is 
essentially a matter of collective choices and it does not pertain to any of the types of 
ontological necessity that prescribe the liberal incarceration schemes. Thus the 
cultural identity approach has the effect of relieving the tension engendered by the 
decline of universal normativity, and makes a virtue-based community value-system 
the major bearer of the normative burden which the universal penal ideology used to 
carry.    
 
Notably, such an effect of normative performance also inspired the ways of 
imagining the reformative future of penal systems which inhabit cultural settings 
distinct from their Scottish counterparts. In those cases, the cultural identity approach 
may work in ways which either advocate the desirability of shifting the extant, 
comparatively disreputable, penal culture to a better-recognised one or else call for 
the restoration of the old civic virtues which used to feature in the ad hoc political 
culture but which tend to be forgotten in the punitive context. For example, the 
traditionally-accepted image of England as a ‘tolerant, forgiving, decent and 
pragmatic’ land and the collective self-understanding based on that image are 
resorted to as a cultural referent for nurturing a ‘penal moderation’ turn (Loader, 
2010: 354). In fact such a strategy is also employed to address the political culture in 
the US, one which is widely perceived as adversary to those civic cultural attributes, 
on the basis that such a comparative approach would establish a recommendable 




Under the scrutiny of the introspective normativity approach, the cultural identity 
approach has much in common with the exterior normativity approach identified 
earlier. The discussion above indicates that ‘cultural identity’ per se serves as a sort 
of external normative standard for enabling a consensus among the addressed 
community members regarding the way of delivering sentences and running prisons. 
In doing so, it somehow manages to evade the normative burden which liberal 
                                                 
11
 And in this case the example of Scottish civic culture is viewed as an appealing model for 
Americans to follow. See Simon (2010a: 268).  
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penology used to carry in the form of a universal penal ideal. As far as the liberal 
image of a particular nation or community maintains its popularity among its 
addressees, the cultural identity approach has the grounds to convince them that 
liberal penal values are also desirable despite the post-universalist predicament. But 
unlike the exterior normativity approach which resorts to certain doctrinal systems 
which are assumed to be orthodox and prescriptive, it is in its nature conditional. 
Instead of presenting its normative claims as being equivalent to categorical 
imperatives, it implies that choice, although performed collectively, plays a 
significant part in constituting the normative basis of the penal system. Thus there is 
a peculiar communicative element in this approach which creates the innovative 
potential for its normative performance to be distinct from the exterior normative 
approach. In the case where ‘cultural identity’ is constructed as a fixed trajectory 
which admits a singular set of principles for directing the prison regimes, its 
normative performance is analogous to that of the exterior normativity approach: it is 
one which leaves the predicament of universal normativity in oblivion and which 
results in normative closure in presenting the imaginary vision of imprisonment. 
However, should the ‘cultural identity’ be given the dynamic meaning of purposeful 
negotiations, reflections and choices being performed through a public forum, it 
would also bring the communicative and deliberative constituents into the normative 
realm of imprisonment and create opportunities for the problematic nature and the 
challenges within it to be better addressed before an interactive public. This might be 
expected to lead to a more innovative and constructive future for the normative 
performance of liberal imaginaries of imprisonment.  
 
In this regard, the current forms of the ‘cultural identity’ approach, as we see in the 
Scottish case, are still in need of further development in order to realise such 
innovative potentials in normative performance. 
 
iv. The Penal Consumption Approach 
 
As studies on the phenomena of consumerism have flourished and exerted immense 
impact on the contemporary sociological enterprise, they have also lent new 
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conceptual tools to criminologists who seek to locate the dynamics of imprisonment 
within the setting of consumer society and unpack their meanings from the angle of 
consumerist studies (Vaughan, 2002; McCulloch and McNeill, 2007; Loader, 1999 & 
2009; Simon, 2010a & 2010b; Goold et al., 2010).  
 
Their work has  not only given rise to a rich array of sociological findings regarding 
the relationship between the rise of consumer society and the current penal-political 
atmosphere, the role of the consumer mindset in the expansion of incarceration and 
the distinctive characteristics as well as the problematics relating to the spread of the 
‘penal consumption’ phenomenon, but also introduced  a peculiar critical perspective 
for addressing the normative facets of penal performance, particularly of the 
institutional practice of incarceration. The latter aspect of the penal consumption 
literature, as we will show shortly, presents a unique approach to the normative 
performance of liberal imaginaries of imprisonment.    
 
Certainly it is beyond the scope of the present section to undertake a comprehensive 
review of the literature in the field but, before we start to examine the penal 
consumption approach as a means of normative construction, it will be helpful to 
sketch some key findings of these consumerist studies which constitute its 
knowledge background. They can be viewed as consisting of two distinctive sets of 
research undertakings. One embarks on exposing the sociological consequences of 
the advent of consumerist society in the sphere of penal practice. A typical example 
in this regard is Vaughan’s (2002) study of the punitive consequences of consumer 
culture, which applies René Girard’s scapegoating theory to explain how the rise of 
consumer society has undermined the traditional desire-containing social 
mechanisms and has exacerbated the anxiety felt by individuals in the society, which 
eventually fuels the scapegoating mechanism that induces increasingly punitive 
reactions to the socially marginalised and excluded.
12
 The other set of studies, in 
contrast, is concerned with how penal practice per se might be structured by the 
consumerist logic and become the proper object itself of analysis in terms of a 
                                                 
12
 Also see Bauman’s (1997 & 2002) analyses of the status of the ‘underclass’ in post-modern 
conditions as ‘flawed customers’ who have lost the safeguards of the welfarist state and have instead 
become subject to intensified penal measures as an alternative form of social control.   
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consumerist perspective. In this case, the demands for safety and for harsher prison 
terms in  reaction to crime is treated as analogous to the appetite for food and 
housing – whose excessive nature is characteristic of the contemporary consumer 
culture (Loader, 2009; Simon, 2010a & 2010b). Similarly, the ‘insecure public’ are 
conceived as the primary consumer of the prison service (McCulloch and McNeill, 
2007). Within this perspective, the ‘excess’ of imprisonment, police and private 
security measures can be analysed in the light of consumption behaviour, albeit of a 
unique type. The existing research in this field has already offered rich and intriguing 
explanations of the sociological attributes of the penal consumption dynamics and 
identified various worrying consequences of its further development, particularly 
with regard to its negative effects on the prospects of having these prison issues 
subjected to democratic deliberation and decision-making rather than market 
regulation (McCulloch and McNeill, 2007; Loader, 1999 & 2009).         
 
In an attempt to advance the sociological understanding of ‘penal consumption’, the 
latter type of research also indicates a new possibility of dealing with the normative 
questions of incarceration. In the consumption-oriented imaginary, the conventional 
moral categories for addressing  prison related issues such as retribution, individual 
culpability and responsibility, correction, justice and integration tend to be replaced 
by new, often metaphorical, categories based on the relationship of consumption. 
The latter (consumption prudence, consumer rationality, ‘diet balance’, over-
consumption, etc) have the effect of transforming the solemnity of the traditional 
morality-laden terminology into the apparent acceptability of the mundane wisdom 
that is normally praised in prudent consumer choices. Accordingly, some of the key 
liberal penological claims – restriction on custodial usage, the need to curb the 
demand for excessive penal measures and to promote parsimony and moderation in 
the current political atmosphere – can be re-established on a particular basis  which 
does not necessarily require support from any essentialist theories or ideologies. So 
long as the criticisms of ‘bad’ consumer decisions are accepted as valid, the penal 
consumption approach can provide a reference framework which can buttress the 
liberal prison scheme which is viewed as having considerable affinity with the 
consumer prudence standards.  
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 A typical example of this approach is the tendency to issue ‘health warnings’ about 
the dangers of overconsumption. As the demand of security is treated as akin to other 
consumer cravings, the results of consumption excess (the soaring number of prison 
inmates) are also treated as comparable to the morbid consequences that people have 
to bear when they yield to the temptation of unregulated consumption of other goods 
(ice-cream, pizzas, SUVs, housing, and so on): obesity, physical or financial 
breakdown. They thus serve as the basis for urging a reassessment of the status quo 
of the prison systems and advocating a more restrained approach to the 
‘consumption’ of incarceration (e.g. Loader, 2009 and Simon, 2010a). This may be 
viewed as a paradigm shift in the representation of the normative reality of 
imprisonment. Yet is it able to carry out the task of ensuring effective normative 
performance for the liberal penal imaginaries in response to the post-universalist 
predicament in the imprisonment field? If we take it as an overall normative scheme, 
there will be noteworthy limitations in its performance of introspective normativity. 
First of all, it is questionable to what extent the ‘consumption’ metaphor reflects the 
comprehensive penal relationships involved in incarceration practice. After all, the 
current ‘illiberal’ attributes of imprisonment involve multiple possibilities of 
interpretation and the consumption approach has to prove its superiority over other 
ways of defining their normative implications. Notably, the consumption approach is 
highly selective in presenting the normative statuses and hierarchies of the factors 
related to the imprisonment dynamics. The severity of custodial sentencing as a penal 
measure, along with the normative burden to justify it, receives little recognition and 
is removed from the centre of its imaginary. In this respect, it is in a weak position to 
defend the validity of its normative vision based on the consumption interpretation 
against the alternative approaches, for example, the ‘limits’ acknowledge approach 
which we analysed earlier.  When the penal consumption approach functions as a 
tactic for constructing a specific one-dimensional normative understanding of 
imprisonment (and for rejecting the alternative normative understandings), it can 
hardly be expected to achieve a more convincing outcome than other post-welfarist 
approaches to normative performance.  
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However, the penal consumption approach also contains an insight which reaches 
beyond the essentialist horizon of normative construction. Whereas the metaphorical 
use of the idea of ‘consumption prudence’ may not serve as an adequate  foundation 
upon which a systemic liberal prison scheme can be built, it manifests considerable 
innovative potential to challenge the conventional framework of penological thinking 
and to inspire alternative approaches to presenting the normative reality in the 
imprisonment field. One of its most revealing undertakings is to expose the fact that 
similar ‘self-control’ patterns exist across the boundaries of other social sectors, but 
they tend to be constructed differently depending on the social positions of the actors. 
As Ian Loader (2009) has analysed, for individuals from the urban ‘underclass’, lack 
of ‘self-control’ is often identified as the cause of their criminality and most of the 
prison correctional programmes contain elements which take the restoration of a 
proper level of self-control as the premise of prisoners’ reintegration into society, 
whereas a similar lack of ‘self-control’ also characterises  middle class members’ 
consumption habits and the whole of society’s excessive appetite for security. The 
consumption metaphor in this case then works in a critical way to question the 
established normative order within the penal sphere; it does not necessarily envisage 
an integral normative scheme to replace the old one, but it has the effect of 
overturning the routine structure of the dominant normative understanding and 
eliciting different angles for its possible reconstruction.  
 
Therefore, the penal consumption approach can be considered as an limited form of 
normative performance when it seeks to endorse the liberal imprisonment scheme by  
advancing  a metaphorical ‘health warnings’ strategy; but its insightful 
deconstruction of conventional penal relations provides an inspiring source for 
potential normative innovation and the revitalisation of the penal imaginaries of 
incarceration.  
     
IV. Discussion 
 
The preceding investigation shows that there is a rich body of resources for liberal 
imaginaries which involve diverse kinds of introspective normative construction in 
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the face of the predicament of the decline of universal normativity in the post-
welfarist imprisonment field. The four approaches we have analysed above certainly 
do not exhaust all the individual types of normative performance within the 
contemporary liberal penal imaginaries, but they do provide us with empirical 
grounds on the basis of which we will be able to capture and examine some of the 
representative aspects of the current liberal imaginaries with regard to their 
performance in terms of introspective normativity.  
 
Whereas all the four approaches that we have investigated aim to enhance the 
validity of certain key liberal penological claims within the current context 
(especially with regard to the curbing of the punitive and excessive use of custodial 
sentences and the advocating of a more moderate and more restrictive approach 
towards it), the characteristics and effects of their performances in relation to 
introspective normativity are not identical. Some of them can be seen to involve 
important limitations in relation to such performances and to meeting the challenge 
related to the decline of universal normativity. The exterior normativity approach 
largely ignores the crucial status of the decline of universal normativity and tries to 
establish the validity of liberal penological claims on certain exterior value-systems. 
Though this approach has the effect of transmitting the burden of normative 
argument to the realm of established discourses which benefit from a large degree of 
public support, it pays the price of imposing closure on the effort to explore the 
pluralistic aspects of the imprisonment complex and making them the very source for 
normative innovation. Its performance in terms of introspective normativity can thus 
be described by the term ‘oblivion’ as we defined it in Chapter 2. In terms of its 
normative performance it has a nihilistic counterproductive effect. The cultural 
identity approach implies the same problem of normative closure, when the cultural 
identity is taken as another form of exterior normativity. By contrast, the ‘limits’ 
acknowledgement approach implies a reflexive space for acknowledgement of the 
lack of universal ideals in the imprisonment field, yet it engages in a different type of 
normative closure through the creation of a dualistic vision which assumes that the 
essence of penality is bound to be alien to the civic social order and external to the 
reach of normalisation.   
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On the other hand, our examination of the cultural identity approach and penal 
consumption approach demonstrates that they involve innovative elements of 
normative performance which are inspiring for the task of confronting the 
predicament of the decline of universal normativity within the imprisonment field. 
Such possibilities are related to the strategies of the two approaches which include 
analytical angles which creatively revitalise the conventional pattern of normative 
construction and which are open to further development and innovative interaction 
with divergent perspectives.   
 
For the task of re-normalising the performance of liberal imaginaries so that they can 
properly meet the challenges within the post-welfarist imprisonment field, it is 
important to recognise this tendency of imposing closure in some of these 
contemporary approaches to normative construction, and to expose its 
counterproductive effect on the pursuit of normative innovation. Meanwhile, the 
innovative possibilities of these liberal penal imaginaries need to be detected and 
given sufficient space for further development. It is on that basis that more 
comprehensive ways of revitalising the liberal imaginary spectrum can be realised 












In Chapter 1 we have had a preliminary discussion about the ‘populist’ discourses in 
the penal realm and their impact on the contemporary imaginaries and practices of 
imprisonment. And it is in the particular political climate charged with ‘law and 
order’ rhetoric, the ever-growing public appetite for security and ‘tough’ measures to 
combat crime and tabloid images of criminals and victims that the advocates of 
liberal prison agendas have tried to develop several innovative strategies to preserve 
and reaffirm the validity of their key values such as penal moderation and a 




Despite their constant resort to ‘healthy instincts’ or ‘gut feelings’, the populist 
approaches also observably seek to gain credit by more sophisticated means of 
expression - they can be as numerical as public opinion polls or as vivid as popular 
films and fictions describing prison life. As a matter of fact, nowadays we live in a 
world which does not only resound with those straightforward ‘prison works’ slogans, 
but is also permeated by images, narratives, stories and theories which in effect tend 
to justify and reinforce the existing tendencies of public reactions to prison-related 
issues. In this situation, it will be a meaningful endeavour for us to investigate how 
certain types of populist penal imaginaries may also intervene and participate in the 
configuration of the post-welfarist normative landscapes within the imprisonment 
field, in a way that is comparable to the case of liberal imaginaries.  
 
The existing research concerning the rise of populist forces within the penal sphere 
has mostly focused on the social and political backdrop which nurtured and 
facilitated it, or has sought to make clear the multiple consequences it has had for the 
                                                 
1
 The relevant content is in Chapter 1 (I.i.c & II.vi.d) and Chapter 3 (III).  
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criminal justice systems and broader aspects of social life (civic liberty, justice, 
gender and ethnical relations, etc) (Pratt, 2000b, 2000c & 2009; Pratt et al., 2005; 
Garland 1996 & 2001a, Bottoms, 1995). Yet the dynamics of its performance in 
terms of introspective normativity, as it is implied in those diversified forms of 
populist imaginaries and representations, has received little attention. This may be 
explained by the fact that, in the eyes of many analysts, the substantive part of 
populist imaginaries is nothing but a repetition of shallow clichés, which are boorish 
and dubious at best, misleading and harmful at worst. To treat it seriously features 
the activities of politicians who are eager to please their electorate, whereas as far as 
academic inquiry is concerned it would be difficult and inappropriate to tackle it in 
this way. For example, how could an academic researcher reason with the advocates 
of ‘an eye for an eye’ punishment in its literal sense? For researchers in this field, the 
common response is to avoid any direct normative debate with these populist claims, 
and instead to focus on neutral analysis of why and how such sorts of imaginaries 
have attained their dominion within the contemporary penal political spectrum.  
 
Along with this neutralising strategy there often comes the implied distinction 
between two particular moral universes – the ‘intuitive’ and reactionary on the one 
hand, and the ‘rational’ and ‘informed’ on the other. In a way this resonates with the 
dichotomy that distinguishes professional knowledge from laymen’s opinions, which 
was a familiar one under the traditional penal welfarist regime. Whereas the latter 
dichotomy has become a major target of criticism and suspicion since the paradigm 
of rehabilitation – one of the most representative products of penal expertise – was 
viewed to have failed to achieve its goals, to mainstream academic thinking the 
unequal value-statuses of ‘rational’ and ‘reactionary’ opinions seem to be endemic 
and they are largely immune from any serious challenge.  
 
It can be noted that the distinction between these two different categories of 
discourses on prisons is partly due to the fixed methodological establishment, which 
is disposed, on the one hand, to engage in normative dialogue with discourses which 
are rationally organised and which are thus considered to be arguable, communicable 
and negotiable, and on the other, to employ a ‘neutral’ and analytical manner of 
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dealing with those ‘expressive’ forms of penal discourse, focusing mainly on 
questions of  ‘what’ and ‘why’. Consequently, it tends to create a particular rank of 
relative ‘normative worthiness’ among different discursive representations of penal 
issues.  
 
What is related to this methodological disparity is the commonly shared belief in 
rationalism and humanitarianism among academics. Against this background, the 
populist views and representations about imprisonment can easily be perceived as 
alien or heterogeneous, which in turn reinforces the boundary between the two 
categories of penal imaginaries. Any effort to reconcile them is doomed to fail: it is a 
matter of an ‘either or’ decision rather than mutual comprehension. From this 
perspective, most forms of ‘populist’ imaginaries of imprisonment are beyond the 
reach of rational dialogue and merely constitute a domain to be tamed and 
manipulated so that they can accord with a ‘well-informed’ understanding of penal 
matters.  
 
However, in the contemporary context of the UK, the strategy based on this 
hierarchical value-order (which tends to play down the normative validity of populist 
discourses) faces intense difficulties, both pragmatically and conceptually.  On the 
one hand, the current political and cultural ethos is observed to be increasingly in 
favour of expressive judgement and stand-taking regarding issues of prisons and 
prisoners, and resistant to dispassionate and deliberative approaches. Under such 
circumstances, the particular ‘value-order’ of different sources of penal imaginaries 
tends to be reversed once it is estimated to be external to the academic circles and 
their ‘informed’ audience groups – for example, in the forums of the tabloid media or 
electoral political debates. In those settings, the very quality of delicate and reflexive 
reasoning tends to weaken, rather than enhance, the palatability of their proposals. In 
contrast, the simplified, ‘straightforward’ and enticing languages are more likely to 
succeed in attracting audiences and gaining their support, insofar as they appear to 
resonate well with ‘common’ people’s apparent concerns and dispositions and 
manage to remove the elitist flavour from their rhetorics (Pratt, 2007 and Sussman, 
2002).   
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On the other hand, the difficulty in the ‘rational versus reactionary’ dichotomy is also 
related to the circumstances of universal normativity within the imprisonment field. 
In the previous chapter, we have already touched on this particular predicament in 
our examination of the liberal imaginaries. As our discussion has shown, the 
contemporary liberal approaches to imprisonment have to incorporate a variety of 
strategies in order to realise their performances in terms of introspective normativity, 
so that the validity of their claims can be established in the absence of their 
traditional ideological support. In this regard, the rational way of organising penal 
discourses does not automatically engender the normative credibility of their ideas, 
particularly as far as the audiences of those heterogeneous ‘imagined communities’ 
are concerned. Accordingly, the ground becomes weaker for granting a higher value-
status to the rationally organised penal discourses than to their ‘intuitive’ populist 
rivals, unless they are proven to be successful within the realm of introspective 
normativity.  
 
Therefore, the ‘rational vs reactionary’ dichotomy with its value assumptions – 
which tend to underlie many of the studies of the populist discourses on 
imprisonment today – needs to be re-examined. There are no inherent reasons to 
uphold the judgement that the ‘populist’ imaginaries are doomed to be inferior to 
those more rational and ‘thoughtful’ patterns. They may, as we will discuss in the 
later part of this chapter, involve some unique characteristics which are meaningful 
for the enterprise of re-vitalising the normative performances of imaginaries of 
imprisonment. Compared with the case of liberal imaginaries, they in some respects 
are in more direct touch with the sentiments and concerns of the ordinary members 
of the public and they provide a peculiar channel for their expression and also a 
potential for inspiring a more democratically justifiable approach to addressing the 
imprisonment predicament under contemporary conditions.  
 
However, to take ‘populist’ imaginaries seriously does not mean that their stands and 
viewpoints should be accepted in a way that renders them ‘equally’ sound and 
respectable to any other claims within the penological field. It is crucial to have their 
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normative performance examined to assess whether they succeed in fulfilling the 
claims of normative construction in vibrant and productive ways. In this case, the 
analytic-evaluative perspective of introspective normativity can help us to shed light 
on the performance of populist imaginaries regarding prison issues. If they are shown 
to fail in the task of fulfilling the standard of defensible normative performance, this 
may also help us to consider what particular aspects of the contemporary populist 
imaginaries can be related to such a failure and how they might be changed to enable 
a more fruitful form of the imaginary of imprisonment to be constructed. 
 
In the main body of this chapter, we will first provide an overview of the 
representative types of populist imaginaries of imprisonment in the context of 
contemporary British society. Then we will shed sociological light on the 
phenomenon of the rise of populist discourses by introducing some important items 
in the criminological literature on this territory.  Following that, we will deal with the 
question concerning how these populist imaginaries can be treated as the object of 
analyses based on introspective normativity. Through the examination of the specific 
forms of their normative performance, we will discuss in the conclusion the aspect of 
these populist imaginaries which is viewed by us as being a form of ‘handicapped 
normativity’ and the possibility of remedying this and realising the innovative 




i. Sources and Dynamics 
 
When we try to identify the sources of ‘populist’ imaginaries of imprisonment, we 
immediately notice that they are highly diversified, as there are myriads of 
representations of the ‘public voices’ saying what prison is and should be. There are 
not only the speeches of political figures which pledge to re-establish the ‘balance in 
the criminal justice system’, whose present form is condemned for being ‘in favour 
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of criminals and against protection of the public’,
2
 but also numerous magazines and 
newspapers which strive to offer provocative descriptions of the latest incidents of 
prisoner escapes or crimes committed by ex-prisoners or prisoners on parole. Apart 
from that, various individual bloggers, community representatives and victim rights 
groups also speak out loud about what they think about prisoners’ right to vote, 
‘laxity’ behind bars or certain novel policies implemented in the prisons.
3
 Thus it is a 
rather difficult task to identify what is the authoritative body in generating such 
populist views of imprisonment and what constitutes the ‘standard’ account of them. 
In this respect, they are very different from the liberal imaginaries which we 
examined in the previous chapter. In the latter case, despite the internal 
differentiation among opinions and theories, we are able to identify a few concrete 
groups (academics, penal professionals and policy-makers clinging to liberal 
traditions) who are the main body who contribute to the multiple forms of liberal 
imaginaries about imprisonment and who seek via various different strategies to 
defend the particular normative vision implied within them.  Apart from that, it is 
also relatively easy to identify the discursive carriers of liberal penal imaginaries – 
their mainstream sources often come from academic journals, books, symposiums 
and other forms of publication such as official reports of target-setting and the 
assessment results of custodial institutions. Thus to delineate the boundaries of the 
liberal imaginaries of imprisonment is less problematic than the populist ones. To set 
the latter as an object of inquiry, we need in the first place to clarify what the 
populist imaginaries of imprison are about and ask who is responsible for their 
mobilization? The answers to these questions are not apparent at a first glance.  
 
More importantly, as we will show later, the populist penal imaginaries are closely 
connected with the peculiar social dynamics that are usually studied under the 
heading of ‘moral panics’ or ‘penal populism’. It is often observed that outbursts of 
populist claims and attitudes are directly stimulated by the occurrence of certain 
                                                 
2
 See Michael Howard’s speech, which was reported by Colin Brown of The Independent, 07 October 
1993.  
3
 One of these examples is offered by Sparks (2007a: 75). He described how the programme of 
installing satellite TV in prison cells stimulated massive negative comments from the mass media, 
which found it deeply unacceptable that prisoners are allowed to watch TV in their cells at a price 
even cheaper than NHS patients.  
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specific events (e.g. a prison riot, or a hideous offence committed by a prisoner on 
parole) and the corresponding media involvement in it. On those occasions, it would 
be counterproductive for theoretical enquiries to separate the contents of populist 
penal imaginaries from the social settings that have nurtured them and the social 
consequences engendered by them. Thus, for the purpose of identifying ‘populist’ 
penal imaginaries and examining their normative performances, it is not sufficient to 
confine the study of them to their external discursive layers. We will also need to 
identify the populist forms of penal imaginaries in those typical social dynamics 
which are crucial to their generation and dissemination.   
 
In the following paragraphs, we will adopt a two-step analytical strategy to provide 
an overview of the phenomena of populist imaginaries of imprisonment in the UK. 
Firstly, we will try to identity some of the most typical ‘populist’ ways of imagining 
the purposes, environments, agents and moral and political implications of 
imprisonment on the basis of the existing studies of the mass media’s representation 
of crime and prisons.  Then we will go on to offer an account of the sociological 
aspect of populist penal imaginaries, following an analytical framework which is 
informed by the ‘moral panics’ approach. This two-step strategy is not meant to 
provide comprehensive analyses of the whole spectrum of populist phenomena 
within the field of incarceration (obviously such a task would require much more 
depth and scope than the current chapter can suitably offer), but it aims to summarise 
the essential empirical findings in the field for the subsequent examination of 
introspective normativity. The latter task must be pursued with an appropriate 
understanding of the concrete social settings and key mobilising mechanics of 
populist imaginaries, but meanwhile it is also keenly related to the limits of the 
sociological approach in addressing their normative aspects.
4
  This two-step 
analytical strategy is thus expected to serve dual ends:  on one hand, it will prepare 
the empirical ground for our further examination; on the other, it can help to show 
the need to remedy the sociological perspective through the implementation of 
introspective normativity analyses in the case of the populist imaginaries of 
imprisonment.   
                                                 
4
 See our argument in Chapter 2 (II.ii). 
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ii. Populist Imaginaries of Imprisonment in the Mass Media 
 
To start the overview by examining images of imprisonment in the mass media is not 
only justified because of its prominent role in stimulating and mobilising populist 
claims on prison-related issues, but also because it is the primary carrier of most of 
the tangible and concrete forms of populist penal imaginaries. By reading the reports, 
editorial comments, columnists’ opinions and audience feedbacks, we may capture a 
variety of voices that differ remarkably from the viewpoints expressed in the 
academic journals with regard to the same issue. Of course, viewpoints other than 
‘populist’ ones also have their own channels of expression within the forum of the 
mass media, and there is no feasible standard by which to decide whether the content 
of a particular item is by nature ‘populist’ rather than ‘deliberative’. As we 
mentioned earlier, how to define the boundaries of ‘populist’ views is far from self-
evident and this issue can only be properly addressed when they are placed in 
specific social settings and the dynamics which generate and give meanings to them. 
Notwithstanding the ambiguity in identifying these ‘populist’ attributes, the extant 
empirical studies on mass mediated images of prisons manage to summarise some 
repeatedly observed features of how those images are represented and what 
assumptions are attached to them (e.g. Cheliotis, 2010; Manson, 2006; Wilson and 
O’Sullivan, 2004; Sparks, 2001c&2007a; Jewkes, 2007a). Based on those studies, we 
are able to draw up some general lines of the tangible ‘countenance’ of populist 
penal imaginaries, though their full depths  cannot be exposed until they have been 
examined in the light of their peculiar social-constructive dynamics (a task which 
will be undertaken shortly after this section).  
 
The mass mediated images of imprisonment in the UK can be depicted in terms of a 
variety of aspects which will be discussed below. 
a. The prison environment and its routines  
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What is notable in the first place is that the coverage of prison issues is more or less 
marginalised in the mass media, especially in comparison with the coverage of 
violent crime and policing. And among those issues that do receive attention, the 
allocation of media resources is rather unbalanced in terms of topics (in comparison 
with academic research in the field of imprisonment).
5
  The focus of the media is 
often oriented towards high-profile prisoners (who tend to be high status figures, 
popular stars or convicts in high profile criminal justice cases). And by representing 
those images the media often suggests an array of constantly confirmed impressions 
about prison surroundings and routines.  
 
Those repeatedly emerging themes include the idleness of prison life:  the metaphor 
of a ‘holiday camp’ is the one most favoured by tabloid newspapers and it vividly 
describes the ‘unworthy’ privileges that the prisoners enjoy at the expense of 
taxpayers’ potential welfare. This particular feature of prison life is represented as 
being not only in contrast with the bad moral character of prisoners but also with the 
painstaking working and living circumstances of the majority of common people: the 
audience and consumers of popular media reports and their interpretations of 
imprisonment.
6
 Moreover, this emphasis on the undeserving idle prison routines also 
indicates that there is insufficient moral condemnation being delivered within the 
prison systems and that ‘justice’ has not been achieved. The Sun’s reports about the 
treatment received by two high-profile prisoners, Robert Thompson and Jon 
Venables, demonstrates these points clearly. One of those reports used the headline 
‘Bulger killer No.2 goes abroad on lads' holiday’ and starts with the provocative 
sentence ‘James Bulger's killer Robert Thompson went on an unsupervised foreign 
holiday — just like his cohort Jon Venables.’
7
 In another report, the Sun highlighted 
the sex scandal of Jon Venables with the even more stirring title: ‘James Bulger 
killer had sex in 'jail' home’.
8
 Notably, it stresses the laxity and idleness of custodial 
conditions – which is connived in to such an extent that the prison’s rudimentary 
function of keeping convicted prisoners behind bars ceases to work and is replaced 
                                                 
5
 For example, statistics shows that in the mainstream news media (Channel Four news, BBC1 and 
ITV) the number of stories about prisons is quite small. See the research result in Manson (2006).  
6
 See more details in the studies of Cheliotis (2010) and Sparks (2007a).  
7
 The Sun 06, April, 2011. 
8
 The Sun 28, March, 2011. Italics have been added by the thesis author for the purpose of emphasis.  
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by entirely opposite services: permission to go on holidays and have sex. In this 
extreme account, prison is not just a holiday camp but actually amounts to a ‘home’ 
which can even accommodation sexual relationships. Furthermore, it also emphasises 
the routine character of such practices by using the term ‘unsurprised’ and ‘just like’. 
The case itself might be a rare one, but the strategies used by the Sun in presenting 





On the other hand, prison is also often depicted as a dangerous place, a warehouse 
full of morally corrupted individuals, and a dark and silencing cave where the ‘civil 
dead’ are buried. Those images and imaginaries about the prison environment is 
often presented in popular literature, drama and films about prison and, paradoxically, 
they assume no less prevalence among audiences than the ‘holiday camp’ 
imaginaries (Wilson and O’Sullivan, 2004, chapter 6). This type of imaginaries also 
appears to have a trans-boundary character, since its primary carriers are, instead of 
localised news reports, popular art forms which have access to an audience outside 
the original country which produces them. For example, the popular American prison 
drama Oz, which also attracts audiences in the UK, ‘presents a vision of hell on earth 
in which inmates are so depraved and vicious that no sane person could possibly 
think they should ever again be let loose upon society’ (Cheliotis, 2010: 175).  
 
As we will shortly see, the coexistence of these competing patterns of imaginaries of 
prison environment in the mass media also constitutes a meaningful point for the 
exploration of the sociological aspects of populist penal imaginaries as well as their 
performances in terms of introspective normativity. 
 
b. Prisoners: ‘us and them’  
 
                                                 
9
 The mass media reports on the prisoners convicted of James Bulger’s murder are particularly 
revealing in demonstrating some of the basic characteristics of populist imaginaries, not only because 
they generate huge volume of media articles, but also because they involve viewpoints and strategies 
of image-representation which cover a broad range of prison management issues. In the following 
discussion of these mass mediated imprisonment imaginaries we will use it a representative case for 
the sake of the argument.  
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Garland (2001a: 137) made the distinction between ‘criminology of the self’ and 
‘criminology of the others’ and used it to shed light on the transformation of penal 
imaginaries in the post-welfarist era. In his view, one of prominent features of the 
post-1970s Anglo-American penal field is that certain ‘pre-modern’ patterns of 
demonising offenders and demanding punitive and exclusionary measures to treat 
those ‘criminogenic others’ have gained considerable credit within the realm of 
political discourses. The imaginary of the ‘criminology of the other’ is thus in sharp 
contrast with the traditional welfarist mindset that views offenders as transformable 
individuals who are within the moral embrace of the community.  
 
If we direct our attention to these mass mediated images of prisoners, we may find 
that the ‘us and them’ binary is quite widely implied and enhanced in the ways they 
are presented to the audience. This characteristic is even consistent within the two 
contrasting images of prison environment (‘holiday camp’ and corrupted and 
dangerous place). In the former case, the moral unworthiness of prisoners is 
highlighted, which is often complemented and re-confirmed by the reports of their 
shameless activities of abusing the system (the Venables case is just such an 
example). In the latter case, the representation of the corrupt surroundings usually 
does not lead readers to sympathise with the inmates who have to dwell with them on 
a daily basis, but tends to reinforce the impression that they are intrinsically 
connected with the negative aspect of the system and indeed part of it. So in both 
these imaginaries prisoners are hardly considered as respectable or even 
communicable. They are harmful because they are a burden on the backs of tax-
payers, and they are morally beyond redemption and can be a tremendous threat if 
they bring their ‘codes’ of behaviour and living customs outside the prison walls. At 
the core of such imaginaries lies the assumption that prisoners are moral outsiders of 
the society and they threaten the values shared by ordinary law-abiding people (see 
also, Jewkes, 2007a and Baumann, 2000).  
 
Certainly there are also different accounts and representations of prisoners in the 
media, including more reflexive and academic-styled ones. But, in terms of the 
‘populist’ character, as we are going to discuss it in a moment, the pattern identified 
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above often prevails, especially on occasions when prison-related incidents become 
the pivot of fierce social reactions (‘moral panics’) and when prisoners become the 
object of  ‘folk devils’ style stigmatisation.  
 
c. Prison staff  
 
Normally prison staff do not belong to the category of high newsworthiness and, if 
they appear in the media, it often means there is a connection with negative, and 
sometimes scandalous events (prison riots, prisoner escapes or the exposure of 
serious flaws of the system). And, in those cases, the prison workers often appear as 
kind-hearted fellows who fail to address the concerns of public safety (Freeman, 
1998). This point is also often hinted at in the reports that stress the laxity and 
idleness of the prison environment and the easy access of prisoners to items that they 
are not supposed to acquire (for example, in the Sun’s report on Venables’ ‘holiday’ 
and ‘jail sex’, the incompetent image of prison workers is also highlighted). 
 
The image of prison governors and workers in popular artistic forms (TV drama, film, 
fiction), can be more diverse. Wilson and O’Sullivan (2004, chapter 8), for example, 
have discussed how the image of prison governors has been depicted in influential 
popular movies such as The Shawshank Redemption and Brubaker (they are 
Hollywood products, but their role in shaping stereotyped prison imaginaries can be 
also recognised in the British context due to the range of their audience), and they 
concluded that the representation of prison wardens in these movies may reveal 
social relations of a general nature and in fact tell us a story about ‘ourselves’. In 
those cases, what gets stressed is the experience of ‘being human’ within the unique 
environment of prison.  
 
d. Purposes and reformative future  
 
In contrast with liberal imaginaries, which apply different strategies to defend their   
values and conceptions of ends of imprisonment, the mass mediated views of the 
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purposes that prison should pursue appear to be a mix of ironical mockery and 
punitive assertions. Notably, we can hardly find in the forum of popular media any 
serious concerns about what might be the desired future of the prison service. Instead, 
the leading impression that they instil in their audience is rather static and it often has 
the effect of confirming that prison is the right place for bad guys and that there is 
little potential for it to become any better. The exposure of all the negative sides of 
prison life does not result in any reflections about how things might be done 
differently, but tends to leave the audience convinced that the status quo in prisons is 
so overwhelmingly rotten that it amounts to the proper expression of the very 
‘reality’ of the institution and is thus beyond any possibility of change or 
improvement. Cheliotis observes that ‘rather than undermining the external 
legitimacy of prisons, and despite endangering professional careers, media 
representations reinforce public perceptions of the overall essentialness of the prison 
institution and of the essentialness of its further growth and harshening’ (2010: 175).  
Accordingly, good wishes and serious speculations about operating the incarceration 
system properly and striving for an ideal result both for the prisoners and for society 
are inclined to be downplayed within the mass media. 
 
Unsurprisingly, the purpose of punishing the morally flawed and incapacitating the 
dangerous is often implied in media representations of imprisonment, which is rather 
in accordance with the impression created by them that things cannot be changed and 
that awful prisons and awful prisoners suit each other. On occasions when a high 
profile ‘outrageous’ event provokes moral panic-like social reactions, as we will 
discuss below, the punitive aspect can gain considerable momentum within the mass 
media and effectively enhance the ‘tough line’ position which was previously less 
visible among the soft strand of prison representations (such as mockery reports and 
comments about prison policies and incidents) which are widespread in the media.  
 
The discussion in the above paragraphs of the populist imaginaries in the mass media 
is not meant to be exhaustive, and it can certainly be rectified and supplemented by 
new materials that might enable us to address the omitted facets and ever-changing 
happenings of such phenomena. Moreover, we can also note that a review of media-
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represented imaginaries alone is not sufficient to explain their ‘populist’ character 
and their normative implications. In the following paragraphs we will try to shed 
some light on the sociological depth of the dynamics of these populist imprisonment 
imaginaries. 
 
iii. The Sociological Aspect of Populist Imaginaries of Imprisonment 
 
Whereas this discussion of the representations in the mass media has tried to outline 
the ‘countenance’ of populist views of imprisonment, it has not attempted to explain 
why the characteristics of these representations should be identified as ‘populist’. In 
this regard, sociological approaches would be especially helpful, as their concerns 
are not confined to the specific static content of media representations and their 
popularity among their audience, but are directed to uncovering those social 
mechanisms which are vital to the constitution and dissemination of such imaginaries. 
When we understand how they are constructed through dynamic social processes and 
especially what role the mass media plays in them, we can better grasp the 
phenomena of populist penal imaginaries and acquire a more solid basis for further 
analyses and evaluations. 
 
With regard to the sociological perspectives related to the subject, those studies 
which are centred on the concept of ‘moral panics’ are particularly helpful for this 
purpose, as they offer well-established analytical frameworks as well as numerous 
individual case studies which may clarity the social dynamics and determinant 
mechanisms underpinning the phenomena of ‘moral panics’ and  the creation of ‘folk 
devils’, which are also insightful for their investigation into the ‘populist’ aspect of 
mass mediated imaginaries of imprisonment. In the following paragraphs, we will try 
to examine how the analytical approaches developed in the literature on moral panics 
(Hall, et al., 1978; Cohen, 1972 & 2002; Goode and Yehuda, 2009; Garland, 2008) 
can be applied to interpret the dynamics of populist penal imaginaries in the field of 
imprisonment. We will find that despite its pertinence in uncovering some key 
aspects of populist penal imagines, the moral panics framework needs to be adapted 
in order to address some contemporary issues more adequately. In the later part of 
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this section, we will also have the chance to discuss the limits of the sociological 
approach in addressing the moral dimension of populist penal imaginaries.  
 
a. The role of mass media  
 
Firstly we can start with the role of the mass media in the social construction of 
populist penal imaginaries. In the respect, Stuart Hall and his colleagues have offered 
a comprehensive account of  how the media function as an ideological instrument to 
reproduce the ‘definitions of the powerful’ and impose them on the whole of society, 
including the suppressed and disadvantaged social sectors (Hall et al., 1978). 
According to their perspective, the media in effect coordinates itself with the 
powerful to create a  ‘consensus’, a framework of agreement which, by disabling and 
excluding alternative frameworks, determines what issues are ‘relevant’ in the 
discursive agenda. This ‘consensus creating’ function of the media is also recognised 
by the moral panics theorist Stanley Cohen (1972) and is viewed by him as the 
essential aspect of its performance. When this point is applied to the mass mediated 
imaginaries of imprisonment, we can get the insight that those typical viewpoints and 
impressions of prisons in essence reflect the definitions of prison issues of the 
‘primary definers’ (who, in the perspective of Hall and his colleagues, are the 
powerful in society), as the mass media transforms them into ‘public idioms’ or 
popularised forms of images and representations. Based on this particular assumption, 
the media theorists come to the conclusion that the ‘consensual’ imaginaries 
established in the mass media about imprisonment are constituents of an integral 
social structure in which the spectrum of the dynamics of economic and political 
power and the spectrum of discursive performances within the mass media are in a 
symbiotic relationship and that they mutually enhance each other. Accordingly, in 
this perspective, to defy the populist images and representations of imprisonment 
should not be simply considered as a task of rectifying them in terms of ‘truth telling’ 
in the media; it must be addressed in tandem with the enterprise of criticising and 
bringing change to the dominant social structure and its economic and political 
arrangements.     
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However, when it comes to the contemporary context, we may find that the media 
theory of Hall and his colleagues will encounter some difficulties, as the boundaries 
of the discursive ‘consensus’ are far from clear-cut in the mass media. Unlike the 
circumstances in the 1960s and 1970s, when the moral panics approach originated, 
contemporary British society (along with many others) has witnessed the flourishing 
of new media forms and a divergence in cultural and political expressions. As 
Garland (2008) has commented, even the ‘folk devils’, who used to have no 
discursive power, have now become able to ‘fight back’ by voicing their views 
through new media instruments. As a result, the hegemonic consensus is no longer 
available in the discursive forum of the new media era and has been replaced by 
considerable fragmentation and competition between diverse strands of imaginaries 
and representations. With regard to the issues of imprisonment, we can often observe 
that the mass mediated imaginaries are in sharp contrast with the practices and 
rationales of the professionals in the field who, in the view of Hall and his colleagues, 
are supposed to play the role of ‘primary definers’ under normal conditions.  
 
For example, the reform scheme which tried to improve the ‘first night’ treatment of 
inmates in prisons once provoked immensely contradictory comments in the media. 
The liberal prison scheme advocates hailed the change on the basis that it contributes 
to a less stressful environment for the new-arrival prisoners, which reflects their 
long-standing notion that the exercise of carceral power is to reform prisoners rather 
than inflicting pain on them. But for the tabloid papers and many of their audiences, 
the change simply confirmed the ‘holiday camp’ image of the prison system. Yet in 
the institutional imaginaries about the same treatment, the focus might be different 
from either of them. The risk of prisoner suicide actually plays a significant role in 
the mobilisation of ‘first night’ treatment, as is demonstrated in the official 




It can be noted that populist penal imaginaries, despite their prominence within the 
mass media, only enjoy a limited degree of ‘consensus’ (as is the case with the other 
                                                 
10
 PSO 2700 (replaced by PSI2011-064 in 2012), which came into effect in 2003, established a clear 
linkage between the early period in custody (particularly the ‘first night’ treatment) and the 
management of the risk of prisoners’ suicide and self-harm.  
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forms of penal imaginaries). Therefore, the assumption that their normative 
orientations are exclusively determined by the definitions of the dominant class 
within the social structure does not always apply to the current media environment. 
Yet the sociological perspective on the relationship between the role of the mass 
media and the moral definition of the dominant social sector remains insightful and 
we will return to it when we embark on our discussion of the normative dimension of 
populist imaginaries.     
 
b. Multi-agent involvement in constructing populist imaginaries  
 
Even if we reject the monistic approach to understanding the relations between the 
mass mediated ‘populist consensus’ and the power structure of the society, there are 
still ways of uncovering the social dynamics of populist imaginaries of imprisonment 
within the perspective of moral panics. In Cohen’s (1972, 2002) analyses of the 
social creation of ‘folk devils’ from youth groups like Mods and Rockers, multiple 
agents were involved and they assumed different roles within the process. This 
approach may also be applied to account for the formation and dissemination of the 
populist views about prison issues. By placing the mass mediated imaginaries of 
imprisonment within the ‘moral panics’ dynamics, we can broaden our understanding 
of their characteristics and mechanisms in terms of their constitution and 
performance.  
 
Based on Cohen’s conceptual framework and research, Goode and Yehuda (2009) 
have summarised the key actors that are involved in the constitution of a moral panic. 
They include five segments of the society: the press, the public, agents of law 
enforcement, politicians and legislators and action groups. Through the interactions 
between those social segments, a concrete moral panic gets mobilised, a particular 
group of ‘folk devils’ is stigmatised and a cluster of moral discourses are reaffirmed. 
In specific terms, the media carries out the task of detecting those events that are 
newsworthy and which potentially touch the moral nerves of the audience. Typically 
they ‘handled the seaside events with exaggerated attention, inflating incidents, 
distorting accounts and stereotyping characters and behavior’ (Goode and Yehuda, 
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2009: 23). Then the concern of the public was stimulated and the events were 
perceived by the public as a symbol of some of the larger problems of the society. 
Accordingly the agents of formal social control also responded to the ‘threat’ 
presented by the press and the concerns of the public; what typically happened was 
that the police attempted to broaden the scope of law enforcement, asked for more 
resources and took more severe actions. The impact of a moral panic may also reach 
into the political sphere, where politicians called for stiffer treatment of those 
problematic people or ‘folk devils’ and corresponding legislative change. The 
dominant mood in such cases can also be described as ‘angry, self-righteous, 
vindictive, condemnatory, and punitive’ (2009: 26). Apart from that, moral panics 
can also generate action groups who believe that existing remedies are not enough 
and seek to mobilise more intensive ‘germinal social movements’ to fight against the 
problem in question. At the same time, the reactions from those respective social 
sectors can also fuel new reports in the press which in turn enhance the seemingly 
‘objective’ character of the identified moral panic.  
 
We can note that this analytical framework based on the interactions of multiple 
agents does not necessarily assume that those factors will finally constitute a 
hegemonic structure of dominance which in essence reflects the definitions of the 
powerful. It instead gives more weight to the concrete interactive mechanisms that 
operate between the different actors and leaves room for contingency and localised 
socio-political dynamics. This may help it shed light on the phenomena of populist 
imaginaries of imprisonment better than the monistic media theory, since their 
production is linked with reactions from multiple social sectors and involves the 
participation of different actors and institutions.  
 
However, we may note that the rules, principles, guiding rationales, concrete 
conditions and daily routines in prison normally receive only limited media attention 
and public concern, although they have their particular representations within 
populist imaginaries. Thus those penality-related spheres hardly ever become the 
cause of a moral panic by themselves. It is instead more common for moral panics to 
be triggered by high profile cases of violence or sexual offences. Under such 
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circumstances, the inmates who are labelled by the media as ‘folk devils’ tend to 
attract attention to prisons as well, which makes the incarceration practice per se the  
main focus of the moral panic dynamic. In this respect, those custodial and parole 
practices which involve sex offenders are particularly susceptible to such a 
construction, since those prisoners can easily be labelled as folk devils and become 
the target of the rage of moral panics audiences, and the prison system which fails to 
manage the ‘dangerousness’ of those prisoners tends to become the object of harsh 
criticisms in the process as well. This was demonstrated in the anti-paedophile 
campaign which was conducted by the residents of Paulsgrove estate in Portsmouth 
in August 2000.
11
 That event was directly driven by the fear of the release of pre-sex-
offenders into the community, whereas the question of how to determine the use of 
incarceration when dealing with a particular category of prisoners was also a major 
concern of the protest. The campaign for ‘Sarah’s Law’ mobilised by the News of the 
World had a similar tendency in their choice of folk devils.
 12
  Their objective of 
amending the law to enable the ‘naming and shaming’ of child sex offenders was 
also concerned with the imprisonment system in terms of its post-release 
management policy. In other cases, those high profile prisoners who are tagged as 
folk devils can also bring the reach of moral panics into the spectrum of the prison 
system, like the aforementioned Venables case. 
 
In the above cases, we can observe some typical multi-agent constructing dynamics, 
as identified in the moral panics theories, but within the horizon of those ‘moral 
panics’, issues related to imprisonment were often subordinate to the other attributes 
of the events (e.g. sex offences, hideous violent crimes or some horrifying 
victimisation experiences) which stood out more distinctively in the eyes of the 
audience and the actors involved. Nevertheless, such dynamics still have vital impact 
on the confirmation and dissemination of populist imaginaries of imprisonment. 
Through their construction, the mass mediated images of incarceration do not remain 
a static picture of the rather unfamiliar and ‘far-away’ world of prisons. Now they are 
perceived as being part of a broader problem that generates massive social concerns. 
                                                 
11
 See the report in the Independent: ‘Wardens to Patrol Paulsgrove Estate’, 19 September, 2000. See 
also the study of Williams and Thompson (2004). 
12
 See the edition of the News of the World, 30 July, 2000.  
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And when the moral panics about sex offenders and other folk-devil-type prisoners 
are stimulated, the related imaginaries of imprisonment, which is perceived as being 
an integral element in the ‘big picture’ of threat, also tend to be confirmed and 
reinforced. If the situations in prisons are exposed as being especially outrageous and 
intolerable by the outburst of such an event, they are also likely to become an 
independent source of the spiral of moral panic. Accordingly, the reinforced populist 
imaginaries of imprisonment can obtain momentum and influence other social 
sectors through  these interactive processes, including policy and legislative changes, 
as was reflected in the ‘Sarah’s Law’ campaigns.  
c. Consequences of populist imaginaries of imprisonment 
 
With regard to the actual effect of these populist imaginaries on the institutional 
practices of imprisonment, extensive empirical findings and analysis are still in order. 
However, we can observe some marked local variations in prison policy making at a 
first glance (e.g. the difference between Scotland and England and Wales), despite 
the fact that the mass mediated prison imaginaries are very much a trans-locality 
phenomenon. Moreover, in the case of Scotland, its prison policies and its agenda of 
prison reform are not only very different from those of its English counterparts, but 
have also changed dramatically over the past few decades (McAra, 2006 & 2008). 
Clearly there are numerous factors which contribute to the status quo of the custodial 
regimes, and it is highly uncertain which aspect of them is particularly attributable to 
the salience of populist imaginaries.  
 
There are, however, studies which have tried to examine the relationship between the 
rising imprisoned population and the punitive climate of opinion. For example, 
Millie et al. (2003) have carried out a piece of research attempting to account for the 
growth in the prison population in England and Wales, and their finding was that the 
rise in the prison population was not a result of rising crime, but was due to 
‘sentencers passing more custodial sentences, and passing longer sentences when 
they opt for custodial sentences’ (Millie et al., 2003: 383). And the researchers found 
that punitive public attitudes are likely to be one of the main factors that lie behind 
this sentencing trend. The populist imaginaries of imprisonment are closely 
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associated with the punitive atmosphere in which criminal justice institutions operate, 
yet to identify in a concrete way how they impact on the various aspects of the 
practices of incarceration, we still need more empirical studies to be carried out on 
this spectrum.  
 
iv. The Normative Dimension of Populist Imaginaries of Imprisonment 
 
This discussion is certainly far from being a complete coverage of the sociological 
aspects of populist imaginaries of imprisonment, and its major purpose is to illustrate 
the way in which such  sociological studies make sense of the phenomena and give 
us insight into how they are actually formulated and circulated within the current 
socio-political setting. Together with the studies on the mass mediated prison 
representations, they provide us with background knowledge of the factual 
dimension of the current dynamics of populist imaginaries of imprisonment.  
 
However, they rarely touch on the issue regarding how to treat the moral status of 
these so-called populist claims. This issue has been discussed by us in the first two 
chapters, and in our view it is related to the major limits of the sociological approach 
in handling these normative issues against the background of the decline of universal 
normativity within the imprisonment field.
13
 In the case of the populist imaginaries, 
we can note that the mainstream sociological approaches - such as the moral panics 
analysis - tend to imply the judgement that these mass mediated punitive views on 
prison-related issues are ill-informed, exaggerating, disproportionate and inherently 
incapable of being taken seriously as an equal opposition for the purpose of 
normative debate and dialogue. Yet such an assumption has certain normative 
implications which are by no means unassailable.  
 
For example, in the account of Goode and Yehuda (2009) of moral panics, 
exaggeration is viewed as an exterior attribute of the social reactions and expressions 
of populist views and is subject to objective observation and identification. But as 
                                                 
13
 See our discussions at Chapter 1 (I.ii) and Chapter 2 (II.ii).  
 163 
David Garland (2008) has pointed out, to apply the term ‘moral panic’ always has an 
ascription effect and creates differentiation between those people who apply it as 
outsiders and those who are tagged (by the former) as actors engaging in the 
generation and escalation of a specific moral panic. It can be anticipated that the 
latter would resist the tagging and would claim that their involvement was suitable as 
a moral response to the detected deviancies. Indeed, in the case of mass mediated 
imaginaries of imprisonment, any comparison with the actual situations in prisons 
would make clear that such ‘holiday camp’ metaphors of prison and ‘monster’ 
images of prisoners are exaggerations. However, what is at stake here can scarcely be 
reduced to a debate about or a clarification of ‘objective facts’. Even the advocates of 
the ‘holiday camp’ metaphor can defend it from a moral point of view; that is: even 
though it may be an exaggeration of the actual situation, it is appropriate and 
proportional as a means of moral engagement in seeking to counter and rectify the 
extant flaws of the custodial system. To accept that this is just a product of moral 
panics means that this particular dimension of moral engagement is poorly 
recognised or at least downplayed. In other words, there is an inherent normative 
facet in determining the issue of ‘proportionality’ and there is no absolute standard 
which guarantees that the standpoint of ‘moral panics’ academics is automatically 
better founded than those who are depicted as ‘moral panics’ actors or mass media 
columnists who also use the term to make a moral judgment. The fact that moral 
panics scholars resisted using the term to address American reactions to the 9/11 
event until the public emotion had cooled down seems to suggest that researchers are 
also within the moral boundaries of their own society and they can by no means 
achieve any absolute grounds for settling the potential moral divergence which may 
be involved in the populist dynamics (see also, Garland, 2008). 
 
The controversy related to ‘exaggeration’ and ‘proportionality’ also suggests that the 
mainstream sociology of moral panics has largely neglected the ‘boundary-setting’ 
facet of the penal discourses within contemporary societies. This facet is central to 
the Durkheimian theory of punishment, which conceives the central function of 
punishment (and broadly the condemnatory social reaction to crime and deviance) as 
the maintenance of the moral order of society. More importantly, it cannot be taken 
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merely as neutral scientific findings; it has certain moral implications. As we argued 
in Chapter 2 (III.i), Durkheim’s perspective on morality may be better interpreted in 
a non-positivist fashion, in which the dynamic maintenance of the moral boundaries 
of a society is not treated just as a sociological fact, but is essential to the moral 
being of its members and their ways of effectively participating in and experiencing 
social reality. It is morality per se. This means that the epistemological element of 
morality cannot be morally authentic in separation from its social-expressive forms. 
Neither logical soundness and coherence, nor objectivity and impartiality 
automatically create the moral character of certain social norms: what matters is how 
they have gained their vitality within the moral performance of the society. In this 
perspective, the religious life in primitive societies may involve highly impractical 
and irrational elements from an outsider’s point of view, but it was essential for the 
moral performance of the society in question, as well as for its individual members, 
as it provided the key sources for the latter to realise their moral being within the 
community (Durkheim, 1915). In this regard, it is intrinsically moral despite all its 
seemingly ‘grotesque’ rituals and conceptual systems.  
 
In contemporary societies, this non-reflexive form of primitive morality can no 
longer sustain itself, but in the meantime the expressive domain cannot be easily 
ruled out. When the sociological approach judges the populist views of imprisonment 
in terms of proportionality, it largely fails to address this normative dimension, as 
identified above. In those cases, it tends to downgrade their normative status on the 
grounds that they exaggerate the ‘real’ circumstances, and implicitly or explicitly 
advocates its own moral or political values (which are often oriented towards liberal 
or left-wing stands). Yet, as we have discussed in earlier chapters, such a strategy is 
not adequate to respond to the normative predicament within the contemporary 
imprisonment field.
14
   
 
For many actors who engage in the generation and dissemination of populist 
representations of imprisonment, they believe that they are acting to demand the 
realisation of democratic reform of out-of-touch penal policies and institutional 
                                                 
14
 See our discussion in Chapter 2 (II.ii). 
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practices (as can be seen in the case of the Sarah’s Law campaign). It is thus difficult 
to expect that they would change their position on being informed that their claims 
are sociologically subject to the construction of differential social forces and 
structural factors and that they factually betray a neutral judgement of the real 
situation of imprisonment. Conversely, it may be anticipated that they would insist 
that there is an element of value in what they advocate rather than it being merely a 
sociologically over-determined viewpoint.  
 
To deal with this dilemma requires that we give appropriate recognition to the 
normative dimension of these populist imaginaries. Only on that basis can we find a 
way to uncover the flaws and limits in their normative performance and explore their 
innovative potential. This endeavour may prove more fruitful than the tactic of 
neutralising the normative validity of populist voices and treating them exclusively 
as over-determined social facts. Since, in comparison with other types of penal 
imaginaries, the populist ones make more intimate contact with the common 
audience in the society, they have significant potential to enrich the normative 
performance of the imprisonment field and make it more democratic by unleashing 
their potentiality for normative innovativeness in a constructive way.       
 
As we have discussed in detail in Chapter 2, the analytical and evaluative framework 
of introspective normativity is designed to pursue this task. In contrast to the 
mainstream sociological approach, it does not presumptively rule out the moral 
quality of populist imaginaries in its analysis, but instead tries to shed light on how 
the populist dynamics might be understood as a particular normative pursuit.  
 
By uncovering their normative performances in a reflexive way, it is capable of 
presenting and analysing both their innovative and their nihilistic aspects and helping 
to decide the direction of improvement.  
 
In the following section, we will thus proceed to examine these populist imaginaries 
of imprisonment through the lens of introspective normativity.  
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III. A ‘Handicapped’ Normative Pursuit: Populist Imaginaries in the 
Perspective of Introspective Normativity 
 
i. Stereotypes, Narratives Construction and Normative Certainty  
 
In the overview part of this chapter, we have discussed how a variety of stereotypes 
about the images of the prison, its particular routines and environment, and the prison 
staff and inmates, have characterised the representations of imprisonment in the mass 
media. The use of those readily-applicable metaphors such as ‘holiday camp’ 
(prison), ‘monster-like’ prisoners and ‘out-of-touch’ penal experts and policy makers 
has the effect of advancing a particular set of narratives which imply a settled view 
regarding how things are supposed to occur in the prison world and to the people 
living in it. By so doing they also signal strong and distinctive messages referring to 
what would be the right way of responding to the problems of imprisonment.  
 
In one of the methodological sections of this thesis (Chapter 2, III.i.b), we analysed 
how narrative construction can be intertwined with the establishment of a particular 
vision of moral reality in Durkheim’s works. In that case, Durkheim’s construction 
of the narrative of specific social dynamics concerning the performance of 
conscience collective and the reaffirmation of the moral order of society serves as the 
unique discursive carrier for a social moral philosophy which is prone to the pursuit 
of solidarity and collective ends and is opposed to the laisser-faire approach.  
 
The normative performance of the stereotype-based populist imaginaries has 
something in common with that tactic. The stereotypical depiction of prison related 
issues does not simply describe the circumstances of imprisonment in terms of the 
populist imaginaries, but also expresses a peculiar normative understanding of them. 
For example, the cynical ‘holiday camp’ stereotype and the corresponding discourse 
on the excessively ‘lax’ intra-prison order imply the evaluative judgement that the 
official prison management scheme and the philosophy underpinning it have 
betrayed justice and abused the trust of the law-abiding community. Other populist 
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narratives that are disseminated through the mass media also tend to transmit a 
similar message: the official system is unreliable and misleading and it turns a deaf 
ear to the voice of the common citizens. Accordingly, those discourses work together 
to construct a particular moral universe in which their audience are urged to adhere 
to the ‘consensus’ that they deliver as to how to define the problems of imprisonment 
and to adopt the corresponding attitudes towards them. As we noted in the overview 
section, the mass mediated images about the unalterably rotten prison surroundings 
and abominable inmates are entangled with the conservative inclination to address 
the moral implications of imprisonment: that is, since it is an inherently degrading 
institution with inmates whose evil characters perfectly match the way they are 
treated, the optimal choice is to impose stringent control upon it and segregate it 
from normal society and innocent people. Thus the use and acceptance of such 
stereotypes and narrative constructions implies a peculiar taking-of-sides in terms of 
interpreting and responding to the issues related to incarceration.  
 
Notably, the normative performance of penal imaginaries based on the use of 
stereotypes and mass mediated narrative constructions is characterised by the pursuit 
of certainty and resistance to ambiguity. The more affirmatively and arbitrarily the 
narratives are organised within the populist forum, and the more conspicuous the 
normative messages they emit, the more likely they are to be held to be fully 
expressive of the intuitive moral judgements and ‘gut feelings’ of ordinary people (as 
against the sophisticated but morally ‘indifferent’ expert opinions). Compared with 
other approaches in terms of normative performance, they rely greatly on their 
interaction with and feedback from the audiences of the mass media, as the 
normative certainty that they seek to present and to preserve needs to be confirmed 
repeatedly by their expressive affirmation. This is manifest in the moral panic 
dynamics that we discussed in the previous section: the generation and growth of 
populist claims has to involve the participation of multiple agents and to experience a 
spiral of mutual stimulation and escalation. Without the resonance of the populist 
audience, these narrative constructions under such circumstances would be fragile 
and lifeless. Conversely, when the support from the audience is prompt and steadfast, 
the normative implications of the populist narratives tend to be characterised by 
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certainty, affirmativeness and unambiguousness. In such cases, the stereotypes 
regarding prisons would appear to be accurately reflecting the moral allegiances of 
the community toward such issues, despite the fact that they may fail to accurately 
reflect the actual situations of imprisonment. 
 
ii. Oblivion of the Predicament of Universal Normativity  
 
We may note that normative performances, as we have observed in the case of these 
populist imaginaries, can produce the effect of certainty among their audiences who, 
for various reasons, react in favour of their flourishing. And this also forms one of 
the responses to the post-welfarist predicament in the normative penological field. 
Whereas there is significant divergence in the normative approaches to imprisonment 
and a marked decline in the prospects of any universal normativity in this sphere, the 
populist imaginaries represent an attempt to revert to absolutist moral grounds for 
judging prison issues. 
 
However, the ‘moral universe’ constructed through these stereotypes is mostly static 
and closed. While the populist imaginaries seek to achieve certainty in their 
normative performance, it is at the expense of excluding the opposite and alternative 
normative understandings from their own perspective, and leaving little room for any 
reflexive revaluation and revival of their own presumptions.  
 
Accordingly, the normative performance of those stereotype-based imaginaries lacks 
any inherent motive to bring change into the ‘moral reality’ presented in their 
narratives. Instead, in the heart of their normative construction, there is an essential 
tendency to stick to conventions and to make their version of ‘moral reality’ appear 
to be a perpetual one. This explains why, in the eyes of populist campaigners, novel 
prison reform programmes (like ‘first night’ treatment) will always appear morally 
dubious.     
 
Thus the normative domain of these populist imaginaries can be viewed mainly as a 
closed one. And since they depend crucially on the reactions and feedback of varied 
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sources – ranging from the mass media and its audience, through the dynamics of 
penal politics, to the prison system and the official criminal justice process – to 
acquire and maintain the confirmation of their specific normative visions and claims, 
we may argue that the effect of their normative performance is externally decided. 
The normative certainty it pursues is then scarcely more than a socio-psychological 
certainty which is reinforced through certain exterior social construction mechanisms. 
From the evaluative perspective of introspective normativity, the normative 
performance in this case lacks the inner vigour to achieve genuine normative 
certainty. The fact that it needs external means and mechanisms to reinforce its 
normative vision actually confirms its incapacity to realise any viable normative 
construction and to offer true certainty within the post-welfarist imprisonment field.  
 
This deficiency in the populist imaginaries is intimately related to its implied 
orientations towards other divergent and competing normative approaches and 
perspectives within the imprisonment sphere and towards the predicament of 
universal normativity per se. The representative pattern of their normative 
performances can be described as total denial of the justifiability of any moral 
horizons that are in conflict with their own and a failure to acknowledge the moral 
diversity and plurality that exists within the field. As we showed earlier, the more 
drastic the populist dynamics become, the more affirmative they are about the 
narrative they put forward and the normative messages implied within it, and the less 
likely they are to give any reflexive space to their own normative presumptions and 
possible alternatives. In terms of our analytical angle, such an approach to normative 
construction can be comprehended in the light of the ‘oblivion’ pattern that we 
identified in Chapter 2 (III.iii.d): in the face of the post-universalist circumstances, 
the normative performance of populist imaginaries is absorbed in defining and 
pursuing its own penal ideal and taking it as the absolute basis for addressing the 
problems of imprisonment, while disregarding and refusing to recognise the decline 
in universal normativity and the fading of the feasibility of essentialist solutions to 
the moral dilemmas in the field. The result of ‘oblivion’ approach is a remarkable 
normative closure and nihilism: any alternative penal ideals, as well as the crucial 
element of reflexivity, get utterly excluded from its perspective.  
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Any vibrant and fruitful kind of normative performance needs to do the contrary: it 
must build up its particular moral realities in such a way that other possibilities of 
normative construction can also be reflexively included within its imaginary 
parameters and it needs to make sure that there is always an active self-reflexive and 
innovation-prone element within the endeavour. Measured by this standard, many of 
current populist imaginaries may be regarded as a ‘handicapped’ approach in terms 
of their normative pursuits. Their stereotype based narrative constructions hinder 
them from being open to diverse visions and ideals and under such conditions they 
are hardly able to fulfil the task of seeking genuine normative certainty for post-
welfarist incarceration practice.   
iii. Possibilities of Normative Innovation   
 
In the previous paragraphs, we have talked about ‘populist penal imaginaries’ as if 
they formed a coherent whole. In reality, this is not exactly the case. As we discussed 
in the overview section, there are hugely diversified forms of imaginaries of 
imprisonment presented within the forum of the mass media. Most of them are not 
yet influential enough to claim a ‘populist’ status. However, it is important to notice 
that populist penal imaginaries are not a static category. There are moments of 
radical change when conventional imaginaries collapse and get replaced by novel 
ones.
15
 With regard to the public imagination of imprisonment, there are also 
historical events which indicate the possibility of overall transformation. For 
example, in the storming of the Bastille, which marked the start of the French 
Revolution in 1789, the public imaginaries of prison and prisoners underwent a huge 
transition: the previously suppressed ideas and sentiments about prisoners and the 
prison system suddenly attained a dominant status and were converted into the 
conventional ones. Despite the great difference in contexts, it is still important to 
acknowledge that there is non-reducible potentiality for current populist imaginaries 
                                                 
15
 A relevant example here is offered by Foucault (1977), in which he demonstrated that people’s 
attitudes towards public execution in early modern Europe were actually ambivalent and such 
uncertainty (with regard to whether to conform to the authority of the monarchy or to sympathise with 
the convict) became one of the factors that led to its final abolition. 
 171 
of imprisonment to shift on to a different track of narrative construction and 
normative performance.  
 
Therefore, we use a collective term in our analysis for the sake of identifying and 
assessing some of the most distinctive phenomena within the contemporary populist 
penal imaginary spectrum, but it is significant for us to realise the different 
possibilities of the mass mediated discourses and images of imprisonment. This may 
not only remedy omissions caused by generalisation, but may also help us to notice 
the innovative potential within the mass-mediated representation of imprisonment. 
 
As we mentioned in the overview section, the advent of the new media era has 
created abundant space for more individualised expression of views about the 
existing penal practice and its moral aspects. Under such circumstances, the 
hegemony of particular types of representations of imprisonment is not bound to take 
place, notwithstanding its affinity with the taste of the powerful ‘primary definers’ or 
that of the security obsessed public. Insofar as alternative kinds of interpretations and 
imaginaries have access to the forum of the public media, they maintain the potential 
to overturn the mainstream discourses and to reveal previously marginalised 
normative implications. Thus the content of ‘populist’ representations is inherently 
fluid, which is in opposition to the disposition of stereotype based imaginaries of 
imprisonment towards closure and stabilization. For example, along with the rise of 
imprisonment rates and their perceived negative social consequences, the abolitionist 
and cosmopolitan discourses about the reform of the incarceration system have also 
gained influence through various forms of media dissemination. So have those 
reflexive artistic representations of prison life by independent film makers, stand-up 
comedians, novelists and playwrights. Their existence makes the mass mediated 
forum amenable to more open-ended and creative forms of normative performance 
than those of the stereotype based narratives. We will further continue to pursue our 
discussion of the innovative possibilities of these forms of imaginaries in Chapter 6.   
 
Apart from the existence of non-mainstream approaches in imagining prison related 
issues, the unique innovative potential of the mass mediated imaginaries lies in their 
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capacity to remedy the limits of the elite dominated pattern of discursive 
performance within the imprisonment field. The ‘populist’ dynamics relating to the 
dissemination of such imaginaries, in spite of their often reactive and intuitive 
disposition, provide opportunities for enhancing the role of democratic participation 
in defining the purposes and moral implications of the prison system. In this respect, 
they remain significant resources for confronting the predicament of universal 
normativity within the contemporary imprisonment field. Yet it is certain that more 
work needs to be done so that the handicapped normative pursuit within the populist 




In this chapter we have mainly dealt with the populist type of imaginaries of 
imprisonment and have sought to examine their performance in terms of the 
perspective of introspective normativity. 
 
An overview of this spectrum shows that the stereotypes based representations of 
imprisonment in the mass media have played a major role in delivering populist 
messages about how prison issues should be responded to. The dissemination of 
these populist imaginaries of imprisonment has also been exposed as being subject to 
the dynamics of social construction in which multiple agents and institutions are 
involved in  creating the peculiar conditions required for those stereotyped images 
and their political implications to be highlighted within the public domain. 
 
However, what we are concerned with particularly is how to identify and take 
seriously the normative aspect of these populist imaginaries, which tends to be 
played down in the critical sociological analyses. Our examination reveals that, in 
terms of the performance of introspective normativity, the current forms of these 
populist imageries have serious limitations in addressing the predicament of 
universal normativity and in responding to the diverse ideals and perspectives within 
the imprisonment field. Their pursuit of normative certainty is tied up with a static 
and closed vision of how the prison world is and should be. If the populist 
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imaginaries are viewed as a particular kind of normative pursuit, our investigation 
demonstrates that it is a ‘handicapped’ one and one that is not well placed to serve as 
the basis for solving the normative dilemmas within the imprisonment field.  
 
Yet we have also tried to show that these populist imaginaries are not to be dismissed 
completely as a forum of narrative construction and normative performance. They 
also comprise significant resources and possibilities for normative innovation, 
particularly with regard to the overcoming of the limits of the elite dominated 
approach in defining the purposes and rationales of incarceration. In order to make 
the normative performance of these populist imaginaries more productive, it is 
crucial to resist the nihilistic tendency of resorting to stereotypical representation of 
imprisonment and engendering normative closure. For this purpose, it is important to 
recognise the non-mainstream forms of representation of imprisonment and to make 
the mass meditated forum more reflexive and inclusive of pluralistic penal ideals and 



















In the last two chapters, we have examined the liberal and populist strands of 
imaginaries of imprisonment in terms of their normative performances within 
contemporary British society. Although we have paid much attention to their 
innovative forms, which have been relatively recently developed in relation to the 
post-universalism predicament, it is also worth noting that both liberal and populist 
imaginaries have behind them strong traditions in formulating their respective 
concepts, notions, values and paradigms of penological ideals which, to a 
considerable extent, continue to affect and circumscribe their present configurations.   
 
The risk-oriented imaginaries, by contrast, are commonly thought to be a more recent 
and, typically ‘late-modern’, phenomenon. Ulrich Beck’s (1992) influential thesis on 
‘risk society’ highlighted the distinction between those traditional lines of social 
thinking which centred around class differentiation and wealth distribution, and the 
‘risk’ logic, which is characteristic of societies which are fluent enough to have 
overcome scarcity but in the meantime are increasingly exposed to new 
modernization hazards. In Beck’s view, risk-oriented social thinking is obsessed with 
the generation of the knowledge of risk, with the negotiation of its political 
significance and with the precautionary management of its potentially catastrophic 
consequences. The core concern is no longer with the active pursuit of ‘good’ ends, 
but with future harm prevention. Such patterns of thinking are believed to have 
transformed a vast spectrum of current social life and governance styles and to have 
contributed to the emergence of a new political and cultural ethos which is permeated 
with risk calculation.  
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In the field of criminology, there is also an expanding body of literature which strives 
to identify phenomena and consequences related to the rise of ‘risk’ in the penal 
sphere. For example, Feeley and Simon (1992 & 1994) have noted the emergence of 
actuarial justice and of a ‘new penology’, in which ‘the language of probability and 
risk increasingly replaces earlier discourses of clinical diagnosis and retributive 
judgement’ (1992: 450). In the case of imprisonment, in particular, there is an array 
of studies which have either explored the potential use of risk rationales within the 
various sectors of the prison system, (e.g. Andrews and Bonta, 2003 & 2006; 
Kemshall and McIvor, eds, 2004; Hannah-Moffat, 2004) or examined critically the 
moral and political aspects of the specific risk-based practices in prison and the 
overall outcome of a risk-penetrated custodial regime (e.g. Hudson, 2003; Ward and 
Maruna, 2007; Lacombe, 2008). Those scholars have in principle agreed on the 
pervasiveness of risk-thinking within the current Anglo-American penal field as a 
matter of fact; but as far as the criteria of ‘good’ practice in risk assessment and risk 
management are concerned, their ideas are much more divergent. Such ambivalence 
also applies to the ways in which the moral and political implications of risk 
phenomena are interpreted. For example, the introduction of risk calculation has 
admittedly transformed many prisoner treatment programmes (especially those 
designed for violent offenders and for sex offenders), but can such changes be 
deemed to be a success for effectiveness and political pertinence (in terms of due 
consideration for the safety demands of the public), or should they be denounced as 
intrusive in relation to prisoners’ rights and well-being, and even as a key contributor 
to an  overall cultural trap which renders the broad social sphere more susceptible to 
insecurity and tightened discipline? When it comes to issues like this, we will find 
ourselves faced by quite polarised standpoints that are implicated in different 
programme designing rationales and theoretical approaches to the studies of risk in 
the penal sphere.  
 
The ambivalence in comprehending risk-based practises and discourses seems to 
suggest that they are intrinsically value-laden and by no means politically neutral, 
despite the fact that they are usually constructed in a techno-scientific language. In 
fact they do not merely reshape different aspects of the imprisonment system in the 
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instrumentalist sense, but also play an important role in re-orienting the landscape of 
normative imaginaries of the field of incarceration: its overall purposes and 
legitimacy grounds, the aims and objectives of individual custodial sectors, criteria of 
assessment, the interpretation of prisoners’ needs and characters, etc. Those 
perspectives are not always explicitly articulated, since the practitioners and 
proponents of risk-oriented approaches scarcely view their activities as having 
anything to do with the fundamental construction of a new normativity, but tend to 
take those (normative) facets as self-evident. However, with the triumph of risk 
techniques in myriad individual cases, it has become prominent that the penal sphere 
has experienced a change that is more fundamental than what can be described as the 
‘efficiency enhancement’ or ‘rationalisation’ of the incarceration system. What 
accompanies the prevalence of risk techniques and strategies in the operations of the 
custodial system is the spreading of a particular strand of value judgements and 
presumptions, which in effect tend to create new allegiances in terms of penological 
norms and which take up much of the space left by the withdrawal of traditional 
penal welfare ideals. For some commentators, these features of risk-calculation have 
in effect played a crucial role in the constitution of an overwhelmingly control-
oriented culture in contemporary societies like the UK and the US (Garland, 2001a). 
 
Although the assertion that a totalised risk regime or ‘new penology’ has already 
arrived  remains quite contestable, it can be  acknowledged that ‘risk’ does play a 
crucial role within the spectrum of penal imaginaries in the post-universalist era. For 
an investigation based on the perspective of introspective normativity, it thus is vital 
to take into account the case of risk-oriented imaginaries, and to examine how they 
perform under the conditions of the withering of universal normativity and in relation 
to other contemporary imaginaries of imprisonment.  
 
Just as  our preceding studies of the liberal and populist imaginaries have proved that 
we can gain insight from exposing both the nihilistic and the innovative aspects of 
those penal imaginaries in terms of their normative performance and shed light on 
the possibilities of improving the quality of normative pursuits in the post-ideological 
penal circumstances, the particular normative reality that is linked with the risk-
 177 
oriented imaginaries is envisaged as being capable of providing a significant resource 
for the undertaking of introspective normativity inquiries.  Moreover, they can also 
give us clues for examining some of the latest tendencies within the contemporary 
imaginaries of imprisonment and enriching our understanding of their normative 
performances. 
 
As we tried to show in the earlier chapters (especially in Chapter 2), the approach to 
the examination of introspective normativity is quite different from the orthodox 
moral and political analyses undertaken by criminological inquiries. In the case of 
risk-oriented imaginaries, we may note that the existing literature has already offered 
extensive analyses of their moral and political implications, but when it comes to 
what particular kind of normative reality is being constructed and how it is realised 
in those imaginaries, we still face a new area of inquiries. The present chapter is thus 
devoted to the task of carrying out an investigation into the risk-oriented imaginaries 
of imprisonment in the UK with a view to uncovering and assessing the strength and 
weakness of their performances in terms of introspective normativity. To start with, 




II. Some Conceptual Issues 
 
The first issue concerns the question: do the multiple risk approaches which are 
being applied or advocated within the custodial field follow one single rationale and 
can they thus be addressed in a single collective term?  
 
If this is the case, we have to assume that those risk-based programmes and 
guidelines in prisons, despite their variation in contexts and concrete formations, at 
least share some common features which are sufficient to create a recognizable 
conceptual coherence. Relevent to this, there are questions regarding how we place 
‘risk imaginaries’ in relation to the liberal and populist cases. As the risk rhetoric 
becomes increasingly pervasive, it is also common to see that it appears within the 
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populist as well as the liberal discourses more and more frequently. For example, in 
the construction of populist visions of prisoners, the issue of ‘risk’ has been routinely 
picked up by tabloid papers to endorse the assumption that those who are locked up 
behind bars are hideously dangerous and that the lenient measures taken by ‘out-of 
touch’ prison and probation practitioners and arrogant correctional experts 
irresponsibly expose the public to risks of victimisation. On the other hand, risk is 
also employed in many circumstances to enhance liberal standpoints on 
imprisonment policies. In defence of the value of the rehabilitation of prisoners, for 
example, risk logic proves to be ‘friendly’ and contributory to the revival of the very 
project which used to lie at the centre of liberal penality.
1
 Thus it engenders the 
query as to whether it is pertinent to view risk imaginaries as a distinct category, as 
opposed to the populist and liberal imaginaries examined previously.  
 
Indeed, the approaches in which risk is constructed are far from one-dimensional. In 
the perspective of cultural theorists, how risk is defined is never isolated from the 
sphere of political communication and socio-cultural construction. The evidence is 
that in some non-western societies risk is constructed in a dramatically different way 
from what is familiar among the ‘risk society’ theorists. Moreover, even within a 
western context, risk discourses in fact reflect multifaceted meanings (calculative as 
well as emotive, for example), which are dependent on particular political settings 
(Douglas, 1992; Sparks 2001b & 2001c). This also applies to the case of 
imprisonment. For example, in the period when British prisons were guided by penal 
welfare principles, the prison service - the central task of which was to offer 
prisoners rehabilitative treatment and promote their re-integration into the normal 
social order - also developed its own version of the risk conception. This was, 
however, clearly different from the actuarial-style risk concept that later came to 
underpin many contemporary forms of prisoner management and assessment 
practises in the same country (Kemshall, 2003: 50-52). For some commentators, 
what matters is not to determine whether the concept of ‘risk’ per se is good or bad, 
but to choose between the inclusive approach and the exclusionary one.
2
     
                                                 
1
 For the revival of rehabilitation and its relationship with risk management, see the discussion in 
Robinson (2008).  
2
 See Hudson’s (2003: 49) discussion of ‘risk management’ and ‘risk control’.  
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Thus it is important to note that risk itself is subject to rather diversified forms of 
conceptualization. This is why it is inappropriate to reduce all sorts of risk-oriented 
imaginaries of imprisonment to one single category as the basis of further 
investigation. Such a tactic can easily create a hegemonic impression of risk 
imaginaries and result in ignorance of their highly diverse implications and 
possibilities, which are particularly worth highlighting within the current 
imprisonment field in which the existing patterns of risk rationales and practices 
have not yet achieved any substantial consensus in terms of their political 
righteousness.  
 
However, does this mean that the ‘risk category’ should be totally excluded from the 
agenda of introspective normativity studies on the basis that no such thing exists? If 
so, we may lose the opportunity to shed light on some of the most distinctive aspects 
of the contemporary imaginaries of imprisonment, for which the concept of risk is 
indispensable. Indeed, these risk phenomena are admittedly diverse in their moral 
and political implications, and there are reasons to be cautious in accepting any grand 
account of the advent of an overall ‘risk regime’.
3
 Yet it is also important to ensure 
that such a significant trend within the current imprisonment realm, as addressed by 
those ‘grand’ perspectives, is treated properly and is not trivialised among multiple 
discrete risk ‘case studies’. The question thus is how we can manage to capture in 
terms of the parameter of introspective normativity inquiries the significance of some 
particular strand among the range of risk imaginaries and in the meantime avoid 
blurring the difference between it and other possible approaches to the construction 
of risks. 
 
For this purpose, we need to define the term ‘risk-oriented imaginaries’ used in this 
chapter in a more specific manner. Firstly, when we use it, it mainly refers to those 
imaginaries which have a detectable linkage with the existing patterns of practises 
and ideas which have a prominently calculative and managerial character, one which 
can be perceived as distinct from the mainstream liberal or populist routes. Secondly, 
                                                 
3
 See O’Malley’s (2010) discussion of different approaches (the ‘risk society’ approach and the 
governance approach) to risk studies.  
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within this range of risk imaginaries, we will try to focus on a few examples which 
are the most influential within the custodial sphere. However, it is worth noting that 
this strategy in circumscribing the subject-matter does not determine in advance that 
the examples of ‘risk-oriented imaginaries’ examined in this chapter share the same 
‘logic’ and are inherently coherent with each other. The investigation we will carry 
out is in its nature inductive instead of deductive. It by no means downplays the 
pluralistic aspect of risk phenomena, but simply seeks to concentrate on some 
representative cases, with a view to illuminating their implications for the emergence 
of those new features of the contemporary normative landscape within the 
imprisonment field that are generating  concerns among the ‘new penology’ and 
‘culture of control’ theorists. Such considerations do not necessarily make the 
definition of the subject-matter and the choice of specific examples close-ended; as 
we will make clear in the later sections, the performance of introspective normativity 
within those risk imaginaries has multifold facets which, compared with the liberal 
and populist imaginaries, will allow us to shed light on its particular normative 
predicament and its reformative possibilities within the contemporary imprisonment 
field.  
 
In the rest of the chapter, we will first identify three cases of risk-oriented 
imaginaries which are prominent at different functional levels within the British 
custodial systems, and then to offer an overview of how they are constructed 
individually in relation to the circumstances of imprisonment practice. Following that, 
we will try to advance the analysis of those risk-oriented imaginaries in terms of the 
perspective of introspective normativity, and to evaluate the quality of their 
normative performances in terms of their nihilistic/innovative tendencies in 




Prisons are associated with risks in a number of ways. In the first place, their basic 
operation – enforcing incarceration on those who are not willing to be there – means 
that, compared to other social settings, they are more susceptible to the risks of 
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causing physical and mental harm to their inmates. In the overview of the situation of 
British prisons, we have already noted that a good proportion of prisoners are 
suffering from mental disorder problems and that there are also high rates of suicide 
and self-injury among prisoners.
4
  Secondly, as the key institution  fulfilling the tasks 
of crime control and offender rehabilitation, the prison itself plays a critical role in 
managing the risks of crime for  society in general, as well as the risks of individuals 
re-offending. Though it is clear that prisons have always engaged in the task of 
dealing with those different types of risks that are associated with their operation, the 
construction and conceptualization of risks were for a long period subordinate to the 
leading paradigms of imprisonment. For much of the penal welfarist period, for 
example, the rationale of correction and integration in effect offered a holistic 
perspective for associating the social causes of offending, individualised treatment 
and the minimization of the risks of individual re-offending and criminogenic social 
environments. Yet, in the account of welfarist penology, the reduction of risk is not 
supposed to be the foremost - let alone the exclusive - end of the prison system, nor 
do the risk discourses acquire any outstanding status of self-referential justifiability. 
But things have changed dramatically since rehabilitation as an overall penological 
ideal was discredited and the ‘what works’ idiom started to exert a massive impact 
on the criminal justice realm. From the 1970s onwards, commentators were 
observing a marked expansion of risk discourses within various sectors of the prison 
service. Notably, they have already become one of the major organising principles 
and criteria of assessment for the practices of imprisonment. And, as we will discuss 
at greater length shortly, in many respects they are no longer appropriate within any 
of the frameworks of the traditional paradigms that offer guidelines and general 
directions to the operation of incarceration. It appears that risks do not only govern 
the concrete technical procedures in pre-assessing and classifying prisoners upon 
their admission, organising the routine activities within the institution, designing 
prisoner training programmes, setting up parole conditions, but they also have an 
ideological function: where ‘risk’ is established, the corresponding measures seem to 
attain a certain self-validating effect, despite  their possible violation of wider values 
and normative ends espoused  by traditional penal ideals. In many cases, an attempt 
                                                 
4
 See the more detailed discussions in Chapter 1 (II.ii). Also see Liebling’s study on risk and prison 
suicide (Liebling, 2008a & 1995).  
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to maintain order and prevent ‘catastrophic’ happenings (ranging from prison riots 
and prisoner suicides to serious re-offending of released prisoners) is crucial to risk 
calculation. In the face of such a mentality, the consideration of enhancing the 
rehabilitation effect in a holistic way, promoting the integration of disadvantaged 
social sectors, or even creating livelier and less stiff prison surroundings is likely to 
be barred on the basis of risk calculation, notwithstanding the benefits that those 
measures might hopefully produce in advancing broad and long-term social goods.   
 
Therefore, within the contemporary imprisonment sphere, where there are no longer 
any overall penal ideologies that are able to hold the normative threads in a 
consistent and coherent way, the risk-based imaginaries have also shifted from their 
former secondary and instrumental status towards one which undertakes ideological 
and moralising tasks. Yet, beneath the ubiquitous resort to ‘risk’ in organizing  
current custodial practices, the concrete approaches to the management of risks and 
implementing specific risk schemes are far from uniform.  For some commentators 
(e.g. O’Malley, 2010), it thus appears to be more appropriate to address these risk 
phenomena in the penal sphere via a more case-specific route, such as governance 
research, rather than assume there is one single overarching risk regime. This is also 
where risk-oriented imaginaries clearly differ from the traditional paradigms of 
penological ideals. The latter are in principle integrated in terms of certain 
hierarchical value orders which link the various sectors of the custodial scheme 
together, whereas the application of risk evaluation tends to individualise and further 
fragment them. As we will show below, ‘risk’ imaginaries do not result in any 
organic connection that unites and governs every one of the individual aspects of 
imprisonment under our examination, except for the general ideological concept of  
‘risk minimisation’. This feature also makes risk-oriented imaginaries rather distinct 
from other forms of contemporary penal imaginaries, such as the liberal and populist 
imaginaries of imprisonment. What the latter two have to deal with is their profound 
incapacity to extend the validity of their normative visions beyond their boundaries 
of allegiance (for example, liberal approaches to imprisonment are hardly going to be 
appreciated by the tabloid media editors and their audiences, and vice versa). In the 
case of risk imaginaries, by contrast, the appeal to ‘risk’ prevention and minimisation 
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seems to be in a better position to receive universal recognition in a post-ideological 
context, but they demonstrate a noticeable shortage in offering a definite and 
systematic approach to uniting different parts of the custodial regime and 
representing their political and moral implications in an integral and unambiguous 
way.  
 
The aforementioned characteristics of risk-oriented imaginaries mean that we need to 
adopt a particular analytical strategy in the overview section.  Firstly, we will start 
from a few specific uses of risk construction within the contemporary imprisonment 
field and avoid presupposing that those applications obey any single kind of political 
implications.  Secondly, we will try to probe into the concrete mechanisms, in each 
case of risk construction, by which these risk imaginaries are convincingly 
established. On that basis, we will then try to resolve the issue whether there are any 
transferable features in each of the selected cases which may help us to identify a 
particular ‘style’ in constructing imaginaries of imprisonment.   
 
There are three particular aspects of imprisonment that have been chosen for the 
purpose of illustrating the construction of risk imaginaries. They are the risk-based 
imaginaries of the general purpose of imprisonment, risk and prisoner rehabilitation, 
and risk in prison management.  
 
i. Prison as An Instrument for Managing Crime Risks 
 
In the following paragraphs, we will try to examine how risk-thinking has 
contributed to the patterns of understanding of the general purpose of imprisonment. 
Within the rehabilitative framework, the prison was mainly imagined in the light of 
individualised correction and social re-integration. As crime was often considered as 
being the result of social pathologies related to the process of modernisation and 
urbanisation, its causes were then identifiable and changeable. In the meantime, the 
development of positivist criminology was also producing the necessary knowledge 
and the theoretical tools required to sustain the progress of prison-based 
rehabilitation.  In this perspective, the task of prison is also commonly associated 
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with the fulfilment of broader social democratic goals, especially those aiming to 
promote the integration of disadvantaged and marginalised social sectors. In other 
words, rehabilitation is seldom conceived as an isolated function of prison, but is 
linked to a holistic social improvement ideal, which serves as the ultimate basis for 
justifying the coercive and intrusive dimension that is unavoidably involved in the 
rehabilitative scheme. Therefore, it is important to note that there are normally a set 
of wholesome positive moral and political designs underpinning the rehabilitative 
imaginaries of the purpose of incarceration.  
 
The characteristics of an adherence to a holistic moral horizon can be also observed 
in the other classic approaches to determining the purpose of imprisonment, such as 
the retributive theories, and even in those reflexive perspectives which seek to 
uncover what prison actually does within the social control system instead of its 
officially stated objectives. For the latter (i.e. the critical evaluation of the function of 
prisons), it is still necessary to build its own normative grounds in order to level 
criticisms; that is, it normally requires an affirmative vision of what are the right 
aims that prisons ought to serve, so that the factual situation can be assessed in terms 
of how much it has deviated from them.  
 
The most commonly observed risk-based approach to the understanding of the 
purpose of incarceration, however, differs drastically from the aforementioned 
imaginaries in terms of its substantive orientation as well as its relationship to broad 
moral and political horizons. Over the past four decades, the ‘risks’ being 
constructed within the British penal realm have to a great extent amounted to the 
risks of victimisation that are faced by the general public.
5
 As for the task of prisons, 
the risk perspective seems to resonate well with the punitive view expressed by the 
populist media; that is, incarceration should first and foremost be the means to make 
offenders ‘pay’ for their criminal deeds and prevent them from bringing crime risks 
into the community to the greatest possible extent.  But it is not difficult for us to see 
                                                 
5
 In the following discussion we will also deal with different types of risk construction, particularly 
the ‘risks’ to prisoners and prisons per se. Yet, within the current political atmosphere and penological 
discourses of the UK, the risks in question overwhelmingly reflect the security concerns of the general 
public or mainstream society. 
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that the contemporary risk-oriented construction of the purpose of imprisonment 
reaches far beyond this purely security-centred and vindictive rhetoric. In the latter 
case, as we discussed in the chapter on populist imaginaries of imprisonment, there 
are often an emotional element and an appeal to ‘justice’ (though it is usually 
depicted as expressing ordinary citizens’ ‘healthy’ moral instincts and being at odds  
with the concepts accepted by the academics and penal elites). In the construction of 
the risk-oriented imaginary, on the contrary, the emotional or moral facets have been 
rendered secondary.  In  respect of operating the custodial institutions to meet the 
requirement of reducing the crime risks faced by the public, what matters for these 
risk imaginaries is their efficiency in identifying, categorising and controlling the 
various risk factors related to offences. This is a requirement which appears to be 
better met by the collective and actuarial style of risk calculation than the 
conventional measures based on a clinical-style diagnosis of individual offenders. As 
a result, the traditional penological factors such as  culpability, fault and moral 
responsibility become less important; the goal of the transformation of offenders 
gives way to group management, ‘dangerousness’ classification and deviance 
regulation. The operational goal of imprisonment then increasingly focuses on 
containing risky personnel, reducing their chances of re-offending by imposing 
incapacitation on them. Imagined in this way, prisons largely resemble human 
‘warehouses’, whose inmates are mainly conceived of as risk-carriers instead of 
subjects with rights and autonomy.  
 
Feeley and Simon (1992 & 1994) identified such phenomena as part of the advent of 
a ‘new penology’, which shifted its focus away from the individual offender-oriented 
welfarist penology towards systematic group management strategies that quantify, 
assess and deal with the risks of prisoners in terms of their collective attributes. This 
logic of new penology gives more weight to the use of actuarial techniques in risk 
calculation than to the discretion of penal professions in charge of prisoners’ 
correctional programmes. In short, it is ‘neither about punishing nor about 
rehabilitating individuals. It is about identifying and managing unruly groups’ (1992: 
457). Not surprisingly, such a presumption goes in accordance with the prioritisation 
of the prison’ incapacitation function over its role as a rehabilitative institution. 
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It is worth noting that this sort of risk-centred imaginary of the purpose of 
imprisonment, as described above, scarcely takes such an explicit form in official 
statements or appears as such within the forum of political debates. Its dispassionate 
and calculative character is ingrained, instead, within the institutional practices and 
the logic underpinning them.
6
 In fact, if it is disclosed thoroughly to the populist 
audience who accept the concept of ‘risk’ in a punitive sense, it is likely to be 
perceived as another sort of cold and distanced professional wisdom, which  fatally 
lacks the moral sentiments necessary to comprehend the role of prisons.  
 
However, it is important to note that such imaginary is neither hegemonic nor 
without its competitors in the contemporary imprisonment field. As Hannah-Moffat 
(2005) observes, the risk/welfare binary, which was palpable in the ‘new penology’ 
style usage of imprisonment, has been destabilised by the emergence of a number of 
new risk management schemes and rationales which render it possible to fuse risk 
construction with elements of welfarist interventions. One of the prominent examples 
in this regard is the development of the ‘risk-needs’ categorisations and the 
management strategies based on them (about which we will go into greater detail in 
the following section).   Hannah-Moffat argues that such development has made the 
field of risk knowledge more ‘fluid and flexible’ and capable of supporting ‘a range 
of culturally contingent penal strategies’ (2005: 30). Whereas the ‘new penology’ 
imaginary mainly conceives its subject according to certain static risk categories (low, 
medium, high), on the basis of accumulated historical factors that mostly cannot 
change,  the new ‘risk-needs’ schemes seek to reassert the welfarist premise that the 
offender can change and can be rehabilitated, by integrating ‘intervenable needs’ into 
the risk assessment technologies. Thus, unlike the actuarial model of risk 
construction, the new generation of risk techniques are inclined to produce the 
‘dynamic and transformative’ risk subject who is amenable to re-integrative 
measures. Accordingly, the ongoing development of such techniques can be viewed 
as containing a wide range of possibilities in terms of exploring and materialising the 
                                                 
6
 Thus such styles of risk calculation and their influence on penal practices are more often reflected in 
sociological studies of the field rather than in directly stated institutional aims.  
 187 
diverse political implications of risk, which cannot be exhausted by one single risk 
management scheme (Hannah-Moffat, 2005). 
 
ii. Risk and the Rehabilitation of Prisoners 
 
Whereas the operational goal of prisons can be defined according to the risk-based 
imaginary described above, this constitutes merely one of the specific examples of 
how the concept of risk has come to permeate the contemporary understanding of 
imprisonment. As we have tried to emphasise in the preceding paragraphs, there is no 
single type of risk construction. Even in the custodial realm, risk imaginaries are 
multifaceted and they are by no means coherent with each other in terms of their 
substantive content. As for the general purpose of imprisonment, we have identified 
one risk-centred vision which places incapacitation and the group management of the 
risks posed by offenders over the traditional penal ideal of rehabilitation and 
transformation. However, risk can also play a role within those prison sectors which 
still attach great importance to the task of the rehabilitation of prisoners. In the 
following paragraphs, we will mainly describe how the dominant risk-oriented 
imaginaries are configured in relation to the rehabilitation of prisoners. The treatment 
of prisoners who have been convicted of sex offences will be discussed as a concrete 
example to illustrate some of the typical features of risk thinking within the sphere of 
rehabilitation. 
 
As an overall paradigm of penal practice, rehabilitation has declined markedly since 
the 1970s. Though the situation varies between different prison systems within the 
UK (for example, the Scottish prison service has preserved a much stronger 
rehabilitative tradition than its English and Welsh counterparts), for most 
commentators, it has lost the ideological power to guide the custodial institutions.  
However, it is worth clarifying that most of these criticisms are concerned about the 
plausibility of achieving any effective outcome of rehabilitation rather than its value 
per se. Moreover, at the practical level, the rehabilitative element can hardly be 
dismissed as easily as it is at the ideological level, since it has largely been 
incorporated into the professional habitus of those who manage various sectors of the 
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custodial institutions. Unsurprisingly, even under the conditions where ‘nothing 
works’ discourse was most prominent in the UK,  the rehabilitative element was not 
entirely absent within the realm of the daily management of prisoners and the 
arrangement of routine order inside prisons.  
 
This is also reflected in the recent literature which engages in discussion about the 
survival or revival of rehabilitation (Robinson, 2002 & 2008; Steen and Bandy, 
2007).  In the view of these commentators, the practices of rehabilitation have not 
been driven out by the rise of punitive penal politics. But they also do not remain in 
the same shape as they used to be. Many aspects of the contemporary configuration 
of prisoner rehabilitation have been adapted to the post-welfarist penal circumstances. 
It is in this context that ‘contemporary rehabilitation has evolved by learning to speak 
the language of risk’ (Robinson, 2008: 434).  As we shall see in a moment, the 
patterns of risk thinking are capable of tremendously transforming the imaginaries of 
rehabilitation and they demonstrate clearly how the logic of risk also permeates the 
conventional practical sectors of the prison system, apart from changing the 
orientation towards the understanding of its general purpose.  
 
One of the most prominent changes that risk has brought into the sphere of prisoner 
correction concerns the ‘social vision’ of the conventional rehabilitative paradigm. 
Under the social perspective of prisoners’ reform, there is a crucial task for the 
rehabilitative programmes to address the social conditions and individual needs of 
prisoners that are vital to their adaptation to a useful and law-abiding life style and 
their desisting from re-offending. In the risk-oriented imaginary of rehabilitation, 
however, its ‘social’ aspect is constructed quite differently. The central task is no 
longer to understand the linkage between the social environment and the causes of 
crime, or the effect of rehabilitation, but to determine the concrete and calculative 
factors relating to prisoners’ profiles which can be used to predict the probability of 
their re-offending. Accordingly, the rehabilitative measures are acknowledged and 
adopted only under the condition that they are proved to be able to reduce the risks of 
crime. As for those corrective measures which are supposed to benefit the well-being 
of prisoners but which do not necessarily have any impact on reducing re-offending 
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risks, they are likely to be dismissed from the risk-focused rehabilitation agenda as 
counter-productive.  
 
Let us now consider the risk-need-responsivity model (RNR) and particularly the 
concept of ‘criminogenic need’, which have become increasingly influential in the 
realm of prisoners’ assessment and treatment.  The major framework of the RNR 
model was established by several Canadian scholars (e.g. Andrews and Bonta, 2003; 
Andrews, et al., 2006; Gendreau and Andrews, 1990), but it has also attained 
popularity in the UK (and in a number of other jurisdictions, including New Zealand, 
Austria and Europe). This model characteristically combines risk logic and the 
requirement of effective rehabilitation. Its key idea is the need to identify and adopt 
rehabilitative measures which are linked to the reduction of risk in crime whilst 
excluding those which are ‘irrelevant’ to such an outcome. Briefly speaking, the 
model includes three principles, and each of them can provide guidelines for the 
treatment of prisoners. The risk principle concerns the classification of offenders 
according to the levels of risk of their re-offending. If they are categorised as 
carrying the highest risk, they will be referred to measures of the strongest 
intervention; if the risks are low, they will be considered for minimal treatment or 
may even be exempted from it. The need principle distinguishes the ‘criminogenic 
need’ from the ‘non-criminogenic need’ and determines that only the former should 
be considered as the proper target of the rehabilitative intervention. ‘Criminogenic 
need’ is defined in accordance with ‘dynamic risk factors’, that, is the changeable 
factors associated with the risk of re-offending (e.g. substance abuse, problems with 
leisure activities, antisocial personality patterns). Those factors which are not proved 
to be useful in the reduction of crime risk are suggested to be removed from the 
agenda of rehabilitation so that the resources can better target the criminogenic need. 
For example, the traditional treatment programmes usually include the task of 
dealing with psychological depression among prisoners and see its improvement as 
part of the rehabilitative goal. But, in the risk-centred imaginary, this basically 
belongs to the category of non-criminogenic need and thus is only secondary to the 
rehabilitation target. The responsivity principle suggests that the treatment should 
match the characteristics of prisoners (particularly their learning skills and their 
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We can see that the NRN model has constructed the realm of prisoners’ rehabilitation 
in a way such that every aspect of it can be defended on the basis of risk 
consciousness. But, obviously, even though the element of correction of prisoners is 
preserved within this vision, it is supposed to serve the aim of risk reduction, not vice 
versa. For some commentators, this revival of rehabilitation is at the expense of 
concerns about the well-being of prisoners, as it is overwhelmingly on the side of 
public safely and risk minimisation. They also wonder ‘how an approach focused on 
the prevention of harmful consequences to others can encourage offenders to change 
their own behavior in fundamental ways’ (Ward and Maruna, 2007: 83). Indeed, the 
risk-based imaginary of rehabilitation has made great efforts to promote the 
evidence-provable effectiveness of the corrective aspect of prison systems, but at the 
same time as  its seemingly science-led and value-free approach is satisfying its 
proponents, the ‘social vision’ that conventionally links the task of rehabilitation 
with a broader social end has markedly decreased.  As a result, the instrumental 
dimension of prisons and their operations gets highlighted, but the goals they are 
designed to serve can no longer be held together as a meaningful whole, despite the 
existence of the general ideological cover of ‘risk minimisation’.    
 
Compared with the risk imaginary of the general purpose of imprisonment (which 
tends to banish rehabilitation and replace it with incapacitation), RNR-style risk 
thinking involves a compromise with the correctional task of custodial institutions. 
Nevertheless, it shares some of the critical features of the former. Apart from the 
restrictions on the social perspective, it also places the demand for a ‘free of crime’ 
community at the centre of its considerations. Yet the construction of such an 
imaginary community is by no means detached from struggles and negotiations 
within the political realm. The risk language, however, tends to create a world 
consisting of evidence, objective calculation and scientific measurement, which in 
effect diminishes the controversial issues such as who should be included in or 
                                                 
7
 For more detailed review of the RNR model, see Ward et al. (2007) and Ward and Maruna (2007).  
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excluded from the ‘risk-minimised’ community and what kind of behaviour should 
be defined as crime or as risky activities.
8
     
 
Another similar characteristic that the two types of risk imaginaries have in common 
is the impersonal and aggravated style of managing imprisonment practice. For the 
RNR model, the classification of risks is primarily based on pre-determined 
impersonal characteristics (age, gender, offending history, family circumstances, etc) 
rather than clinical diagnosis. The rehabilitative (or risk-reduction) effect is also 
envisaged according to analyses of the data of past cases of recidivism and desisting 
from re-offending. Compared with the classical paradigm of rehabilitation, the 
importance of the individual prisoner per se has diminished greatly in such 
imaginaries. However, in the case of the risk-centred imaginary of rehabilitation, it 
also creates a new role for individual prisoners, one that engenders new requirements 
they have to meet. As risk becomes the guiding principle for rehabilitation, its 
ultimate effect is supposed to be realised in each concrete prisoner who has gone 
through the corrective process. That means that the final task of risk reduction must 
be carried out by those individuals. The success of risk-directed rehabilitative 
programmes is then measured by whether they can transform the prisoners into risk-
conscious subjects who will continue to be ‘responsible’ of managing the risks of 
their re-offending even after they are released into the community. In other words, 
each prisoner is considered to be an autonomous risk-controlling unit:  she has 
learned to recognise the ‘alerting’ signs of the mobilisation of criminal behaviour, 
ascribe their management to her own responsibility and take effective measures to 
curb her deviant motivations and prevent them from causing any harmful results to 
the community.
9
 Thus the common impression of risk-oriented imaginaries that they 
are only interested in collective categories and aggregate calculation and tend to 
ignore individuals is not true. In terms of the spectrum of attitudes to prisoner 
rehabilitation, the risk approach may in effect impose heavier burdens on the subject 
of correction than traditional does liberal rehabilitation, in terms of both scope and 
scale. However, in creating risk-conscious subjects its focus is excessively 
                                                 
8
 We will return to this point in the further discussion in the next section of the chapter.  
9
 It is in the case of sex offender management, as we will discuss in detail shortly, that such features of 
risk-dominated rehabilitation can be detected most clearly.   
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instrumentalist and outcome-oriented. What matters is not accurately capturing the 
subtle personality composition of the prisoner or identifying the aetiological factors 
of her deviant disposition, but planting the particular behaviour customs in her which 
are pertinent to fulfilling the risk minimisation task, in spite of the fact that such 
customs may be connected to her personality and her integral social needs only in a 
loose and external way.  
 
The characteristics of the risk-oriented imaginaries of rehabilitation that have been 
addressed above can be observed clearly in the realm of sex offender treatment in 
prisons. In the case of the UK (as well as several other countries including Canada 
and the US), risk assessment has become a precondition for treatment programmes. 
The assessment instrument Risk Matrix 2000 (RM2000) is generally used in the 
prison and probation service to predict violent and sexual re-offending. Such 
practices reflect well the RNR principles, as they widely use actuarial techniques to 
classify sex offenders according to the risks of their relapse and then decide the 
follow-up treatment level. The classification of sex offenders overwhelmingly 
concerns the probability of their re-offending in terms of group characteristics 
(offending history, conditions of personality disorder, etc) and is strictly defined in 
terms of the outcome measurement and allocation of resources for treatment. As a 
result, ‘[g]one are the days when insight and understanding were the primary goals of 
assessment’ (Grubin, 2004: 91). The treatment programmes are mainly designed to 
intervene in the criminogenic needs or dynamic risk factors of prisoners convicted of 
sex offences. Those factors are defined as changeable and constitute the main target 
of treatment programmes. They include the client’s attitude of denying or minimising 
her offence, dysfunctional thinking patterns, lack of victim empathy, deviant sexual 
fantasies and arousal, low self-esteem, intimacy deficits, attachment problems, 
assertiveness difficulties, management of negative emotions and problem solving 
deficits (Beech and Fisher, 2004). The treatment programmes usually take the form 
of consecutive and circular modules and admit their clients according to the risk-
category that they belong to. In the process they will learn to address those risk 
factors step by step until they become competent enough to be ‘masters’ of the 
successful self-management of relapse risks. In those modules the cognitive-
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behavioural approach is quite prominent. The attendants firstly face the crucial task 
of learning how to think normally in respect of sexual relationships and sexual norms; 
it is supposed that only when they accept a non-deviant thinking pattern are they 
capable of making changes to their behaviour.  
 
We can note that the risk perspective that is employed in sex offender treatment 
programmes touches very intimate dimensions of an individual’s social existence and 
the realisation of her personal values and pursuits. For example, one’s sexual 
fantasies are normally thought to belong to a deeply personal sphere, and to intrude 
into them goes quite against the common moral perceptions of contemporary society. 
But once this sphere is linked to the demands of the risk management of sex offences, 
it immediately becomes a technical spectrum, which is subject to a number of 
manipulative tactics. The same thing happens to other risk-related aspects of human 
activities such as relationships with the other gender, knowledge of and attitude 
towards one’s self, attachment and intimacy, etc. Those realms are admittedly 
confusing to people at all times and inquiries into them have never proved exhaustive. 
Whereas the traditional corrective paradigm sought to offer an integral normative 
vision based on the ideal of social inclusion and solidarity, in the case of risk 
imaginaries, those realms are never constructed as a meaningful whole, though they 
may be integrated into certain coherent risk management paradigms. On the contrary, 
they are dis-organised into separate pieces to be governed by respective risk-
management strategies. 
 
A case study in a Canadian sex offender treatment programme (undertaken by 
Lacombe (2008)) may well illuminate this general tendency in such imaginaries. The 
researcher had a role as a participatory observer in the operation of this programme 
and found that fantasy management formed a significant task for the attendants to 
perform. A clear distinction was  made between ‘good fantasy’ and ‘bad fantasy’, as 
part of the cognitive-behavioural therapy, since managing the risk of committing a 
sex offence needs to start from managing the deviant thoughts. Thus,   ‘[a]s they train 
to scrutinize their fantasies to identify the bad fantasies and interrupt them,’ as it was 
documented by the researcher, ‘inmates are carefully instructed to create good ones. 
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They are encouraged to set a ‘‘mood’’ by ‘‘imagining a candle light dinner’’, 
including ‘‘intimacy’’ and ‘‘foreplay’’ by describing different ‘‘scents, smells and 
touches’’ and communicating to their partners clearly by ‘‘expressing feelings’’’ 
(Lacombe, 2008: 69). In another case, the therapist tried to urge a 57-year-old 
attendant to shift his sexual fantasy target away from 16-17 year old girls (‘At your 
age the correct age for you is a 35-year-old woman’ - Lacombe (2008: 68)). It is 
obvious that under normal conditions it is simply impossible to set up standards for 
fantasies. But under the governance of risk imaginaries, they seem to enter into a 
particular sphere which is detached from the common normative visions and moral 
controversies, a world characterised by clearly defined boundaries of right and wrong. 
As this sphere is only supported by the risk logic and its derivative standards, it is 
largely independent from the more comprehensive ‘social’ vision and its holistic 
normative foundations.   
 
Furthermore, the sex offender treatment field also illustrates how the individual 
prisoner is imagined in the light of her own role within the risk scheme. As the aim 
of the treatment shifts from the prospects of complete cure to risk management, the 
prisoner is required to carry out effective self-control. She needs to master sufficient 
knowledge about her ‘crime cycle’ and intervene as soon as the ‘warning signs’ 
emerge. Most importantly, these skills must be preserved as long as the risk of re-
offending exists. ‘In short, self-monitoring must become second nature for them. The 
crime cycle and relapse prevention plan instil in the offender an awareness that he is 
always at risk of re-offending’ (Lacombe, 2008: 72). In short, in this risk-oriented 
imaginary, the thorough rehabilitation and moral integration of the offenders is not a 
feasible target of the treatment; prisoners cannot be made ‘normal’, but they can be 
trained to adhere to the behaviour model that suits the risk-minimisation goal and 
take personal responsibility for it. What matters is the outcome.  
 
iii. Risks to the Prison and Prisoners 
 
Both of the previous cases of risk-oriented imaginaries are concerned with the 
reduction of the risk of crime for the public and the mainstream society. In the field 
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of imprisonment, however, risks may also be identified as affecting prisoners and the 
prison per se. For example, the prison may engage in enterprises which are designed 
for the purpose of providing meaningful activities for the prisoners and facilitating 
the effect of rehabilitation. Such pursuits inevitably involve various types of risks to 
the prison as well as the prisoners. Apart from the risks which are normally faced by 
commercial enterprises (product liability, product safety, health and safety at work 
and changes in legislation), they may also involve risks which are particularly 
associated with the prison environment. For example, when the prison enterprises are 
concerned with the production of printing and publication materials which will be 
seen by the public, especially children, the working process may engender 
opportunities for prisoners to insert inappropriate materials (see the guideline for 
managing risk in prison enterprises, Prison Service Order No.4101). In such cases, 
the prison may face the risk of being subject to legal action and even political 
disputes.  On the other hand, prisoners are also a very vulnerable group of people. 
They tend to have more chances than those living outside the prison of having 
negative life experiences, especially those associated with suicide and self-injury. To 
manage those risks are vital to the maintenance of the custodial institution itself as 
well as the accomplishment of its operational goals. Thus it is not surprising that 
practices within this realm of imprisonment are also reflected in the risk-oriented 
imaginaries. 
 
In respect of managing these risks to prisoners and the prison, the calculative model 
is similar to what we have discussed in the previous sections. It makes use of group 
data to categorise risks and on the basis of this it sets up concrete guidelines, 
responding strategies and various check-out lists for relevant practitioners within the 
custodial institution. For example, in the light of dealing with risks in prison 
enterprises, the prison service administration in England and Wales has set up 
detailed categories of risks related to the venture (product liability, environment 
safety, patents and trademarks, etc). Once particular risks get identified, they are then 
assessed and ranked in terms of their impact and probability. ‘Documentation should 
be kept detailing the risks identified, and the associated rank allocated to each of 
them. The risk assessment is intended to identify risks specific to the sale of goods or 
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services and to allow an opportunity to set up the relevant controls’ (Prison Service 
Order No.4101, 1.1.6). This work then provides a basis for designing and specifying 
various risk-minimization strategies, ranging from the separation of duties between 
different sections of the system to regular updating of product-related legislation.   
 
The management of risks to prisoners also contains a marked actuarial element. A 
typical example is the management of prisoner suicide and self-harm risks.  Based on 
the statistics of recorded incidences of suicide and self-harm, the prison service is 
able to identify the high risk groups of prisoners and occasions (e.g. the first night 
after the prison reception) and take corresponding measures to minimise the risks. 
Recalled prisoners, for example, are taken as a  high risk group of suicide and self-
harm on the basis  that ‘[s]tatistics on apparent self-inflicted deaths show that there 
was 1 such death in 1996 and 1 in 2001, but then 5 in 2002, 11 in 2003, 9 in 2004 
and 6 in 2005. In percentage terms, apparent self-inflicted deaths involving recalled 
prisoners represented 8% of the total number of deaths in 2005’ (Prison Service 
Order No. 2700, Annex 4L). Accordingly a host of strategies can be directed to deal 
with  this particular risk group, including staff support (informing those prisoners of 
the opportunities for appeal and re-release), increased opportunities for them to 
contact their family and partners, access to personal officers, etc.   
 
It can be noted that the risk-oriented imaginary within the realm of minimising risks 
to prisoners and the prison shares the same instrumentalist character as the other two 
cases discussed before. But as the objective of risk minimisation shifts from the risks 
to the members of the public and the community to those faced by prisoners and the 
prison, it also generates certain difference in its normative implications. In cases 
where the public and the community are taken as the beneficiaries of the 
minimisation of crime risks, since under most conditions they do not have any direct 
and vivid presence within the custodial regime, protecting their interests thus forms 
an abstract and exterior principle for the functioning of the prison system. Whereas 
when the custodial power is most directly linked with the prisoners, such risk-
oriented approaches tend to be indifferent and fail to respond to their idiosyncrasies 
and concrete needs, which can hardly be captured in terms of the static risk-based 
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categories. As we noted in the former two sections, the risk imaginaries are mainly 
targeted at ‘managing’ rather than ‘understanding’ those who are subject to their 
governance. And this is closely connected with their a-social vision and strategies of 
responsibilisation.  
 
However, in those conditions where the prisoner becomes the target of risk concerns, 
the risk model can respond better to its clients, as they (the prisoners) are not far 
away from its exercise but instead are in a position to interact with the effect of risk 
minimisation. Despite the fact that most of the risk categories are pre-determined, 
they can adopt insights from the dynamic interaction between the prisoner and the 
prison practitioners and make the risk guidelines and ‘check-out’ lists reflect the 
broader and more in-depth aspects of prisoners’ needs and their humanity. This may 
explain why the prison service instructions in relation to minimisation of the risk of 
suicide and self-harm turn out to demonstrate genuine interest in understanding those 
quite specific aspects of prisoners which are related to their vulnerability. In this 
respect, the instrumentalist facets of the risk imaginary tend to be moderated by the 
more individual-oriented concerns and possibilities of a less control-dominated risk 
perspective. Our discussion about this particular dimension of the risk imaginaries of 
imprisonment will be taken further in the next section.  
 
IV. Evaluating the Performance of Introspective Normativity 
 
In the previous section, we have examined some representative cases of risk-oriented 
imaginaries in the realm of imprisonment. Through this overview we have also 
touched on the normative aspect of the constructions of risk in three different 
custodial spheres. It has also confirmed the view, as we discussed in the introduction   
to the chapter, that the logic of risk is by no means value-free.  
 
The aim of introspective normativity analysis, however, is not to judge its value-
orientation according to certain exterior standards (whether they are civil liberty, 
human rights, social democratic ideals or utilitarianism), but to uncover and assess 
how it performs in  respect of building its particular normative reality within the 
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spectrum of penal imaginaries. In other words, it is concerned with the quality of its 
normative introspection in terms of the dynamic construction of risks, and it seeks to 
shed light on whether it forms an effective/productive approach for confronting the 




In following paragraphs, we will try to apply the perspective of introspective 
normativity to analyse the case of the risk-oriented imaginaries discussed in the 
previous section. Since we are aware of the differences in risk construction among 
those cases, we will start from an examination of some of the general patterns of 
normative performance that are detectable in each of these cases and try to expose 
how they may be assessed in terms of the opposition nihilism/innovation in their 
normative performances. Following that, we will try to shed light on the possibilities 
of developing some innovative aspects of risk thinking with a view to improving its 
normative performance within the contemporary field of imprisonment.    
 
i. Subordination of A Holistic Normative Perspective 
 
In our discussion of the risk-oriented imaginaries about the purpose of imprisonment 
and the rehabilitation of prisoners, we have already noted that the normative visions 
implied in them are largely disassociated from the pursuit of holistic social aims. To 
define the goal of imprisonment in terms of incapacitation-style risk management is 
not simply a shift in the direction of the function of prison, but implies an essential 
departure from the faith in establishing meaningful moral linkages between the 
prisoner and society. The former is identified merely as a set of variables to be 
calculated within the overall management scheme that aims to create favourable risk-
circumstances for the community. Accordingly, the moral depth of the life of 
prisoners and its connection with possible normative ends for the whole society are 
largely abandoned and become subordinated to the restrictive aim of minimising the 
risks of crime.  
 
                                                 
10
 See the more comprehensive explanation of our methodological perspective in Chapter 2.   
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Even in those places where the rehabilitation of prisoners is acknowledged as being 
the goal of the imprisonment practice, the risk-oriented imaginary, as examined in 
the preceding section, has succeeded in building a distinctive normative vision 
different from that based on the ideal of social integration. Since the central task of 
rehabilitation is defined in terms of ‘criminogenic need’, prisoners’ interests can only 
be considered when they are connected to the risk-management purpose. In this 
perspective, priority is placed on the requirement of effectiveness in resource 
allocation and cost-benefit calculation, and is seldom given to the understanding of 
the prisoner’s fundamental needs and her moral relationship with the society and the 
polity which she inhabits. This can be seen most clearly  in the case of sex offender 
treatment, which in effect imagines the group of people who embody sex offence 
risks as permanent ‘strangers’ to the community: they are taught to develop risk 
consciousness and skills of management, but the prospects of genuine moral 
integration are entirely lacking. 
 
We may recall the ‘detachment’ model of normative performance that we have 
identified in Chapter 2 (III.iii.d). It provides a lens for understanding the dynamic of 
normative construction that admits the inescapable loss of universal normativity and 
seeks to come to terms with it. In this model, what is valued is the regained freedom 
following the detachment from the faith in and pursuit of any ‘thorough’ moral end; 
and it is the constant ‘contact’ with and subsequent ‘escape’ from the heavy authority  
of conventional universal ideals that gives life to its particular normative reality 
which  has a deeply ‘light’ character. We also found that this model is more likely to 
be found within the sphere of the individual’s life styles than within the penal realm. 
The obvious reason is that punishment is among the most restricted and justification-
demanding powers of the state, and it is hard to imagine that it can continue to exist 
in the vacuum of universalist moral discourses. Thus we can observe that the 
contemporary liberal and populist imaginaries both seek to offer their own moral 
discourses to support their desired forms of the exercise of custodial power and the 
‘detachment’ model thus seldom applies to them. 
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Yet, when it comes to the risk-oriented imaginaries of imprisonment which have 
been examined in this chapter, the ‘detachment’ model seems to be able to cover 
some of the key facets of their normative performance, as the risk-penetrated 
normative reality in effect acquiesces in the fact that it is not feasible to pursuit a 
holistic approach to the moral integration of prisoners. Instead it favours the more 
realistic endeavour of management:  managing the crime risks they carry rather than 
extinguishing them, managing the potential harm they may suffer in the prison and 
managing the increasing security demands from the community. At the centre of 
such a vision is a compromise: since there is nothing that can be done to rebuild the 
consensus on the ultimate moral foundations of imprisonment, the best thing we can 
do is to devote our efforts to the task of meeting the realistic and relatively 
uncontroversial demand for harm prevention and management. As a result, in the 
case of the risk-oriented imaginaries of imprisonment, the crucial supportive element 
of ‘regained freedom’ is simply absent. This would undoubtedly amplify the inherent 
problem of the detachment approach to the penal realm and determine that risk-
oriented imaginaries need to employ other strategies to enhance the strength of their 
normative reality and remedy the vulnerability that may result from its character as a 
compromise.  
 
ii. Risk as An Ideological Shelter 
 
One of the strategies used to remedy the shortcomings of the detachment approach is 
the use of risk as an ideological cover for the problems associated with imprisonment. 
It prescribes the minimization of crime risk as the self-evident end and prior task in 
arranging various sectors of the custodial regime. On the condition that other 
interests and considerations (such as the welfare and rights of prisoners) are involved 
as well, their fulfilment is made subordinate to the requirement of risk 
management.
11
   
 
                                                 
11
 We can see this typically in the risk-need-responsivity model. In fact, the ideological function of 
risk discourse reaches far beyond the sphere of imprisonment and forms one of the dominant 
characteristics of contemporary societies.  
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Despite the fact that risks are subject to multiple types of construction and their 
political implications may be hugely different, most risk discourses tend to downplay 
the diverse possibilities within their subject-matter and manage to create the 
impression that they represent the single ‘objective’ approach to handling the issue. 
In the case of the risk-oriented imaginary of rehabilitation of prisoners, for example, 
the massive use of collective data and actuarial models of calculation successfully 
sends the message that they represent a dispassionate technological approach to 
fulfilling the irreproachable purpose of reducing the crime risks faced by the 
community. Under this ‘politically correct’ shelter of risk minimisation, it thus 
acquires an advantageous status in its attempts to justify its unconventional measures 
for  treating prisoners and to direct the critical public gaze away from their 
problematic moral and political assumptions.  
 
We can see that in many respects the strategy of using ‘risk’ as an ideological shelter 
resembles the ‘exterior normativity’ approach employed by some contemporary 
liberal imaginaries of imprisonment, as has been discussed in Chapter 3 (II.i). In that 
case, different exterior normative sources – ranging from human rights discourses, 
European court decisions to the cultural values of local jurisdictions – are brought 
into the current liberal imaginaries of imprisonment so that the traditional liberal 
penal values can adhere to some politically uncontroversial anchor without being 
washed away in the ebb of the decline of penal welfarism in particular and universal 
normativity in general.  In the case of risk-oriented imaginaries, the ideological 
function of risk minimisation is not connected with the task of reusing some 
endangered traditional value, but is a means to remedy their detachment from the 
pursuit of universal normativity. Notably, the exterior normativity approach is based 
on a closed normative vision: its boundaries are static and lack any interaction with 
other normative angles. Accordingly, the ideological use of risk can hardly provide a 
lively sphere of normative performance which might remedy the essential 
insufficiency of universal normativity within the imprisonment field, but tends to 
consolidate the detachment model. Just like the exterior normativity approaches 
applied within the liberal imaginaries, it results in normative closure in constructing 




iii. Re-creation of Isolated Normative Reality 
 
Apart from the ideological function of risk, the risk-oriented imaginaries of 
imprisonment also involve another type of normative performance that seeks to tame 
the impact of the detachment from universal normativity. Whereas any holistic 
perspective is abandoned in the risk approaches, this does not mean that the 
operational sphere of risk logic is entirely instrumentally constructed. On the 
contrary, risk imaginaries also manage to build their respective normative realities in 
those varied settings where risk logic takes concrete forms. 
 
For example, in the case of sex offender rehabilitation, we can notice that the risk-
oriented imaginaries have created a micro-world in which the norms and rules of 
behaviour and thinking-patterns are established in accordance with the particular end 
of risk management and are to a large extent detached from the broader moral 
concerns shared by members of civil society. What is characteristic of this world is 
that it not merely operates in these instrumentalist ways, but develops its own 
normative understandings about the nature of social (particularly gender) 
relationships, good/bad selves, negative/positive fantasies and proper/improper ways 
of solving personal problems. Notably, what is included in this corrective perspective 
reaches far beyond the commission of sex offences per se, and covers a broad range 
of the prisoner’s personal life and behaviour models. As one of the observers of the 
sex offender treatment programme commented, ‘[t]he exercises and techniques used 
to develop the crime cycle and relapse prevention plan aim ultimately at making 
offenders recognize that their criminal identity as sex offenders constitutes the pivot 
around which all other aspects of their personality revolve’ (Lacombe, 2008: 72). 
Thus the risk imaginary in effect establishes a particular moral universe, in which the 
structure of norms and values is governed by the essential goal of managing the 
deviant sexual impulse, effectively intervening in the ‘crime cycle’ and reducing the 
chances of the client’s relapse in her post-prison life.  
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The particular normative universe that is constructed in such risk-oriented 
imaginaries is, however, largely isolated from the moral forum of normal society. 
Whereas the latter is inherently diverse and plural under modern conditions, the risk-
centred vision is basically affirmative, static and coercive. This feature is revealed 
very well in the case of fantasy management which we discussed in the previous 
section. In the risk-centred perspective, the proper target and content of this very 
private sphere is defined in a very concrete way and the prisoners are trained to 
follow it and to alter their old patterns of thinking and generating fantasies.  Yet, as 
to the definition of the ‘correct’ fantasy pattern, there is no negotiable space because 
it does not take place in dialogue and interaction with different views and 
experiences, but on the basis of an instrumental understanding of the risk-reducing 
requirement.  
 
Obviously, if such a strategy works, it is mainly because it is employed within the 
isolated environment of the prison which facilitates the construction of its particular 
structure of norms and moral conceptions. This also explains the arbitrary aspect of 
such normative visions: they are not to be challenged within their operational 
boundaries. In this regard, the isolated normative realities that are constructed in risk-
oriented imaginaries of imprisonment are also closed ones. They are not only 
detached from the sphere of universal normativity, but are also even closed from 
each other, since no coherent perspective can be guaranteed if the establishment of 
those micro-normative universes is primarily the outcome of an attempt  to meet risk-
management goals in varied contexts. This characteristic of normative closure may 
be detected most clearly in cases where even the therapists themselves may not share 
the gender norms they are urging their clients to adopt: such norms only appear 
‘normal’ in the particular risk-obsessed settings and might easily turn out to be 
absurd outside the training programme and the trainee groups (Lacombe, 2008: 69). 
In this regard, this is a great limitation of such normative performances in responding 
productively to the predicament of universal normativity within the field of 
imprisonment.   
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V. Nihilism and Innovation: Conclusion 
  
The examination conducted in the previous section shows that the normative 
performance of the risk-oriented imaginaries under discussion has demonstrated the 
characteristics of normative closure. In the construction of their normative visions, 
the pursuit of a holistic perspective and universal normativity is dismissed; risk 
instead plays an ideological role while different sectors of the custodial system 
become the sites for various finite and isolated patterns of normative imaginaries to 
dominate. Under such a scheme, the opportunities of opening up to the pluralistic 
normative dynamics in the contemporary imprisonment field are quite limited. In fact, 
it remains relatively insensitive to the normative predicament of post-ideological 
incarceration and tends to normalise such moral insufficiency within the field.   
 
However, we also need to be reminded of the fact that these approaches to risk 
imaginaries are by no means single-dimensional.  The cases examined in this chapter 
may represent an influential trend within the current penal sphere, but the other 
possibilities are far from exhaustive. And they do not necessarily contribute to the 
nihilistic side of the normative reality constructed by the penological discourses.  
 
With regard to this point, the work of O’Malley (2004, 2008 & 2010) has provided a 
good deal of insight. In his exploration of the ‘uncertain promise’ of risk, O’Malley 
contends against any monolithic vision of risk and points out that the construction of 
risk occurred at differential historical settings and can involve quite diverse 
techniques, which makes its political implications rather complex and by no means 
unitary. In this perspective, risk techniques is not predetermined to reinforce a 
hegemonic suppressive scheme, but have great potentials for being employed in a 
‘more optimistic, socially inclusive and constructive fashion’ (O’Malley, 2010: 7). 
The case of the drug harm minimisation programme, which was discussed at length 
by the author (O’Malley, 2004 &2008), shows that the risk technique can be used to 
promote the social inclusion aim by introducing a ‘stakeholder politics’, which 
allows the interests and concerns of different parties affected by the harm of drug use 
to be reflected and acknowledged in the risk minimisation scheme. This stands in 
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stark contrast to the ‘war on drugs’ strategies, whose style of risk calculation is 
intimately tied up with vengeance and social exclusion.  
 
Importantly, in the perspective of O’Malley, what is currently in place in terms of 
risk practice is open to further innovation and ‘[t]he future can be invented’ (2008: 
455). The study on this issue, therefore, should abandon ‘fatalism’ and take its 
responsibility to consider the ‘promise’, as well as the problems, of risk. To pursue 
this end, O’Malley proposes the analytic framework of governmentality, which, as 
opposed to the grand theory approach, draws upon the existing intellectual and 
political resources, such as the existing rationales of risk construction, and 
emphasises what is feasible within their conditions. It works as a means of 
diagnosing the present, but not one that merely presents it as ‘bad’ or unavoidable, as 
it also forms the basis for revealing the potentials of alternatives and for 
(re)designing such alternatives (2008: 457).  And what is imperative in this 
undertaking is that it can be pursued in the direction of the ‘maximization of 
opportunities for contestation’, that is, it can become the resource for the 
development of alternative forms of governance that minimize domination (2008: 
456). In his study of the cases of risk practicing experiments, particularly the practice 
regarding the drug harm minimisation programme and restorative justice, O’Malley 
shows how his approach can enrich the understanding about the inventive and 
promising aspect of risk. For instance, the drug harm minimisation programme is 
found to be able to develop the neoliberal ‘stakeholder’ idea in favour of the purpose 
of social integration; and the restorative justice approach has the effect of 
challenging penal experts’ dominance in the definition of crime-related risks and 
promoting the status of layman’s judgement. Those approaches may have their own 
particular worrying and even dangerous aspects, yet the aim of the investigation is to 
identity and make use of their constructive elements through critical examination and, 
on the basis of that, shed light on feasible alternatives which attune to the prospects 
of minimised domination and which can contribute to a risk politics that is always 
open to revision and provocation (O’Malley, 2008). 
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O’Malley’s vision of risk also sets up a sound ground for supporting the endeavour 
of exploring the innovative potentials of risk-oriented imaginaries of imprisonment 
in terms of their normative performances. Based on it, we may well reject the 
pessimistic observation that those nihilistic patterns of normative performance as 
discussed above should constitute the single essential character of risk schemes 
governing the incarceration practice. On the one hand, the complexity and diversity 
in the field need to be adequately acknowledged so that those innovative and 
experimental developments can receive proper attention. On the other, it is important 
to revitalise the political debates about risk so that those innovative forms of risk 
imaginaries and practices can have the chance to gain broader recognition and to 
challenge the dominant paradigms. In this respect, O’Malley’s proposal for an open 
and ‘minimal domination’ framework of risk discourses is quite consistent with such 
ends.  
 
Additionally, O’Malley’s work contains rich insight as to ‘where’ to look for the 
inventive resources of risk experiments. As the cases discussed above indicate, the 
practices and innovations (like those initiating restorative justice experiment) in the 
peripheral sector of society can be as valuable resources as the officially mobilised 
prison reformations for the endeavour of exploring and realising the ‘promise’ of risk.  
 
In the overview of the imaginaries of managing risks to the prison and to prisoners, 
we have already noted that the risk-centred imaginaries also contain the potential to 
embrace a more inclusive and open-ended kind of normative construction. In that 
case, the risk language may prove to be able to incorporate the element of 
‘understanding’  into its operational scope and, more importantly, it may manifest the 
possibility of being hospitable and inclusive to those experiences which may not fit 
into the instrumentalist framework of risk control. The innovative part of this 
approach is that the risk management task can be fulfilled in tandem with the 
learning and recognition of prisoners’ emotional needs and the moral depth of their 
social experiences.
12
 The latter pursuit is by its nature an open and ongoing process: 
it needs to be based on continuous interaction with prisoners (and also ex-prisoners) 
                                                 
12
 See the relevant discussion in the overview section.  
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so that the risks they face can be comprehended more accurately. The insight gained 
in the process can, in turn, contribute to broadening the normative understanding of 
the realm of imprisonment.   
  
Though it is too early to anticipate that such a reflexive-learning process of risk 
construction will certainly produce the needed insight for improving the normative 
performance within the contemporary imprisonment field, it does display some 
valued qualities that are lacking in the criminogenic-need approach. As we have seen, 
in the latter case ‘risk’ and prisoners’ ‘needs’ are only connected in an external way; 
‘needs’ only get acknowledged when they are endorsed by ‘risk’ management 
objectives and their normative depth is markedly impoverished. In comparison, it 
may be envisaged that the former pattern of normative construction could be more 
productive and promising.  
 
This observation may also be extended to the more general sphere of the normative 
performances of risk-oriented imaginaries. As can be noted, the nihilistic patterns of 
these normative performances are often associated with the approaches to risk 
construction which separate the major beneficiaries and the targets of risk control. 
The type of risk imaginary that prioritises the incapacitation function of 
imprisonment is a typical example in this respect. In such cases, there is a very slim 
normative connection between prisoners and the sources of power which determine 
the goal of risk minimisation. As a result, the whole risk scheme is imposed on its 
target as an external force and is totally in lacking in communication. Such a strategy 
undoubtedly enhances the closed character of the normative reality that it coercively 
constructs. In the other situation, when prisoners are both the targets and the 
beneficiaries of the risk management scheme, it becomes easier to establish an 
interactive relationship between the prisoners and the agent who learns from them to 
decide the pertinent risk reduction measures. Accordingly, there are also more 
opportunities for exploring the multiple moral implications of risk construction.  
 
Apart from the above case, there are also other differences in constructing risks; for 
example, theories in risk studies have highlighted the difference between the 
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approach of ‘risk control’ and that of ‘risk management’ (Clear and Cadora, 2001; 
Hudson, 2003). They suggest that the latter approach, which recognises the 
uncertainty and inevitability of errors in risk situations, can better balance the various 
practices in treating offenders than the former approach which defines security as an 
absolute goal.  
 
In sum, these types of risk-construction are far from being exhaustive. When those 
innovative approaches gain more influence within the custodial sphere, we will be 
able to extend our examination to cover broader dynamics regarding the normative 





















So far we have investigated three representative forms of penal imaginaries about 
incarceration in the UK and examined their performances in the light of introspective 
normativity. On this basis we are now in a position to seek some more general views 
of the contemporary field of penal imaginaries that we have studied and also to shed 
light on the major research questions raised at the very beginning of the thesis. This 
thus constitutes the main task of the present chapter. 
 
We will try to identity some general attributes of contemporary penal imaginaries in 
the imprisonment field in terms of their nihilistic and innovative aspects in relation to 
normative performance. Following this discussion, we aim to illuminate a number of 
key factors relating to the quality and character of normative performance within the 
sphere of penal imaginaries and, on that basis, to find clues to a future which is more 
capable of openness, inclusiveness and normative innovation with regard to ways of 
conceiving incarceration and realising such visions: a future informed by a vibrant 
cosmopolitan spirit and marked by success in transforming the post-universalist 
penal dilemma into a creative sphere.  
 
 
II. Escaping from Being Normative: Assessing the Contemporary Imaginaries 
of Imprisonment in the UK 
 
In the last three chapters, we have applied the analytical approach articulated above 
to probe into three representative bodies of penal imaginaries about incarceration in 
the UK. They have provided the major grounds for us to assess the general 
performance of introspective normativity in this field.  
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This section will first summarise the findings of those three chapters and then try to 
advance an integral perspective for identifying some of the common dispositions of 
those representative imaginaries and investigate their implications for the normative 
performances in the current imprisonment field.  
 
 
i. Liberal Imaginaries of Imprisonment 
 
In Chapter 3 we examined various approaches of the contemporary liberal 
imaginaries in dealing with the imprisonment complex. In sum, the liberal 
imaginaries have been directly affected by the loss of faith in penal welfarism, which 
is viewed by us as the last universalist paradigm of penal ideals and which used to 
reflect the major normative consensus among the liberal elites and practitioners on 
managing the prison systems in the UK. Consequently they face a vacuum of 
universal normativity when trying to defend and develop the core values of the 
liberal tradition. Thus the normative performance of the contemporary liberal 
imaginaries is characterised by a notable struggle to acquire normative strength in a 
context where there is no support from any established allegiance on the ideal and 
purpose of imprisonment. Different strategies have been employed to pursue a 
revitalised normative vision of these contemporary liberal imaginaries. They include 
the exterior validity approach, the ‘limits’ acknowledgement approach, the cultural 
identity approach and the penal consumption approach.
1
  It has been observed that 
there is a prominent tendency within these contemporary liberal imaginaries  either 
to bring in external normative authorities to bear the burden of legitimising their 
central claims or relating them to some ‘realistic’ type of reasoning that implicitly 
acknowledges and somehow endorses the fundamental absence of any realisable 
utopian vision regarding the ideals of carceral practice. As a result, the vacuum of 
univeralist normativity is consolidated and neutralised; the question concerning how 
the deprivation of liberty from individual members of the society and the imposition 
                                                 
1
 See the discussion of each specific strategy in Chapter 3.   
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of large-scale custodial measures on disadvantaged social groups can be morally 
justified becomes unanswerable or is directed into other discursive spheres (e.g. 
human rights, European values, ‘Scandinavian’ penal culture) which provide 
standards for the procedural aspects of imprisonment rather than the fundamental 
rationales which buttress its existence per se. Those strategies thus in effect 
disconnect the focus of the contemporary normative visions from the predicament of 
the post-welfarist penal field and all the puzzles and uncertainties related to it, while 
forwarding various alternatives to the essential task of confronting the perplexing 
circumstances of normativity directly. This position can be viewed as a retreat from 
seeking an ultimate ‘response’ to the normative challenge in the imprisonment field, 
and by doing so it creates a detachment from the ongoing antagonisms in the 
custodial realm, as well as in its corresponding socio-political dimension, where the 
concrete normative realities need to be identified, represented and developed 
innovatively at the discursive level. As our investigation demonstrates, the 
contemporary liberal imaginaries tend to cause a considerable degree of normative 
closure and block the potentialities for approaching the normative realities and 
developing their perspectives in open and creative interaction with them.   
 
On the other hand, the transformation of these liberal imaginaries from their 
conventional allegiance to a single, universalist modern project (as expressed in the 
rehabilitative paradigm) to the increasingly recognised awareness of ‘limits’ has 
made possible the endeavour to approach the imprisonment field in a non-ideology-
oriented way and to re-assess the liberal doctrines and penological perspectives 
according to that perspective. It also means that there is a potential for innovating 
and re-normalising liberal imaginaries if they are directed towards embracing the 
pluralistic, and often troubling, aspects of the realities in the present custodial sphere 
instead of sticking to the fashion of normative closure, as has been shown above.  
 
ii. Populist Imaginaries of Imprisonment 
 
These imaginaries represent one of the prominent trends within the current penal 
spectrum of the UK and are viewed by many as negative and detrimental to the civic 
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order of the country. In Chapter 4 we have examined the major representations of 
these populist imaginaries and the critical societal backdrop associated with their 
dominion. The study shows that populist imaginaries are deeply against the 
monopoly of discourses by the ‘formal’ approaches to exercising carceral power. 
They involve a crucial aspect of criticising and defying the official discourses and 
patterns of imagining prisons, which they deem to be ‘out of touch’ and to reflect the 
prejudices and weak moral sensitivities of penal elites and academics. However, in 
their attempts to establish the visions of prison which are in accordance with 
‘healthy’ public sentiments and opinions, there is a notable inclination to adopt 
readily-available stereotypes, simplified images and instigating slogans as widely 
used tactics to generate normative understanding about issues related to prisons. As a 
result, these populist imaginaries have depicted a rather fixed picture regarding a 
broad range of the custodial phenomena, such as the environment and daily routines 
in the prison, the typical characters of inmates and staff and the plausible purpose of 
imprisonment. In effect they also fuel a particular tough and punitive standpoint of 
responding to the incidents and reformative proposals within the custodial sphere, 




It turns out that these populist imaginaries should not be simply understood as being 
led by a ‘lack of judgement’ or the blind revengeful emotions of the public. Instead, 
they seem to demonstrate their own sensitivity to the particular circumstances that 
have been characterised by the absence of normative certainty in the custodial realm. 
In the meantime, they also have minimum confidence in the ability of the official 
system to address this essential vacuum. In many populist visions, what signifies the 
failure of the formal criminal justice system and its representative intellectuals is not 
only their arrogance in their interactions with the ‘lay’ public and community 
members, but more importantly their dubious indifference to the moral aspect of their 
tasks. It is perceived that what should fall within the domain of public participation 
and debate as a comprehensive moral issue have been monopolized by a small elite 
group who claim a professional (and a-moral) approach to taking care of it. But there 
are great limitations in the ways in which these populist imaginaries seek to settle the 
                                                 
2
 See more discussion about the performance and social dynamics of populist imaginaries in Chapter 4.  
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normative predicament. In the first place, their conceptual tools are primarily non-
reflexive. Thus in the attempt to grasp and express the normative realities within the 
custodial sphere they tend to cling to a fixed set of assumptions rather than keeping 
themselves open to the diverse facets of the puzzles and struggles that characterise 
the intricate status quo of the contemporary imprisonment complex. Eventually, the 
‘commonsensical’ and ‘rough morality’ approach which is employed in the populist 
imaginaries does achieve some degree of certainty in determining what the normative 
orientation of imprisonment should be. But this certainty is at best a collective 
psychological certainty, rather than a normative certainty, because they in fact have 
already closed any access to approaching and interacting with authentic moral 
performance within the custodial realm by restricting their perspectives to some 
static ideas and cliché-oriented opinions. 
 
In spite of the nihilistic side of populist imaginaries, it is important to recognise that 
they do reveal the intrinsic need to seek a vibrant moral basis for the crucial 
operation of penal power in places such as prisons. If the formal custodial system 
fails to provide such resources, it cannot help curbing the rise of the more reactive 
ways of seeking them. Moreover, the examination of the case of populism has also 
indicated that there is a potential for overcoming the normative predicament through 
the constructive process of democratising the penal field. The present situation of the 
populist imaginaries turns out to be close-ended and unsatisfactory; to fully resolve 
the inadequacy of elite-dominated normativity, they need to figure out a more 
innovative and productive way of doing this.  
 
iii. Risk-oriented Imaginaries of Imprisonment 
 
In Chapter 5, we have explored the risk-oriented imaginaries which have become a 
potent trend in the management of prisons as well as of many other public sectors. 
We find that the risk logic has penetrated into various levels of the custodial systems 
and has mediated many of the traditional patterns of activities in and related to the 
prison. For example, the understanding of the functional goals of prison and its 
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concrete operations, such as rehabilitating prisoners, become subject to the risk-
centred rationales and thus get re-defined and re-organised.  
 
However, our study also suggests that risk-orientated imaginaries are not at all 
‘value-free’ as they appear to be. In contrast, they are involved in a variety of 
patterns of normative construction which are rather sophisticated but which have 
concrete normative implications. They comprise strategies which trivialise the claims 
of holistic normative perspectives and subordinate them to restrictedly defined 
normative systems which are conditional in nature and case-specific for certain pre-
established ‘risk’ contexts. Apart from that, they routinely use ‘risk’ as an ideological 
shelter so that the target of risk reduction and minimisation is endorsed naturally as a  
prerequisite to the detriment of any other substantive normative concerns. Finally, 
the risk-oriented imaginaries are connected with a very diverse set of types of praxis 
in the custodial systems and in general they lack an integral and coherent rationale. 
In each specific practical domain managed by the risk logic, however, they usually 
give rise to a certain normative structure which contains a hierarchy of norms and 
standards for guiding and evaluating practices within this particular risk-penetrated 
sphere. Accordingly, the risk-oriented imaginaries have established their own 
normative visions. The features of such normative pursuits can be described as 
fragmentary and divergent. The sphere of universal and holistic normativity is 
basically exiled to a state of oblivion under the guise of risk-prioritised normativity. 
3
      
                              
Thus the risk-oriented imaginaries provide a distinctive approach to the task of 
responding to the post-welfarist normative predicament. But they are also rather 
limited in expressing and developing the dimension of normativity within the 
contemporary imprisonment field, for they are intrinsically self-referential and 
closed-ended and can hardly enable any constructive and productive interaction with 
the authentic situation regarding the puzzling aspects of current custodial practise. 
Yet we also notice the fact that in maintaining the effective operation of risk 
practices within the prison regime, this approach requires a certain degree of 
understanding of the inmates’ needs and thus often engenders a process of interaction 
                                                 
3
 See more details about the normative performance of risk-oriented imaginaries in Chapter 5.  
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and reflexive assessment of its undertakings. Consequently, the normative 
construction involved in risk imaginaries cannot be entirely isolated from the 
concrete realities that enter into their reflexive diameters on a routine basis. For 
example, as we have noted in our study, the risk-management scheme which aims to 
reduce the risks posed to prisoners and the prison itself can also create an interactive 
space between inmates, staff and policy-makers and generate some first-hand and 
intimate understandings of the relations and real needs of the people involved. From 
this perspective, the risk-oriented imaginaries can be considered as containing the 
potential of becoming innovative resources for the normative endeavour within the 
imprisonment field.   
 
iv. Handicapped Normativity: Outlining the Challenge of Imprisonment Imaginaries 
 
The penal imaginaries that we have explored in the last three chapters are among the 
most representative ones within the custodial sphere. On the basis of these studies, 
we can now start to identify some common aspects of normative performances 
within the contemporary imprisonment field from a more holistic perspective. It is 
anticipated that such an investigation can also contribute to the task of meeting the 
challenges that are hermeneutically displayed in this general vision of introspective 
normativity.   
 
The various forms of the penal imaginaries discussed in our thesis have shown a 
rather divergent set of strategies in constructing their normative visions of the 
custodial phenomena, but most of them can be observed to involve a nihilistic aspect 
according to the introspective normativity assessment. The diversity in their ways of 
expressing and responding to the moral realities of the post-ideological custodial 
field does not remedy their essential weakness in fulfilling the task of innovatively 
overcoming the absence of any universal normativity. On the contrary, their 
approaches are basically oriented towards normative closure and in many cases are 
content with some self-referential discursive systems.  Thus there is scarcely any 
space within them for getting in touch with the dynamic realities of the custodial 
domain, especially in the light of its incoherent and ever-changing character which is 
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subject to and fragmented by antagonism, compromise and intercommunication 
between pluralistic normative orientations and the societal forces that buttress them. 
This normative closure identified as such does not only manifest the crucial 
impotence of those approaches at the technical or strategic level, but is itself a 
constitutive element of the status quo of the normative spectrum regarding the 
contemporary custodial regimes in the UK. It signifies the deep division in the 
normative foundations of the exercising of carceral power and the lack of any viable 
moral resources for redefining and justifying the purposes of its operation. Moreover, 
the strategies of those penal imaginaries that have the effect of neutralising or even 
concealing this profound lack of universal normativity also indicate a noticeable 
inclination to ‘escape’ from the task of being normative. We have seen many 
concrete examples of this in the preceding discussion. The risk-oriented imaginaries 
can be  observed to engage in organising various ‘isolated’ normative spaces with the 
risk logic as their ideological shelter; the populist imaginaries stick to their ‘rough’ 
morality and find their  certainties in the repetitive representations in the mass media, 
whereas the liberal imaginaries build their normative claims on external discursive 
systems or merely come to terms with the decline of any utopian visions and 
aspirations in their pursuit of the improving of the custodial system.
4
 As a result, the 
inherent call for the re-normalising of the exercise of carceral power in the post-
welfarist phase is either bypassed or substituted by something else in different ways 
within those imaginaries. This suggests a more profound predicament than the lack 
of universal normativity per se. To ‘escape’ from the struggles and uncertainties 
within the normative sphere of imprisonment means that those approaches also give 
up their intrinsic ambition to grasp and improve the realities of the custodial sphere, 
for such realities cannot be appropriately addressed by any technical terms or 
externally articulated explanatory schemes, but are intimately associated with the 
performance of introspective normativity in the ways in which they are imagined and 
are being realised in concrete praxis. Without active participation in the exploring, 
                                                 
4
 It is noteworthy that in order to achieve a general assessment we have to omit some of the specific 
types of imaginaries discussed in the last three chapters, particularly those that we find contain 
potentials for normative innovation. The generalisation we make here does not imply that the 
‘escaping from being normative’ is a defining feature of the current imaginaries of imprisonment; it is 
instead treated as indicative of an overwhelming tendency in them which we capture on the basis of 
summarising studies of each of the specific strands of penal imaginaries.   
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re-discovering and re-defining of the normative dimension and remaining  open to its 
development, we can only anticipate a handicapped normativity, which is far from 
being able to meet the challenges posed by the present incarceration complex. 
 
In the methodological chapter (Chapter 2), we have elaborated four ideal types for 
understanding the dynamics of introspective normativity as it is performed in 
different penal imaginaries. They include the patterns of ‘detachment’, ‘oblivion’, 
‘confrontation’ and ‘transformation’. The former two patterns have been exposed as 
having a noteworthy nihilistic facet in dealing with the absence of universal 
normativity, as they tend to shrug away the burden of normalising penal practice 
rather than seeking an authentic response to such deeply perplexing aspects of penal 
realities. In our assessment of the three representative imaginaries of imprisonment, 
such patterns can be observed to be immanent in many cases in spite of the great 
variations in specific ways of employing them.
5
 From this perspective, the limitation 
of those approaches and the handicapped nature of the normativity they represent are 
also clear.   
 
As for the two innovative patterns of normative performance, we have not yet found 
any examples of systemic approaches in penal imaginaries. But the hermeneutics of 
introspective normativity, which forms the primary task of our thesis, may have 
manifested itself to be able to pave the way for their realisation. By exposing the 
nihilistic patterns of the normative performance within the extant approaches to 
imagining imprisonment, this effort facilitates the nurturing of the consciousness 
which is keen to confront the normative challenges in the imprisonment field in an 
authentic way and to reject the easy answers offered by those counterproductive 
approaches. In doing so, it also helps to clear the ground for the possible innovative 
‘transformations’ to take place.  Therefore, the examination based on the idea of 
introspective normativity should be understood as intimately associated with the 
endeavour of normative innovation in the imprisonment field and as opposed to that 
which confines itself to the pursuit of neutral ‘scientific’ knowledge. 
 
                                                 
5
 See the examples and the relevant analysis in each of the chapters discussing concrete forms of penal 
imaginaries.  
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If we recall the social-historical hermeneutics which we discussed on the basis of 
interpreting Durkheim’s works, we may find that it fulfils a crucial normative task in 
exposing the moral realities within the traditional symbolic systems (such as 
religions) because, while it succeeds in transmitting such realities hermeneutically to 
an audience who adhere to those conventional moral sources, it also accomplishes 
the task of re-building these realities in an innovative (rational) form and thus also 
developing them. In contrast, our study aims to capture a rather different sort of 
normative realities in the case of the incarceration field. They have a more pluralistic 
character and can hardly be conceived of as a coherent whole. More importantly, our 
examination also seeks to direct our attention to the ‘null’ aspect of the normative 
spectrum (i.e. it focuses on the dynamics related to ‘incompleteness’ and ‘absence’: 
the absence of universal normativity, the absence of competent successor of holistic 
penal paradigms, etc); this appears to be contrary to Durkheim’s search for ‘what is 
real’ in seemingly illusionary symbolic systems. However, in the respect of pushing 
forwards the normative understandings and normative performances within the 
society (as in the imprisonment field), our study has the same effect as the former 
approach. By revealing the nihilistic aspect of the normative reality within the prison 
systems, we also shed light on their inherent need to re-normalise the ways in which 
imprisonment is imagined. In the following section, we will probe into some of the 
relevant topics which are crucial to this task.   
 
III. Re-normalising Imaginaries of Imprisonment: Social Conditions and 
Innovative Approaches 
 
It is worth noting that the normative performance of penal imaginaries does not refer 
exclusively to the discursive domain, but is intrinsically an issue that is rooted in 
comprehensive social dynamics. The task of  overcoming the nihilistic aspects of 
these imaginaries of imprisonment and  re-normalising them is never confined to a 
paradigm change within the abstract realm of ‘ideas’ and ‘notions’, but should be 
viewed as achievable only through a more holistic transformation within the socio-
political dimension which is indispensable to the configuration of the imaginary 
landscape of imprisonment. 
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In the previous chapters, we have already noted the particular societal backdrop of 
each of the specific approaches in the construction of penal imaginaries and have 
incorporated them into our discussion. It is clear to us that the performances of those 
penal imaginaries are all realised in concrete social settings. In this respect, the 
tendency to try to escape from being normative is also deeply connected with some 
of the key attributes of the social dynamics concerning the circumstances of custodial 
practice. In the previous chapters we have touched on some of the socio-political 
facets of each of these types of penal imaginaries and on this basis we will make a 
further effort to shed light on some general aspect of the social conditions that are 
correlated with the performance of introspective normativity within the 
imprisonment field. The aim of this investigation is not to establish a cause and effect 
relationship between them, but rather to establish a broader context for pursuing the 
task of re-normalising the imaginaries of imprisonment. If such an undertaking can 
engender any fruitful results, instead of restricting itself to the cognitive realm, it 





i. Social Conditions Correlated with Nihilistic Introspective Normativity 
 
In our examination of the three representative imaginaries of imprisonment, we have 
found that they are all characterised by a certain degree of normative closure. This 
was observed as co-existing with different types of relative segregation of the 
primary audiences and advocates of specific penal imaginaries in the society, 
especially in terms of their relationship to the population sectors which are most 
targeted by the carceral power of the state. The risk-oriented imaginaries, for 
example, mainly apply an instrumentalist logic to define the functional goal of the 
prison, and in many respects give rise to a ‘governance-in-a-distance’: the individual 
characters of those who are subject to it tend to be marginalised in its gaze and its 
                                                 
6
 On the other hand, the ultimate end of the renormalisation of penal imaginaries is nothing but an 
attempt to make meaningful interventions in the existing custodial practices with a view to creating a 
better situation and set of arrangements which is underpinned by vibrant representations of the moral 
realities that are being developed in the society.  
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collective categories become the major target of risk calculation and management. 
Accordingly, there is scarcely any space for active interaction with inmates (and even 
with prison staff), for in the risk schemes they are nothing more than passive subjects, 
whose ‘needs’ are defined and acknowledged only in accordance with the end of risk 
reduction. Their own idiosyncrasies cannot play any significant role in establishing 
the normative visions in the risk-oriented imaginaries, since they are basically 
excluded from the sphere of normative construction and reflexion. In the case of 
populist imaginaries, we also noted the paradoxical isolation of the ‘punitive’ public. 
Its members (or the audience/consumers of populist accounts of prisons) are far from 
being well organised and capable of taking effective actions collectively, but are 
mainly separate and powerless individuals who find no other way of living with their 
deep perception of insecurity than resorting to ‘tougher’ measures as a response to 
the imprisonment circumstances depicted in tabloid newspapers.
7
 The presentation of 
prisoners as strangers and monsters in the populist imaginaries thus reflects the deep 
segregation between the public and the group of people who are most targeted by the 
custodial systems, as well as the segregation between the audience/consumers of 
such imaginaries. As for the liberal imaginaries, what is at stake is the puzzling status 
of liberal penologists and academics within the imprisonment field. The contrast 
between the expanding academic sectors in universities (most of whom tend to 
embrace the liberal penal values as broadly defined in this thesis) and their actual 
influence in the policy-making realm has nowadays received widespread notice and 
engendered extensive debates.
8
  This may also be viewed as a signal that active 
interaction of the liberal imaginaries with the practical sector, as well as with the 
‘punitive’ public, is rather restricted.  
 
The most problematic side of the social situations concerning the performance of 
introspective normative approaches, however, is connected with the segregation and 
exclusion of the contemporary disadvantaged groups within the society. In the 
overview section of Chapter 1, we have remarked on the over-representation of those 
members of the population who are often thought of as the ‘urban underclass’ and 
the ethnic minorities. Most of them are unemployed, have not received a university 
                                                 
7
 See the analysis of the socio-psychology of the populist audience in Cheliotis (2010).  
8
 For example, see the discussion in Loader and Sparks (2010).  
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education and are suffering from psychological disorders at different levels. Apart 
from such disadvantages, they are mostly marginalised from the society and are not 
recognised as fully competent ‘citizens’.
9
 This not only engenders the problem 
regarding structural inequality and the material sociological consequences within the 
society, but it also has a profound impact on the sphere of normative performances in 
the contemporary imaginaries of imprisonment. Because the groups that are the main 
targets of custodial measures are rendered powerless and are mostly silent within the 
discursive forum, this tends to enhance the monistic disposition of the mainstream 
penal imaginaries. They do not seek to understand those who stand on the opposite 
side and instead find satisfaction in articulating a single-dimensional account of what 
purposes the prison should serve. Thus the normative realities in this field are only 
partially constructed; and without any effective interaction with the ‘strangers’ who 
are directly affected by carceral institutions, all the mainstream penal imaginaries 
lose a significant reflexive dimension: they cannot have any authentic relationship 
with the others (whose truths has been established in advance by their already-
established stereotypes or ‘logic’ in understanding their ‘needs’ and ‘problems’) and 
as a result they are left with an impoverished normativity. The tendency of ‘escaping 
from being normative’ in fact reflects their powerlessness to achieve normative 
innovation, which can be viewed as closely linked with this peculiar social-structural 
situation. Therefore, we may suggest that re-normalising the imaginaries of 
imprisonment is a task that should be pursued along with the de-segregating of the 
custody-targeted social groups; the overcoming of normative closure is inherently 
connected with a revitalising interaction between the mutually segregated social 
spheres and with the fight against exclusion at a social-structural level.  
 
ii. Re-normalising the Mainstream Forms of Imaginaries in the Imprisonment Field 
 
As we showed above, the task of re-normalising the imaginaries of imprisonment 
must be interactively embedded in the enterprise of bringing innovative changes to 
                                                 
9
 See our discussion in Chapter 1 (II.ii), and see also Vaughan’s (2000a) discussion on punishment 
and ‘conditional citizenship’ and Bauman’s (2000 & 2002) analysis of the relationship between 
‘underclass’ and consumer society.  
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the material social circumstances relating to the normative predicament within the 
custodial sphere. For each specific approach to constructing the normative 
understanding of imprisonment, it needs to fully acknowledge and face the nihilistic 
dilemma which is identified in its introspective construction of the normative 
realities of imprisonment, and to seek innovative ways to break through the 
normative closure which jeopardises its effective communication with the suppressed 
but living realities in the field which are usually associated with the experiences and 
perspectives of those who are amenable to incarceration and severe social exclusion. 
Accordingly, modifications can be made at the conceptual level and in the meantime 
may result in particular reforms in the practical arena with a view to a better 
recognition of the different strands of moral realities as well as the authentic needs of 
those people who are involved in the exercise of carceral power. In return, such 
modifications, whether they are comprehensive or merely restricted to specific 
matters, can be envisaged as  leading to further exposure and development of the 
moral domain regarding imprisonment.  The interactive process can thus serve as a 
motivating mechanism for the pursuit of a re-normalised scheme regarding the 
operation of the carceral systems. It is quite possible that the established boundaries 
of the specific approaches to the penal imaginaries are subject to redefinition as well, 
as they become more open to other perspectives. The puzzles regarding the deeply 
divergent and fragmented normative landscapes within the imprisonment sphere can 
also be dealt with in a more constructive way.  
 
In this perspective, each of the specific forms of penal imaginaries can be viewed as 
containing the potential for innovative development in terms of their normative 
performance. In the case of liberal imaginaries, for example, the challenge lies in the 
attempt improve their connections with the general public as well as the custody-
targeted social groups. The latter are usually treated as the objects of sympathy or 
else as co-operators and passive interviewees in ethnographic studies of incarceration, 
while the former are taken as the containers of blind vengeful emotions. This mutual 
segregation renders it impossible for the liberal imaginaries to revitalise the moral 
realities to which they adhere. However, as we sought to show earlier, they tend to 
recognise the limits of their conventional paradigm based on the rehabilitative ideal 
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as a single universal solution to the task of the imprisonment complex. This 
particular consciousness may serve as the starting point for initiating such innovation 
by virtue of their normative performances.  
 
As for the populist imaginaries, the key challenge for them is to transform their 
primary means of constituting and expressing consensual views about the prison in a 
more constructive and authentic direction. The abandonment of the partial and 
stereotypical patterns in their normative performance needs to be accomplished  
along with a  structural change in their ‘populist’ audience and progress in building a 
more meaningful relationship between them and the stigmatised ‘underclass’ social 
sectors. As we discussed in Chapter 4, the mass media forum is by nature a site for 
heterogeneous representations of social realities and it is by no means monopolized 
by a single strand of imaginaries of imprisonment. There is, as a matter of fact, a 
good source of representations and reflections of the people and the forms of life 
which fall outside the mainstream social order and which are affected most severely 
by the exercise of the carceral systems. They include the various works of 
independent film directors, writers, stand-up comedy shows and academic 
publications. Though their influence in terms of the ideology of ‘populism’ is not 
comparable with the dominant imaginaries about imprisonment, they nonetheless 
present challenging perspectives which may potentially lead to the transformation of 
populist views of prisons and prisoners. More importantly, such a transformation 
should not only aim at a static change in the ‘picture’ of imprisonment in the public 
mentality, but should also seek to shed reflexive light on the constitutive structure of 
the audience and the consumers of such imaginaries as well as their interrelationship 
with the segregated others, who have so far been treated mostly as the passive object 
of ‘policy changes’, whether such changes are in their interest or not. In other words, 
to effectively re-normalise the current populist imaginaries of imprisonment it is 
necessary in the meantime to motivate the reconfiguration of the ‘audience’ and the 
dynamics of forming and expressing a ‘democratic’ voice on how to treat the 
imprisonment issue, and also to re-invent the relationship between the mainstream 
society and the custody-vulnerable populations. The cognitive content of such re-
normalised ‘populist’ imaginaries can only come to life when it is genuinely 
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correlated with and interacts with what is concretely going on and giving rise to a 
reshaping of the legal-political statuses of and mutual recognition between those 
different social sectors. On the other hand, the re-normalised ‘populist’ imaginaries 
should never be satisfied with developing a new ‘picture’ of the ideal state of prisons; 
instead they must understand the inherent ‘incompleteness’ at the core of their task, 
and try to bear this ‘incompleteness’ and bring it into their concrete encounters with 
those people who have more intimate experiences of incarceration but who lack the 
discursive power to bring their experiences into the light of public awareness.  
 
On the basis of this idea, it is worthwhile to identify a number of reformative 
propositions that may serve as initiating strategies to facilitate such progress. Firstly, 
a broader discursive forum needs to be established to allow intensive dialogue and 
interaction between those who are routinely segregated by different statuses within 
the existing social material and symbolic systems. This task does not only include 
that of transmitting more voices and ‘points of views’ of the marginal and the 
‘underclass’ to the mass mediated domains, but, more importantly, is about creating 
sufficient mundane occasions and opportunities for communal political and socio-
economic engagement across those divided social sectors. For example, in the case 
of initiating a significant policy change in custodial institutions (e.g. the decision as 
to whether to hand over inmates at multiple prisons in England to some privately 
owned and managed enterprise), this should not be taken merely as a bureaucratic 
issue to be decided following established examples (like those custodial institutions 
which have been privatised already), or as an issue to be settled exclusively through 
the routine parliament-democratic procedures. Instead, the decision-making must 
also make audible the voices of those who are affected most considerably – not only 
the specific inmate groups who are subject to the possible transmission, but also their 
family members, other close relatives, local connections and those ‘underclass’ and 
ethnic communities whose members either serve their sentences in prisons (including 
privatised ones) or face a high probability of suffering such a fate. This discursive 
expansion per se, apart from its role in generating greater legitimacy in prison 
policies, would be a meaningful step towards promoting encounters with the 
irreducible existence of those strangers whose images are presented as less 
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stereotyped. Despite the fact that such encounters are easily subject to distortion 
caused by the fixed imaginaries on both sides, such occasions might not be entirely 
fruitless in the sense of putting into question the unilaterally elaborated images and 
developing people’s skills in confronting strangeness and being open to the 
knowledge and the living experiences of the suppressed. Very likely, the process 
would engender encounters between varied forms of discourses as well, since the 
suppressed and the other cannot be fully represented if their voices are framed within 
the routine forms of reasoning and the strategies of advocacy that are expressed in 
the mainstream media. It thus can be envisaged that many sub-cultural tactics of 
presenting the visions of the formerly segregated may actively enter the discursive 
forum. They are no longer such constrained forms as those defined from the 
perspective of correctional institutions or of academic interviewers, but are in 
accordance with the subject’s own motivation for expression and recognition. Indeed, 
the whole process may turn out to be more complicated and more challenging than 
even the most liberally-oriented deliberation approaches that have been practiced so 
far in reaching a consensus in terms of prison matters and its outcome will never be 
immune from uncertainty. Nevertheless, it is vital - and indeed indispensable - to the 
renewal and re-normalisation of the performance of the current penal imaginaries in 
the populist spectrum, if the pursuit aims to achieve anything meaningful.  
 
Secondly, apart from the effort to broaden the discursive forum, it is also meaningful 
to create more occasions which will necessitate communication and negotiation 
between separated social sectors in terms of ‘action-together’.   This is because such 
discursive encounters with ‘strangers’ can rarely be productive if they are taken as an 
abstract-cognitive matter alone. What falls short in this case is the motivation factor, 
without which the discursive progress is doomed to be impoverished. The concrete 
needs of taking communal actions and striving for a shared end can thus serve as the 
unique catalyst for nurturing an innovative milieu which might transform the 
conventional imaginaries of imprisonment of mainstream society. To create 
occasions for ‘action-together’ between the populist audience and the alienated 
others may include a diversity of options. For example, the programmes of prisoners’ 
engagement in community service and the exhibition of inmates’ artworks have 
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already been carried out by some of the custodial institutions in the UK.
10
 Yet the 
critical part of this ‘action-together’ is that sufficient interactive space should be 
secured to enable genuine engagement and interaction between the public and the 
often-imagined-but-rarely-contacted strangers: those who are or were detained and 
their fellows and family members. In this respect, community-oriented prison 
programmes still have extensive innovating possibilities.  
 
The examples discussed above mainly concern the initiatives related to the 
reformation of imprisonment practice. However, to re-normalise the current populist 
imaginaries it is even more important to extend the endeavour to a broader social 
policy spectrum. As we have manifested in chapter 4, the populist dynamics have 
profound structural roots in the interactive patterns of the mass media, its major 
audience and the silent ‘others’. Thus to promote an effective transformation of 
populist penal imaginaries, the ‘encounter’ and ‘action-together’ with strangers need 
to take place at multiple and diversified social-interactive spheres rather than 
revolving around specific prison issues. The imaginaries of imprisonment would 
transform accordingly as the encounter and action-together with ‘strangers’ produce 
an innovative milieu for the populist audience and the marginalised social groups to 
renew the comprehension of each other (and themselves) and to redefine their social 
relationship on the basis of that.  
 
The requirement of embedding normative innovation within more vibrant interactive 
and communicative relations between different social spheres also concerns the risk-
oriented imaginaries. The normative closure in those isolated models of risk 
reduction can only be properly addressed when their practice can manage to integrate 
the heterogeneous realities concerning the living experiences of those who fall into 
their contact. In sum, the innovative re-normalisation of those different types of 
penal imaginaries has to be realised in accordance with the reduction of social 
segregation and the promotion of effective communication and mutual recognition 
between perspectives based on diverse moral realities.  
 
                                                 
10
 For example, ‘insider art’ was exhibited in Gallery North in Northumbria University, and it formed 
part of the programmes in the British Criminology Society Annual Conference in 2011.   
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It is also noteworthy that the prospects of such re-normalisation are not yet 
conspicuous. This is because in essence it is concerned with a longitudinal process of 
development involving not only shifts in values and ideas, but also a re-arrangement 
and re-definition of the realities in the imprisonment field. Thus the task is by nature 
a dynamic one and is subject to continuous renewals. Nevertheless, it is not 
meaningless to identify the crucial social conditions and the critical factors in 
relation to this pursuit, as the adequate understanding of them is indispensable to its 
ultimate realisation. 
 
On the other hand, as the exposure of inadequate ways of addressing the absence of 
universal normativity within the mainstream imaginaries of imprisonment has 
indicated some similar patterns in terms of introspective mechanisms and social 
conditions, it tends to urge us to find a set of relatively consistent normative grounds 
as the gross premise of and guidance for the innovating efforts advocated above. It 
becomes necessary not because it in advance prescribes substantive norms for 
establishing ‘ideal’ prison systems, but because it serves to alert us to what is not 
legitimate and what is not constructive in conceptualising the imprisonment sphere 
and in framing the social relationships between different groups and identities. In a 
sense, it is given the task of making us aware of the absence of universal normativity 
and at the same time rejecting false substitutes and counterproductive social 
arrangements.  As a peculiar ‘night-watchman’, this prerequisite normative guidance 
would then be capable of clearing the ground for some decisive normative innovation 
which would be potent enough to justify the future direction of reforms in the sphere 
of incarceration.  
 
In the current circumstances, such a role can be best assumed by an enriched 
cosmopolitanism. In fact, some of the criminologists from the liberal penological 
background have turned in a cosmopolitan direction in their critical refection on and 
criticisms of the current criminal justice systems.
11
 And it is not easy to draw a clear 
line between the liberal penal imaginaries and the cosmopolitan vision of penal 
practice. Yet, as we will show shortly, there are certain facets of cosmopolitanism 
                                                 
11
 Barbara Hudson is one of the examples, and we will discuss her ideas shortly.  
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which are particularly relevant to our undertaking of re-normalising the imaginaries 
of imprisonment; and they are worthy of a particular examination. 
 
IV. Normative Innovation in the Field of Imprisonment: An Enriched 
Cosmopolitan Imaginary 
 
i. Encountering Strangers in A Divided world: The Perspective of Cosmopolitanism 
 
There are a variety of versions of cosmopolitan theories in the contemporary 
academic literature (Moellendorf, 2002; Benhabib 2006; Habermas, 1999, etc). 
Despite the divergence in their specific ideas, they all attach great importance to the 
status of the strangers or ‘others’ in contemporary societies and just ways of treating 
them. In such perspectives, coexistence with strangers is acknowledged to be both 
prevalent and normal; it is then proposed to extend legal protection and social 
recognition to those who are not necessarily members of ‘our’ political and moral 
community. For many cosmopolitans, the exclusion of immigrants, ethnic minorities 
and underclass youths engenders huge gaps and inequalities within contemporary 
societies which cannot be justified, despite the fact that many of the excluded may be 
deemed ‘incompetent’ citizens by the designers and legislators of conventional 
liberal political regimes because they are either unwilling or unable to assume the 
‘duties’ of a qualified member of the community. From a cosmopolitan perspective, 
such moral differences should be tolerated at least and strangers should be treated 
with dignity and respect. The use of measures of exclusion, particularly incarceration, 
must be meticulously restricted; they are only justified when dangers to the society 
can truly be identified. For instance, authors like Barbara Hudson (2008) have 
levelled criticisms at the orthodox discursive models of criminal justice based on the 
‘while male subject’, and the use of incarceration as a means to contain ‘strangers’ 
and to maintain the conventional order and social structure. They instead advocate 




 In this perspective the existing relationship between the mainstream society 
and the ‘strangers’ it encounters needs to be completely revised. Tolerance and 
‘hospitality’ are proposed to take the place of requirements based on qualifications 
and identities. ‘Strangers’ are viewed as deserving hospitable treatment, despite the 
fact that their moral universes are quite distinct from ‘ours’ and are even beyond the 
reach of ‘us’. In this case, the application of custody is subject to harsh scrutiny even 
before it is delivered.  
 
What makes cosmopolitanism particularly relevant to our research is that it 
represents one of the keenest forms of consciousness of the divertive and pluralistic 
status quo of the normative landscape in the contemporary social settings. Moreover, 
it shows great concern for the conditions pertaining to the encounter with strangers. 
In this regard, cosmopolitanism stands out as opposed to some key shortcomings of 
the mainstream penal imaginaries. Its valuing of ‘hospitality’ towards strangers, 
when applied to the cases of prison-prone disadvantaged groups, can potentially 
remedy the social conditions that are connected with normative closure of the kind 
we identify in the mainstream imaginaries of imprisonment.  
 
Yet, for many people, cosmopolitanism has an unrealistic utopian colouring; even its 
advocates hardly bother to analyse the concrete scheme of actions which might lead 
to its realisation in the political and institutional realm, particularly with regard to the 
predicament we face in the contemporary imprisonment field. Therefore, like many 
other progressive perspectives, the cosmopolitan approach is susceptible to the 
accusation that it is largely detached from the real situations in society and that it is 
no more meaningful than an elusive dream. In this respect, our findings based on the 
examination of introspective normative can also contribute to developing the insights 
of progressive imaginaries by exposing and making effective their normative 
construction. In the case of the cosmopolitan imaginary, such an examination can 
help us to explore the possibility of concrete forms of co-existence with strangers and 
                                                 
12
 There are diverse resources from which these cosmopolitan ideas have sprung; some of them can be 
traced to philosophers in ancient Greece, like the Stoics, whereas Immanuel Kant's 1795 essay, 
‘Perpetual Peace: A Philosophical Sketch’ has been deemed the most representative and systematic 
articulation of the cosmopolitan ideal in the modern era.              
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may shed light on how the renewed moral realities can be achieved in the interactive 
process and what they may imply for the arrangement of carceral power.  
 
Therefore, an abstract theory of cosmopolitanism is not sufficient to remedy the 
problems within the imprisonment sphere. It must be enriched by following our 
approach of normative reflection and innovation in order to become a concrete and 
dynamic undertaking. Whereas a cosmopolitan conception of value is meaningful in 
helping us re-imagine the arrangement of carceral systems, it also serves the 
significant task of creating the cognitive and socio-political premises for innovating 
and re-normalising the contemporary custodial landscape.  
 
ii. The Cosmopolitan Imaginary of Imprisonment: Enriched in the Light of 
Introspective Normativity 
 
In this section, we will advocate some concrete proposals inspired by the idea of 
cosmopolitanism for dealing with the problems of imprisonment.  
 
In the first place, it is necessary to stress that cosmopolitanism alone is still not 
sufficient to serve as the ultimate ‘answer’ to the current normative predicament in 
the imprisonment field as it has been identified in our preceding analysis. The reason 
why we choose to highlight this approach, following our assessment of the three 
mainstream forms of penal imaginaries, is not because it is thought to be a 
substantive replacement of those mainstream approaches. As a matter of fact, as is 
suggested by our brief discussion above, the existing forms of cosmopolitan thought 
have mainly been developed by virtue of international or cross-cultural relationships. 
When it comes to the problems associated with ‘internal strangers’, those who are 
mostly segregated as the result of those socio-economic processes which are 
penetrated by the ‘market supremacy’ ideology, the full scope of cosmopolitanism 
has yet to be developed.
13
 In terms of penal policies and structural arrangements, 
                                                 
13
 With regard to the relationship between the primacy of neo-liberal strategies over welfarism and the 
governance of the socially disadvantaged population, see particularly the analysis of Wacquant (2009a 
& 2009b).  Unlike those ‘strangers’ who come from other cultures, the profile of the urban 
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cosmopolitanism is still at a tentative stage. There is much still to do for 
cosmopolitan theorists to uncover the ‘otherness’ of those who are convicted by  
official criminal justice systems which apply a highly homogeneous language 
characterised by formal uniformity. In this respect, what is needed is more concrete 
studies about and insight into how these suppressed identities, experiences and 
perspectives could attain appropriate recognition within the criminal justice 
procedure as well as in the correctional intuitional practices and how the entire 
system could be re-organised to meet such a requirement. From this point of view, as 
a substantive approach, cosmopolitanism still needs to be developed into a more 
mature and concrete position before it will be qualified to offer a substitute for the 
current mainstream forms of penal imaginaries.  
 
However, there is one more important reason why we should be cautious about 
taking cosmopolitanism directly as a readily available route for addressing the 
normative predicament within the imprisonment field. For what lies at the centre of 
this predicament, as we sought to demonstrate at length in the previous chapters, is 
not simply the rightness or wrongness of particular penal ideals, but the 
problematical status of introspective normativity within the post-universalist 
imprisonment field. If cosmopolitanism is taken as a set of established norms that are 
waiting to be applied to the under-enlightened penal sphere, then it is by no means 
immune from the vulnerability found in the mainstream forms of penal imaginaries. 
Adopting such an approach, cosmopolitanism can easily be transformed into a sort of 
essentialist normative system which is oriented to prescribing universal norms 
regardless of contexts. However, once it becomes a closed prescriptive system, 
cosmopolitanism is subject to the queries of introspective normativity as well. In this 
regard it does not necessarily assume any privileges over its counterpart penal 
imaginaries, such as the liberal approaches to imprisonment discussed in Chapter 3.  
 
Therefore it is necessary to make a distinction between two ways of making use of 
cosmopolitan insights in the custodial context. One is concerned with attempting to 
                                                                                                                                          
‘underclass’ has  largely been shaped by the policy shifts in  post-Second World War Britain; this very 
fact means that their social characteristics and discursive status must be treated particularly if an 
approach based on cosmopolitan inclusion is to achieve any meaningful goal.  
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establish substantive ideals and objectives endorsed by cosmopolitan moralists and 
reorienting institutional praxis in accordance with them; the other is mainly 
concerned with how to deal with those situations which are characterised by 
differences and pluralism which have been created by the coexistence of multiple 
substantive value systems. In short, the former primarily inherits the desire of 
modernity for a homogeneous moral horizon while the latter understands its 
normative role as less ontological and more relational: it is attempting to find a 
morally sound and feasible solution to the deeply divided normative spectrum and 
competing claims from heterogeneous traditions of values and moral visions. For 
those who advocate the latter perspective, the respect for different others is usually 
attuned to the ethics of dialogue and communication: it is not an imperative for the 
foundation of certain ontological goods, but rather a necessary substitutive approach 
to reaching a normative consensus in a world that is devoid of the prospect of any 




If we recall the examinations that we made following the route of introspective 
normativity, we will find that the latter cosmopolitan perspective, instead of the 
former, may be well suited to our task of re-normalising the imaginaries within the 
imprisonment field. As we tried to show, the peculiar normative predicament of 
incarceration is related to the impotence of the mainstream penal imaginaries to 
respond to the divided and fragmented realities in this sphere, which renders them 
vulnerable to different types of normative closure. We tried to uncover the profound 
social linkage with such nihilistic tendencies in the realm of normative performance. 
The major problem is the segregation and isolation of those disadvantaged social 
groups who constitute the main source of the imprisoned population from the general 
public and the mainstream society. To mobilise the endeavour of re-normalising the 
imaginaries of imprisonment is thus a two-fold task: on the one hand, it is necessary 
to bring reflexive light to the existing forms of penal imaginaries in order that their 
introspective normative constructions can be made open to certain distinctive and 
                                                 
14
 For example, Habermas (1999) has offered a review of the challenges within the cognitive sphere of 
morality since the absolute moral authority of religion lost its fundamental power with the ascendancy 
of the enlightenment.  In his examination of various modern approaches to providing a rational 
content for morality, he acknowledges that ethics based on discourses can best fulfil the role of 
achieving justifiable moral arrangements in the contemporary world.  
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under-recognised realities within the imprisonment field; on the other, an effort 
should be directed towards transforming the social segregation and deprivation of 
communicative actions so that the required conditions and the atmosphere necessary 
for re-inventing the penal imaginaries and actual practical patterns can be created.  In 
this perspective, cosmopolitanism is a meaningful approach in the sense that it places 
the relationship with strangers and different others at the centre of its ethical 
considerations. In this regard, the relational (instead of the ontological) cosmopolitan 
approach has managed to target the most critical part of the problematics of 
contemporary imaginaries of imprisonment.     
 
However, it is then also clear that cosmopolitanism is valued in this context mainly 
for its keen consciousness of these irreducible ‘others’ and of their fragmented moral 
universes rather than for its substantive notions about the worthwhile objectives of 
custodial institutions. To put it differently, the promising aspect of cosmopolitanism 
lies in what it can do to make the future different from the status quo of a social 
reality characterised by social segregation and the suppression of effective 
communication and mutual recognition between the mainstream society and 
disadvantaged groups. That means that the new realities envisaged by 
cosmopolitanism address the crucial social conditions that are responsible for the 
quality and improvement of the performance of introspective normativity. Such a 
contribution may thus be better seen as indirect rather than direct. For the same 
reason, we are not in a position to be able to readily describe what the specific 
prospects of the normative imprisonment sphere would be, if the cosmopolitan 
principle were to prevail in broad social relationships and in the organisation of penal 
practices, especially in terms of its cognitive element, which would have to be 
created in the concrete transformative process rather than prescribed in advance. 
 
On the other hand, the limits discussed above do not render futile our purposeful 
pursuit of a more comprehensive understanding of the cosmopolitan approach which 
would be oriented towards the actual needs in the imprisonment field and towards 
bringing corresponding changes to the mainstream forms of imaginaries. When we 
do this, we aim to figure out what concrete contents and innovative ideas such a 
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general cosmopolitan ethics can bring to our project and how it can be enriched in 
the light of introspective normativity. 
 
iii. Imagining Imprisonment in A Cosmopolitan Spirit 
 
The failure of the mainstream imaginaries of imprisonment in the respect of 
normative performance is directly associated with their inability to address the moral 
realities in the ‘lower’ social sectors: the urban poor, the unemployed and the 
‘unemployable’, teenagers and youths who have dropped out of school, the black 
community, illegal immigrants and other ethnic minorities, who have so far 
comprised the majority of the prison population. From the perspective of 
introspective normativity, the first demand in our attempt to re-normalise the 
imaginaries of imprisonment is to end their peculiar normative closure so that 
representations of different realities can be reflected in the discursive forum, and in 
the meantime to change the existing practices and relationships within the 
imprisonment field. In the foregoing studies, we have already tried to explore what 
respective strategies can be adopted by those three mainstream approaches in 
imagining incarceration as intended to serve such an objective. A cosmopolitan way 
of dealing with ‘difference’, particularly difference within the moral sphere, is very 
much in accordance with the innovative proposals hitherto discussed, and it can 
further inspire us to find some more systematic approach towards imagining 
imprisonment and organising its institutional practice.    
 
a. Ideological transformation 
 
In the ideological sphere, a cosmopolitan spirit can help us to challenge the 
conventional ways of defining the role of imprisonment in the polity and society by 
placing this issue within the broad context of encounters with strangers. In the first 
place, it urges us to suspend the assumption that the prison is, and is bound to be, an 
indispensable part of the reality of the world that we live in. As we can note from the 
investigation of those mainstream imaginaries of imprisonment, there is no shortage 
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of critical arguments about various negative aspects of imprisonment, but most of 
them are made from the standpoint of restricting the scale of imprisonment or 
remedying its detrimental consequences. However, at the ideological level, the prison 
is taken as an institution of penal power which is acquiesced in: which, although ugly, 
is required by society. In this peculiar respect, the conventional liberal approach is 
not much different from the populist views of prisons. A cosmopolitan vision, 
instead, questions whether incarceration constitute the best  approach to treating 
those problematic people, who are defined by the formal criminal justice procedure 
as lawbreakers  but whose actual outsider’s identity and whose own moral appeals  
are largely disregarded and suppressed by the official discourses about culpability, 
just desert and rehabilitation. It urges us to identify in such practices a tremendous 
form of injustice and to seek for alternative ways of addressing the issues relating to 
the maintenance of the legal and moral order of society. As many cosmopolitan 
theorists have advocated, the ethics of hospitality and respect for difference should 
guide the ideological transformation regarding the issue of imprisonment. Its focus is 
then to explore a just way of promoting unsuppressed co-existence between social 
groups whose living conditions and moral points of view are deeply divergent. This 
task will have to directly confront the current use of incarceration as a means of 
managing particular social groups rather than others and denounce it as contradictory 
to the cosmopolitan principle. Those who actually constitute ‘the others’ and 
strangers of mainstream society should be acknowledged in terms of their particular 
living experiences and moral perspectives. Their voices should be heard and 
reflected in the communal effort to strive for cosmopolitan co-existence, which will 
be able to challenge the unilaterally-determined official criminal justice discourses. 
What is favoured in these cosmopolitan prospects is more cooperation and 
communication oriented praxis in negotiating the relationship between an equally-
treated ‘us’ and ‘them’, while what is strictly monitored is the use of coercive means: 
it will not be proved if the social groups who are most affected do not get sufficient 
chances to engage in the decision making procedure.  
 
We can note that the cosmopolitan appeal is still quite general at the ideological level 
and, needless to say, there will be numerous questions which will need to be 
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answered when it is to be implemented at the practical level. As we argued in the 
previous section, the ultimate contours of a reformative scheme addressing the 
current imprisonment predicament should not be thought of as a pre-decidable matter 
but need to be worked out stage by stage in close interaction between the innovations 
within the imaginary spectrum and the transformation of existing patterns of practice. 
The particular value of the cosmopolitan vision then lies in its strength in terms of 
motivating a reconfiguration of the dominant penological ideology. To some degree, 
it shares the standpoint of prison abolitionists; but rather than being confined to a 
prison-centred type of argumentation, it seeks a holistic approach towards imagining 
the normative order pertaining to us and them, the powerful and the socially 
marginalised. On such a basis, it opens up pathways to strive for a minimised use of 
coercive and custodial measures and an expansion of diversified and innovative 
forms of justice that are in accordance with the cosmopolitan spirit.    
 
In respect of ideological guidance, we may yet need to go beyond the inclination to 
advocate a closed scheme of ‘cosmopolitan rights’ for non-citizens and ‘conditional’ 
citizens. Indeed, to guarantee that the suppressed and disadvantaged ‘others’ get 
proper legal protection is of great importance to the endeavour of correcting the 
prominent shortcomings of the current regimes that are responsible for the 
imprisonment complex. However, this should by no means be the conclusion of 
cosmopolitan imaginaries. What makes the cosmopolitan approach appealing to our 
investigation based on introspective normativity lies in its potentiality of creating the 
necessary conditions for re-normalising the ideological sphere with regard to 
incarceration. Thus, to undertake a cosmopolitan venture in the penal field, it is of 
particular significance to be sensitive and to capture the emerging forms and 
possibilities of interaction, communication and ‘action-together’ between the 
mainstream societal groups (also including the academics) and the under-recognised 
‘others’, and to seek a communal construction of normative understanding of the 
exercise of custodial power. This effort should aim at a more dynamic and ever-
innovating ideal than establishing a fixed doctrinal moral or legal system to 
guarantee tolerance for ‘strangers’.  
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What the introspective normative demands of cosmopolitan imaginaries require is in 
particular the consciousness of the undermined universal horizon of the moral 
foundations of imprisonment. This urges us to resist the temptation to speedily 
embrace or invent any universal ‘solutions’ that will turn out to be close-ended and 
which by no means reflect the complex realities of the current imprisonment field. 
On the  contrary, it encourages us to adopt a  ‘confrontation’ attitude: that is, to face 
the deprivation of universal normativity without distorting or underplaying it, and, 
while maintaining faith in the ultimate result, to accept that re-normalising the 
imprisonment sphere is a dynamic process instead of a fixed scheme that has been set 
up ready for pursuing.    
 
In sum, at the ideological level, the cosmopolitan imaginary points in the general 
direction of the de-centralisation and minimization of imprisonment in treating the 
socially marginalised and under-recognised groups and of the re-normalisation of the 
whole spectrum in the process of re-inventing social relationships and forms of inter-
communication and coexistence within a pluralistic society like the UK. 
 
b. Sentencing rationale and guidelines  
 
Apart from its ideological appeal, the cosmopolitan perspective can also inspire us to 
review some more specific aspects of the current imprisonment systems and to set up 
reformation agendas. 
 
Firstly, the judiciary practice which directly delivers the sentences of prison terms 
needs to be re-oriented in order to encompass more elements of cosmopolitanism and 
to address the particular appeal to justice from the side of the socially excluded 
others. Thus in deciding whether or what kind of custodial sentences the convicted 
should serve, the courts must go beyond the formal criminal justice rationale which 
centres on  establishing culpability and the corresponding punishment, and must go 
beyond the traditional utilitarian consideration that is based on the calculation of 
social gains related to the effects of incapacitation or rehabilitation; they should 
instead maintain the particular consciousness that those under prosecution are from 
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deeply divergent backgrounds and that to enforce a single-dimensional code of 
penalties can engender great injustice in such cases. The ‘strangers’ should be given 
appropriate opportunities to voice and engage in the procedure of determining the 
penal treatment and the reasons behind that.  
 
More crucially, the judiciary practice needs to be entirely aware of the predicament 
regarding the normative foundations underpinning the systemic imposition of 
imprisonment in the contemporary UK and should try to avoid the nihilistic traps in 
generating and applying their sentencing guidelines. This means that the criminal 
judiciary should recognise that non-reflexive adherence to the established routines of 
sentencing practice and the working ethics of ‘insofar as  we do what is required by 
criminal law and legislation, our sentences are justified’ could not stand as an 
unassailable choice before the examination of introspective normativity. It would 
turn out to be detached from the troubling realities in the imprisonment sphere and in 
turn might result in further consolidation of the nihilistic dilemma in the field.  
 
To recognise the deficiencies in universal normativity has a particular bearing on the 
judiciary’s decision-making regarding the delivering of the sentence of imprisonment. 
It does not only lead to a mentality of moderation and cautiousness, but also tends to 
promote an innovative and experimental spirit: those sentences which are less 
constrained and which involve better potential to benefit the interaction and action-
together of  those custodial-targeted groups and the mainstream society should take a 
more prominent role within the criminal justice scheme. As we mentioned in the 
preceding discussions of  the innovative direction of populist imaginaries, a variety 
of occasions can be created and employed to enhance the understanding and 
inclusion of ‘strangers’. The judicial guidelines may prioritise options outside prison, 
as there will be better chances of achieving these goals than behind bars. Community 
service and various forms of restorative justice, for example, can function well or can 
easily be adjusted to produce an interactive space that is vital to the prospects of re-
normalised imprisonment imaginaries and praxis.  
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c. Incarceration settings  
 
Whereas the major concern of the cosmopolitan approach is connected with re-
orienting the ideological significance of imprisonment and redefining its role within 
the contemporary pluralistic social context, it also sees the importance of reforming 
the existing settings where hundreds of thousands of prisoners are detained at the 
present time. However, in this respect, its goal is not any type of ‘model prison’ or 
‘ideal prison’, as the essence of systemically imposed incarceration and 
incapacitation (which remains in even the most thoughtful prisons) can hardly accord 
with the ultimate cosmopolitan aspiration of a world in which ‘strangers’ are 
included in an embracing hospitality and their ‘differences’ are respected or at least 
tolerated. The idea of imposing restrictions on basic liberty, despite consideration of 
all the possible justifications, should be recognised as intrinsically heterogeneous to 
the cosmopolitan value of being open and hospitable to the others even if that is 
never risk free.
15
 Thus any reformative initiative must be advanced with a peculiar 
consciousness of its ‘incompleteness’: that its effective implementation will not form 
the ultimate end in itself but will be the start for the undertakings of the next stage. 
 
Secondly, the cosmopolitan perspective requires that prison reformation schemes to 
incorporate strategies which aim at generating an appropriate interactive space for 
the social and discursive connections between groups of inmates and the general 
public. The existing prison reform programmes are often dominated by utilitarian 
designs (the management of re-offending risks, rehabilitative effects, fiscal factors, 
etc.) or by human rights and humanitarian considerations (hygiene and diet 
conditions, medical care and educational opportunities, prisoners’ right to vote, etc.). 
In the cosmopolitan vision, the conventional reform agendas are seen to fail to 
recognise the importance of making prison settings into a site for normative 
innovation that is responsive to the consciousness of ‘incompleteness’. Such 
innovative potentialities would be dismissed if prisons were organised as entirely 
closed institutions. The maintenance of adequate connection and interaction between 
the inmates, the community and the general public is significant for achieving a non-
                                                 
15
 See Derrida’s (2001) interpretation of the unconditional dimension of hospitality.  
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demonised view of the strangers and is vital to envisaging a future of re-normalised 
understanding and consensus building with regard to the use of custodial measures.  
 
A variety of strategies can be adopted to serve such an end. As we mentioned in the 
discussion of renormalized mainstream penal imaginaries, there are already some 
innovative and experimental programmes that are being carried out in certain prisons 
in the UK. One of the preeminent examples is the prisoner’s art project.
16
 The crucial 
point is that there should be more experiments within this realm so that effective 
means to promote communication and action-together between prisoners and the 
society can be identified and systemically incorporated into the prison settings.  
 
d. Community and societal transformation 
 
It is also worthwhile to emphasise the point that there is no ‘cosmopolitan penal 
policy’ or ‘cosmopolitan prison policy’ per se, for in nature the cosmopolitan 
approach is first of all concerned with the desirable characteristics of the socio-
political relations existing within the pluralistic world that we inhabit. A 
‘cosmopolitan turn’ facilitated within a broad community and societal spectrum 
would turn out to be more fundamental than any progressive policy changes inside 
custodial institutions in terms of confronting the normative as well as practical 
predicament in the contemporary imprisonment field.  
 
In this respect, the central objective of a cosmopolitan social policy is to identify the 
various barriers, especially those that are structurally produced, of free and effective 
communication between different social groups (the mainstream and the 
marginalised) and to find pertinent means to remove or at least to remedy them. It is 
worth noting that this task does not only require effort to reveal the existing social 
pathologies that are responsible for the social and discursive segregation of different 
groups of ‘strangers’, but also experiments in terms of innovative tactics to  promote 
                                                 
16
 See Lyn Tett et al. (2012)’s documentation and analysis of an art project in Scottish prisons. Also 
see the discussion in the previous section of the re-normalising of the mainstream imaginaries of 
imprisonment.  
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the reconfiguration of the partially constructed discursive and imaginary forum itself. 
For example, there is a rich body of research which uncovers the linkage between 
socio-economic inequality and the different forms of discursive power and which, 
specifically, illuminates the impact of the post-welfarist politics and social changes 
on the circumstances and discursive status of the lower-class population in the UK 
(e.g. Wacquant, 2009a & 2009b; Morris, 1994; Field, 1989). The cosmopolitan 
approach agrees that such structural and political causes of discursive disparity need 
to be addressed and that the achievement of a desirable social order of unsuppressed 
intercommunication depends crucially on the de-marginalisation of the poor and the 
unemployed social sections in terms of their economic status. But, in the meantime, 
it should also view the current circumstances as opportunities as well of stimulating 
innovative forms of interaction and dialogue. The ‘alternatives’, such as independent 
film-making, stand-up comedy performance, protests of the new ‘commons’ and so 
on, have already been practiced in various  spheres and in effect constitute challenges 
to the normative closure of the mainstream imaginaries in the contemporary social 
and economic order.
17
  They signify the possibility that the efforts made to renew the 
ideological routines of mainstream society can actively participate in the process of 
promoting a more equal and less segregated social atmosphere. This also means that 
there are a wide range of strategies, which are by no means confined to the 
government’s social policies, of facilitating community and societal transformation 
that might lead in a more cosmopolitan-favouring direction.  
 
It is noteworthy that such prospects cannot be exhausted by any static schemes or 
predictions, for they do not aim at a lifeless equalitarianism but a colourful 
coexistence of differences and a dynamic inclusion of diversity and plurality. To 
achieve such objectives, the internal structure of many of the contemporary gated 
communities and of the mainstream society, as well as their ways of connecting with 
the excluded social sectors, will have to be transformed in the meantime by the 
prevalence of the cosmopolitan style of consciousness and imaginaries. Under such 
circumstances, we can expect the emergence of a revitalised normative consensus 
across society with regard to the use of coercive powers such as imprisonment.    
                                                 
17
 See the discussion of Campbell (2011) on the implications of stand-up comedies in the post-9/11 
context, and also see Žižek’s (2010) speech delivered at Wall Street. 
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 iv. Discussion  
 
From the above discussion we may be able to form a general idea of how an enriched 
cosmopolitan imaginary might respond to the challenges within the current 
imprisonment field in the UK. We may also note that this attempt is not oriented 
towards offering a comprehensive paradigm as a substantive substitute for the 
mainstream imaginaries of imprisonment examined in the last three chapters, but 
instead focuses on the pathways towards improvement, with a view to overcoming 
the limits of closed normativity and creating and maintaining a dynamic sphere for 
normative innovation in the field.  
 
Thus the cosmopolitan imaginary of imprisonment is better described as one with an 
inviting spirit: it is sensitive to the fact that the contemporary normative spectrum 
underlying custodial practice is fundamentally divided and fragmented, yet it rejects 
the nihilistic approaches to coming to terms with it, such as the detachment and 
oblivion patterns that we observed in the current mainstream forms of imaginaries. 
Instead it undertakes the task of confronting the normative vacuum within the 
imprisonment sphere and keeping this particular awareness of ‘incompleteness’ in 
the endeavour of re-normalising the imaginaries of imprisonment. Thus,  unlike the 
moral reconstruction project as interpreted by Durkheim, our pursuit of the re-
normalising of the custodial sphere can no longer rely on a homogenous approach to 
the acquiring or reviving of one single normative paradigm and using it to settle the 
dilemmas of imprisonment once and for all. It is a task which must be carried out in 
the communicative ‘action-together’ of actors who are from divergent traditions and 
backgrounds. Accordingly, the focus of the performance of introspective normative 
analysis then needs to shift from that of rationalising and re-establishing the moral 
content of shared religious traditions in a secular moral education project to making 
the best of the ‘encounter with strangers’ and seeking normative insights from 
interaction and dialogue with the moral ‘others’. This thus determines that the 
cosmopolitan perspective that we advocate is a dynamic one which is open to 
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innovative possibilities in the light of normative performance within the 




Based on the framework of introspective normativity, our investigation into the 
contemporary imaginaries of imprisonment should be considered as an ongoing 
undertaking which is open to continuous changes and innovations in the penal 
imaginary spectrum. Nevertheless, it is helpful to sum up what this thesis has 
accomplished so far and to identify its key findings at the present stage.    
 
As we try to demonstrate in the first chapter, our research project is motivated by the 
aspiration for meeting the normative challenges in the contemporary imprisonment 
field in the UK, which is characterised by the decline of universal normativity and 
the fragmentation of heterogeneous post-welfarist approaches. We find that the 
traditional ways of promoting the normative understanding of imprisonment - the 
‘normativist’ approach and the sociology of punishment - involve crucial limitations 
in fulfilling such a task. They either adopt an orthodox approach to prescribing 
certain specific normative visions to a deeply pluralistic discursive spectrum, or seek 
to avoid direct normative engagement. And both of the methodological perspectives 
are beset by the dichotomy between the normative sphere and the factual sphere. In 
those cases, the predicament concerning the decline of universal normativity in the 
imprisonment field cannot be addressed pertinently.    
 
Our alternative methodological framework has been developed with a view to 
overcoming such limitations and making fruitful the task of doing the normative in 
the contemporary imprisonment field. It is mainly a hermeneutic approach which is 
centred on the concept of introspective normativity. In Chapter 2, we have showed 
how the key elements of this methodological perspective are established. Durkheim’s 
methodological insights, particularly those relating to his social-historical hermetical 
approach, have provided the major inspirations and theoretical basis for the 
construction of our methodological framework. The chief merit of Durkheim’s 
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social-historical hermetical approach, as we have interpreted and analysed in Chapter 
2, is that it illuminates a pathway to the bridging of the scientific study of norms and 
the pursuit of moral construction in modern society. In this regard, it has the 
advantage over the normativist approach and the positivist approach. And our 
analysis also shows that Durkheim’s methodological insights and their merit are not 
necessarily bound up with his own project of moral reconstruction, but that they can 
be modified to apply to a post-universalist context. For this reason, we take 
Durkheim’s work as the key methodological sources for our research project.  
 
Based on the interpretation and reconstruction of Durkheim’s social-historical 
hermeneutical approach, we have developed our own research framework which is 
centred on the idea of introspective normativity. It is designed particularly to meet 
the needs for addressing the normative dimensions of post-welfarist imprisonment 
and responding to the predicament relating to the decline of universal normativity in 
the field. Like Durkheim’s social-historical hermeneutics, our methodological 
scheme seeks to overcome the limits of the dichotomy between the factual and the 
normative and to pursue an integral inquiry of the reality exposure and the normative 
innovation. At the same time, because it is mainly designed to address a post-
universalist imprisonment context, it has its own analytic focuses and objectives that 
are different from those of Durkheim’s moral reconstruction project. Instead of 
aiming to establish any new essentialist universal paradigm for custodial practices, it 
is oriented towards analysing diverse types of the contemporary imaginaries of 
imprisonment in terms of their performances of introspective normativity and 
uncovering their particular nihilistic/innovative tendencies in those respective cases. 
And it primary concern is to improve the normative performances of imaginaries of 
imprisonment in a post-universalist context so that the normative enterprise in the 
field can be pushed forth towards a healthy direction.  
 
Following the elaboration of our methodological framework, we examined three 
representative types of imaginaries of imprisonment (from Chapter 3 to Chapter 5). 
The major findings of our examination have already been summarised in an earlier 
section (Section II) of this chapter. On the basis of these findings, we have also 
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achieved a general evaluation of the normative performances of the post-welfarist 
imaginaries of imprisonment in the UK. It shows that the peculiar tendency of 
‘escaping from being normative’ is immanent in a number of contemporary 
imaginaries of imprisonment (despite their innovative potentials in various cases). In 
terms of the performance of introspective normativity, it is a problem of normative 
closure or penal nihilism.  
 
Our examination also suggests that the problem of normative closure is tied up with 
the problem of social segregation which occurs at various levels in contemporary 
society of the UK and which has resulted in the suppression of differences and 
plurality in the penal-discursive realm and, accordingly, in the constraint upon 
normative innovation. We conclude that the re-normalising of the imaginaries of 
imprisonment needs to be pursued in tandem with the de-segregating of the custody-
targeted social groups and with the promotion of effective social interactions and 
‘action together’ across different social sectors.  
 
In response to the problem of normative closure and to the need for normative 
innovation in the post-welfarist imprisonment field, we advocate a cosmopolitan 
approach, which places at its heart openness towards diversity and plurality, 
hospitality to ‘strangers’ and inclusion of the ‘others’.  And we propose that such an 
approach can help to reject the normative closure that is implied in those mainstream 
types of imaginaries of imprisonment as we have examined, and that they can 
contribute to the task of re-normalising the contemporary penal imaginary sphere in a 
constructive way. In this case, it does not aim to reveal any universal ideal of 
imprisonment, but seeks to nurture a peculiar consciousness which is keen to detect 
the counterproductive approaches to imagining imprisonment and to prepare the 
necessary conditions and premises of normative innovation in the imprisonment field. 
Under this cosmopolitan perspective, we may not be able to acquire immediate 
answers to all the questions with regard to incarceration, but we can envisage a wide 









These are the social imaginaries in terms of which penal phenomena are conceived 
and comprehended. In the context of our research, they consist of three 
interconnected dimensions: firstly, the cognitive dimension, which refer to the 
categories, concepts, metaphors and theories that are employed in them which give 
meaning to penal practices and penal relations; secondly, the socially realistic 
dimension, which means that the penal imaginaries are not abstract or static notions 
and ideas, but active forces that  enable the practices and shape the realities in the 
penal domain; thirdly, the normative dimension, which means that penal imaginaries 
imply deeper normative notions and presumptions about the purposes and 
significances of penal practices and that they also imply various mechanisms and 
tactics to establish the validity of their respective normative claims and perspectives.   
 
 
Normative Performances of Penal Imaginaries 
 
These refer to the ways in which different approaches in the penal imaginaries 
establish the validity of their respective normative claims in relation to specific penal 
issues as well as their general penological perspectives. In the context of our research, 
the decline of universal normativity within the imprisonment field is considered as 
presenting a major challenge to the contemporary penal imaginaries in terms of their 






This is related to the allegiance to certain universal ideals for arranging the practices 
in a given domain of society. In the context of our research, we mainly use the term 
to refer to the faith in a holistic scheme of organising the practices of imprisonment, 
which is usually underpinned by a specific vision of good society.     
 
In the thesis, we link the status quo of imprisonment in the UK with the decline of 
universal normativity in the field on the basis that the faith in a holistic solution to 
imprisonment has observably been fading since the downfall of penal welfarism. 
And this is viewed by us as providing a crucial context for the normative 
performances of imaginaries of imprisonment, because under such circumstances 
they can no longer depend on a viable universal orthodox system to validate their 
respective normative claims, but they have to resort to the performance of 
introspective normativity to establish their validity in relation to competing forms of 




This is related to the particular performances of penal imaginaries in symbolising the 
post-universalist penal realities and constructing their distinctive normative visions 
of imprisonment. It concerns how, without the backing of any conventional penal 
ideological beliefs and in some cases in the absence of any essential allegiance to 
such belief systems’ desirability, the validity of differential normative claims gets 
established in their respective forms of penal imaginaries.  
 
The hermeneutic examination based on this idea seeks to shed light on whether and 
to what extent certain particular type of imaginaries of imprisonment can manage to 
assume the normative role which the traditional universalist penal ideologies used to 
play. By exposing that, it helps us to detect the innovative as well as the 
counterproductive tendencies within the normative performances of those 
imaginaries, and accordingly it helps us to advance the normative endeavour within 




Ideal Types of Introspective Normativity 
 
These involve the abstraction of distinctive patterns of the performance of 
introspective normativity in ideal cases. They are used to specify the particular ways 
in which different types of penal imaginaries seek to establish their respective 
normative visions and validate their normative claims under post-universalist 
conditions. Our research mainly involves four such ideal types, including detachment, 
oblivion, confrontation and transformation (a full elaboration of them is given in 
Chapter 2 (III.iii.d)). Because they are deeply indicative of the nihilistic/innovative 
tendencies of the normative performance of penal imaginaries in dealing with the 
predicament of the decline of universal normativity, they are applied in our thesis as 
an analytic-evaluative instrument to unpack a variety of concrete types of 
imaginaries of imprisonment.  
 
 
Penal Nihilism  
 
This refers to the counterproductive tendency existing within penal imaginaries, in 
terms of their performances of introspective normativity, which result in the arbitrary 
exclusion of diverse competing perspectives within the imprisonment field and in the 
restriction of their own prospects of normative innovation. It amounts to the 
imposition of closure on the normative performance of penal imaginaries. The two 
ideal types of introspective normativity – detachment and oblivion – are viewed by 





In opposition to penal nihilism, normative innovation stands for the inclusive and 
innovative tendencies of penal imaginaries in terms of their performances of 
introspective normativity. In the context of our research, this represents the 
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innovative endeavour to meet the challenge of the decline of universal normativity 





The complex of the praxis and the ideologies that which dominated the penal spheres 
in the UK and the US in the post-World War II era and which declined in both these 
countries during the 1970s amid intense criticisms of the effectiveness of its 
functioning and of its underlying philosophy.  Penal wefarism is characterised by its 
commitment to individualised rehabilitation, penal expertise, welfare and integration 
of offenders. In the context of our research, it represents the latest (if not the last) 




This refers to those systems of ideas which place the relationship with ‘strangers’ at 
the centre of their concerns. There are diverse cosmopolitan approaches; our research 
mainly links a particular strand of cosmopolitan ideas to the normative performance 
of imaginaries of imprisonment. It is one which advocates the embrace of differences, 
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